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Abstract 
 
This PhD thesis comprises three empirical studies relating to the phenomenon of market 
switches in the UK and more specifically the moves from the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) to the Main Market (MM) and vice versa. The AIM is a secondary, light and exchange 
regulated market and the MM is a main and traditional regulated market. The markets have 
several eligibility and ongoing regulatory differences between them. The main scope of the 
AIM is to act as the stepping stone to the MM and to attract small and high growth firms that 
cannot join the MM due its strict eligibility criteria. However, it has rapidly started to attract 
many firms from all over the world as well as from the MM gaining its own identity and 
reputation. AIM’s success in attracting a large number of firms, spawned the creation of 
similar markets across the world, while it attracted interest from regulators in considering 
the establishment of decentralised regulatory markets in other countries. Some recent 
examples include the launch of the AIM Italia in 2008 and the Tokyo Pro Market (formerly 
known as Tokyo AIM) in 2009. 
The first empirical chapter tests the information leakage hypothesis and explores whether 
firms experience abnormal stock price reactions prior to the announcement of the move from 
the AIM (a light regulated market) to the MM (a traditional regulated market) and vice versa. 
By examining 406 moves between the two markets from 1996 to 2015, I find evidence of 
abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading volume prior to the announcement of the 
switches, after controlling for rumours through media coverage and other major corporate 
announcements. More specifically, I find price reductions and increases in trading volume 
for the firms that move from the MM to the AIM, a move which is characterised as a market 
downgrade. On the contrary, I find price run ups and increases in trading volume for the 
firms that move from the AIM to the MM, a move which is deemed as a market upgrade. 
The abnormal stock returns on both events remain statistically significant after matching the 
sample firms with similar firms that did not switch markets during the same period. I further 
find a significant and contemporaneous relation between the abnormal stock returns and the 
abnormal trading volume, in line with the information leakage hypothesis. 
The second empirical chapter investigates whether corporate insiders trade on their own 
personal accounts in order to generate profit from the abnormal stock returns triggered from 
the market switches. I examine insider trading activity in 352 firms that move between the 
two markets during the period of 1999-2015. Using time series, cross sectional and 
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difference in differences tests, I find abnormal insider trading activity on both events. In 
particular, I find increases in corporate insider sales and decreases in corporate insider 
purchases which translates to significant decreases in corporate insider net purchases six 
months prior to the official announcement of the switch from the MM to the AIM. In 
addition, I find insignificant increases in corporate insider purchases and significant 
decreases in corporate insider sales which results in significant decreases in corporate insider 
net purchases one year prior to the announcement of the move from the AIM to the MM. 
The third empirical chapter explores whether reputable Nominated Advisers (Nomads), 
firms which are the regulatory body and trading monitor of the AIM, could play a role in 
reducing the levels of abnormal stock price activities that are documented in the first 
empirical chapter. By creating a reputation ranking composite variable using five different 
measures, I find that reputable Nomads reduce the abnormal stock price reactions 60 trading 
days prior to the announcement of the switches on both events from 1996 to 2015. However, 
the reductions decrease or even diminish when reputable Nomads simultaneously act as 
brokers in the respective firms, raising concerns as to whether the Nomads take the necessary 
safeguards in order to avoid any potential conflict of interest that might arise by having duties 
of two different roles within the same firm. The results are qualitatively similar after 
controlling for different ranking benchmarks. 
In summary, the main findings of this thesis suggest that informed investors and corporate 
insiders take advantage of the private information they possess prior to market switches 
between a light regulated market and a traditional regulated market in order to generate 
profit. However, I argue that quality and reputable regulators/advisors can mitigate this 
effect by reducing the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. The results 
can be of interest to academics as I introduce a new corporate event in the information 
leakage and insider trading literature as well as to policy makers and to regulators as I point 
to a new direction which lacks focus. Finally, the results can benefit investors as they can 
potentially avoid market abusive behaviours during these events. 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation of the study 
Corporate insiders usually have access to more information about the future plans of their 
firms than outside investors and market analysts which might not be manifested to the firm’s 
stock price (Eckbo and Smith, 1998). In the UK, insiders are considered to be the directors 
of a firm, the executives and any individual that has the power to make managerial decisions, 
also known as Persons Discharging Managerial Responsibility (PDMRs) as well as their 
connected persons. According to Section 118 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000 (FSMA), firm insiders as well as any other individuals are strictly prohibited to trade 
when in possession of price sensitive information. The regulators are responsible to ensure 
that investors do not violate these rules as well as to reduce financial crime in the markets. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for example, states that “Insider trading 
continues to be a high priority area for the SEC's enforcement program”1. However, 
distinguishing between legitimate informed trading and manipulative trading, along with 
convicting an individual for insider dealing or even proving insider trading is difficult 
(Fischel and Ross, 1991). As stated by Chris Hamilton, a spokesman of the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA), “Insider trading cases are extremely complex and are therefore 
often time consuming” (Wall Street Journal, 4 January 2014).  
Prior literature has well documented that corporate insiders earn abnormal stock returns 
several months after their trades, outperforming the market both in the US and in the UK 
(e.g., Jaffe, 1974; Finnetry, 1976; Seyhun, 1986; Pope et al., 1990; Lakonishok and Lee, 
2001; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). In addition, studies report that often insiders use their 
information advantage in order to generate profit by either actively or passively trading 
(refrain from trading) on their own private accounts prior to major regulatory news 
announcements (Korczak et al., 2010) or prior to announcements of major corporate events, 
such as new issue announcements (Karpoff and Lee, 1991; Kahle, 2000), leveraged buyouts 
(Harlow and Howe, 1993), real estate investment appraisals (Damodaran and Liu, 1993) and 
takeovers (Agrawal and Nasser, 2012). Another method that insiders use, is trading through 
other investors or selling private information for a price in order to escape detection (Keown 
and Pinkerton, 1981), a technique which is known as leaking information to the market or 
the information leakage hypothesis. Several studies illustrate price run-ups and abnormal 
                                                 
1 http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/insidertrading/cases.shtml 
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trading volume many days prior to tender offers (Eyssell and Arshadi, 1993) and takeovers 
(Jabbour et al., 2000; King, 2009; Siganos and Papa, 2015), confirming the existence of 
information leakage prior to major corporate events. The price run-ups are typically 
generated as informed trading generally drives prices in the direction consistent with the 
price sensitive information, reflecting and incorporating that private information into stock 
prices (Kyle and Viswanathan, 2008). 
In an attempt to measure the insider trading activity in the UK markets, the FCA (formerly 
known as Financial Service Authority or FSA) has introduced in their annual reports the 
“market cleanliness statistic” which constitutes an indicator that reports whether the markets 
are clean from market abusive behaviours and insider trading (Dubow and Monteiro, 2006; 
Monteiro, 2007; Goldman et al., 2014). This statistic essentially examines abnormal stock 
price reactions two days prior to major trading announcements and takeovers that take place 
on firms included in the FTSE 350. However, the results of the statistics are extrapolated for 
the entire London Stock Exchange (LSE) markets, creating concerns over the coverage of 
this measure2. In addition, approximately 70% of the criminal sanctions related to insider 
trading in the UK between 2009 and 2016 are due to insider dealing prior to takeovers3, 
indicating that the UK regulators put a significant amount of their efforts on takeovers4 
(some examples of insider dealing cases in the UK are presented in Appendix 1). 
So far, both the literature and regulators focus mostly on takeovers or other famous (and 
notorious for insider trading) corporate events when they attempt to measure or examine 
insider trading activities. Albeit takeovers are events widely known to greatly affect stock 
valuations (Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989a; Servaes, 1991; Kaplan and Weisbach, 1992), this 
behaviour and centred attention could leave space for insiders to engage in market abusive 
activities in other less popular but equally profitable corporate events. A recent event that 
has been reported to exhibit abnormal announcement stock returns is the UK market 
switches, and more specifically the switches between the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM), a light and decentralised regulated market, and the Main Market (MM), a traditional 
regulated market. A move from the MM to the AIM is characterised as negative news and a 
                                                 
2 The FCA recognises the weakness of the “market cleanliness statistic” in their Annual Report and 
Accounts 2017/18 and report that they intend to create additional indicators to better evaluate market 
cleanliness in the UK markets. 
3 A total of 12 cases out of the 17 are related to insider trading prior to takeovers. The other cases 
were related to market moving purchases, forthcoming transactions and joint ventures among others. 
4 In a similar vein, the US studies report a high percentage of illegal insider trading cases prosecuted 
by the SEC based on takeovers. For example, 51% of Ahern (2017) and approximately 80% of  
Meulbroek (1992) samples of illegal insider trading prosecuted by the SEC are prior to takeovers. 
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market downgrade, triggering negative abnormal announcement stock returns while a move 
from the AIM to the MM is considered to be positive news and a market upgrade, triggering 
positive abnormal announcement stock returns (Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2013; Campbell 
and Tabner, 2014). The abnormal announcement stock returns of the market switches could 
create incentives for investors and insiders to engage in market abusive techniques in order 
to generate a quick profit by trading on the information of the forthcoming firm transition 
between the two markets. Hence, this thesis strives to examine whether corporate insider or 
other investors take advantage of their information privilege by leaking inside information 
or by engaging in insider trading prior the public announcement of these events during the 
period of 1996-2015. 
The UK provides two listing choices in order to facilitate the different needs that 
companies may have. The first listing option is the MM, the oldest and prestigious UK 
market that attracts medium and large firms that are already fully developed. A listing in the 
MM provides a large and knowledgeable investor pool as well as prestige to the listed firms. 
However, a listing in the MM also requires commitment to its strict regulatory standards 
(London Stock Exchange, 2010). The second listing option is the AIM, which was 
established in 1995 in order to attract small and high growth firms in need of finance. Hence, 
firms that could not join a traditional regulated market such as the MM due to its high 
admission, annual and compliance costs would prefer to choose another option such as the 
AIM (London Stock Exchange, 2015b). The AIM is a light regulated market, with minimum 
eligibility criteria and ongoing obligations. Initially, it was considered to be a stepping stone 
to the MM. However, it rapidly started to attract numerous firms from all over the world as 
well as from the MM (Michie 1999, p. 614-636). 
The AIM and the MM have many regulatory differences between them, both on the 
eligibility criteria and on the ongoing obligations. For instance, the admission criteria for the 
MM are stricter, imposing a minimum percentage of float of 25%, a minimum of three years 
of audited financial statements prior to the admission to the market and a minimum market 
capitalisation of £700,000. In contrast, in the AIM there are no minimum entry criteria. In 
addition, the two markets function under different corporate governance rules. The MM 
listed firms have to “comply or explain” to the UK corporate governance code while the 
AIM listed firms just have to disclose whether they follow any corporate governance code. 
Finally, the AIM firms are not obliged to create an “insiders list” while for the MM firms 
this is mandatory. The “insiders list” documents all individuals who are considered to be 
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insiders in the firm, providing confidence to the market on who might have access to 
privileged information (London Stock Exchange, 2010; 2012; 2015b).  
However, the uniqueness of the AIM lies in its regulatory nature. It has a decentralised 
regulatory system which is called Nominated Advisers (Nomads), firms which are 
responsible not only to regulate the AIM listed firms but also to advise and guide them during 
their entire lifetime in the market. The Nomad firms are also held accountable to oversee the 
trading activities of the AIM securities that they are responsible for, especially when there 
is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to these companies. The Nomads are 
also responsible for sustaining the integrity and stability of the entire AIM. The selection of 
Nomads is conducted by the LSE and takes into account several criteria, among them is the 
general reputation of the Nomad firms (London Stock Exchange, 2014a; 2015a; b). 
Reputable Nomads are deemed to increase the survivability rates of the AIM firms 
(Espenlaub et al., 2012) while Nomads that provide effective oversight are reported to reduce 
the post listing underperformance of the firms they supervise (Gerakos et al., 2013). Thus, 
this thesis also analyses whether reputable Nomads, measured by the market share, can 
moderate any abnormal market reactions prior to the official announcement of the market 
movements between the AIM and the MM. 
The UK offers a unique environment for the analysis of potential market abusive 
behaviours prior to market switches between a light regulated market and a traditional 
regulated market, as the AIM features one of the most popular secondary markets in the 
world (Doukas and Hoque, 2016). AIM’s success has spawned the establishment of several 
secondary markets that follow similar principles and regulatory features as the AIM5. In the 
European Union (EU) such markets are also known as Multilateral Trading Facilities (MTF). 
Apart from the European and Asian countries, the US shows an increasing interest in the 
secondary markets with the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012 being the 
                                                 
5 Some examples of the markets that were created following the success of the AIM are the Euronext 
Growth (formerly known as Alternext) which was established in 2005 and operates in Belgium, 
France and Portugal, the NewConnect which was launched in 2007 and operates in Poland, the AIM 
Italia which was launched in 2008 and operates in Italy, the Mercado Alternativo launched which 
was launched in 2008 and operates in Spain, the Bratislava Stock Exchange MTF which was 
launched in 2008 and operates in Slovakia, the First North, NASDAQ’S European growth market 
for Nordic countries launched in 2008 and operates in Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Sweden, the 
Boerse Berlin-Freiverkehr which was launched in 2008 and operates in Germany and the Tokyo Pro 
Market (formerly known as Tokyo AIM) which was launched in 2009 and operates Japan among 
others. 
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first step towards that direction6. In addition, there have recently been several discussions 
considering the benefits and drawbacks as well as the implementation of a secondary market 
in the US7. Market switches are thus of international interest. Examining the two UK 
markets, with the longest sample period possible, can contribute to the relevant discussion 
regarding potential insider trading and information leakages. 
1.2 Research questions  
Following the previous discussion, this study strives to answer the following research 
questions: 
1. Do firms experience abnormal stock price and trading volume activities several days 
prior to the announcement of the market switches between a light regulated market 
(the AIM) and a traditional regulated market (the MM) which could be potentially 
linked to leakage of inside information? 
2. Do corporate insiders trade on their own personal accounts in order to generate profit 
from the abnormal announcement stock returns generated by the market switches 
between the AIM and the MM? 
3. Do reputable Nomads offer higher regulatory and better quality services by 
mitigating potential abnormal trading patterns compared to their non reputable 
counterparts? 
1.3 Methodology and key findings of the study 
This thesis provides evidence of abnormal trading activities prior to the public 
announcement of the switches between the AIM and the MM. In order to assess the stock 
returns for potential price run patterns, I measure the abnormal stock returns following a 
standard event study methodology. I employ an OLS market model following Brown and 
Warner (1985) and the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) following Barber and 
Lyon (1997). I find evidence of abnormal stock returns prior to the official announcement 
                                                 
6 The JOBS Act of 2012 effectively reduces the burdens of small firms that seek capital by exempting 
them from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 
7 Some examples are the public statement from Luis Aguilar on March 2015, Commissioner at the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, on the need for greater secondary market liquidity for 
small businesses (https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/need-for-greater-secondary-market-
liquidity-for-small-businesses.html#_edn33), the testimony from Stephen Luparello on  March 2015, 
former Director of the Division of Trading and Markets, on venture exchanges and small-cap 
companies (https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-venture-exchanges.html) as well as the 
white paper from the CFA Institute in May 2016 with the title “United States Venture Exchange: Has 
the Time Come?” (https://www.cfainstitute.org/-/media/documents/article/position-paper/united-
states-venture-market.ashx). 
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of the switches between the two UK markets. In addition, as the existence of abnormal 
trading volume constitutes a reason for further investigation over potential price 
manipulation (Bris, 2005), I measure the trading volume using two different methods. I 
employ a conservative abnormal trading volume model following Bris (2005) and the 
average mean adjusted trading volume model following Chae (2005). I find evidence of 
abnormal trading volume activities prior to the switches from the AIM to the MM and from 
the MM to the AIM. More specifically, I find price run-ups of approximately 6% and 
abnormal trading volume of about 3.5%, 60 trading days prior to the public announcement 
of the switches from the AIM to the MM and stock price reductions of circa -4% and 
abnormal trading volume of 3.5%, 60 trading days prior to the official announcement of the 
moves from the MM to the AIM.  
In order to control for other factors that might trigger abnormal activities prior to the 
announcements of the events, I hand collect any rumours and other major corporate 
announcements (e.g. takeovers, mergers, annual results, half year results) prior to the market 
switching events. The results report that rumours and other major corporate events can only 
partly explain these abnormal stock patterns, with a significant percentage of abnormal stock 
returns being unexplained in line with the information leakage hypothesis. In addition, I find 
a contemporaneous relation between abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading volume 
60 trading days prior to the official announcement on both moves, which is also a sign of 
leakage of information. Furthermore, after matching the firms that switch markets with a 
sample of similar size, value, year and industry characteristics firms that did not switch 
markets during the same period, I find that the switching firms experience significantly 
higher or lower stock returns, depending on the switch, compared to the control firms’ 
sample. The results are in line with prior studies that examine potential leakage of inside 
information prior to takeovers in the US (Eyssell and Arshadi, 1993), in Canada (Jabbour et 
al., 2000; King, 2009) and in the UK (Holland and Hodgkinson, 1994; Siganos and Papa, 
2015). 
In addition to assessing the stock price and trading volume patterns ahead of the market 
moves, this study provides evidence of abnormal disclosed corporate insider trading 
activities several months prior to the public announcement of the switches between the AIM 
and the MM. Since there is evidence of information leakage prior to the market switches, an 
examination of corporate insiders’ behaviour provides further insight over potential market 
abusive behaviours around these events. I separately examine corporate insider purchases, 
sales and net purchases using three different insider trading measurements (the amount of 
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insider trades, the amount of shares traded and the value of shares traded) following Agrawal 
and Nasser (2012). By using a time series, a cross sectional and a difference in difference 
(DiD) methodology, I find that corporate insiders change their trading strategies ahead of 
both market switches. Specifically, I find insiders to significantly increase their sales and 
decrease their purchases, resulting in significant decreases in net purchases (measured as 
purchases minus sales) six months prior the announcement of the moves from the MM to 
the AIM in line with the active insider trading hypothesis. In addition, I find a significant 
increase in net purchases one year prior to the announcement of the switches from the AIM 
to the MM. However, the results for the latter event appear to be weaker, a finding which 
could be explained by the fact that the AIM firms are under no obligation to create an insider 
list, which could lead to missing disclosed insider trades. The results of the disclosed insider 
trading tests are similar with previous literature on other major corporate events or 
announcements (e.g. John and Larry, 1991; Karpoff and Lee, 1991; Kahle, 2000; Agrawal 
and Nasser, 2012, Agrawal and Cooper, 2015) providing evidence that the market switches 
constitute an event that requires further regulatory attention. 
Finally, this study reports evidence of the regulatory quality offered by reputable Nomads. 
In order to measure the reputation of Nomads, I follow a ranking methodology similar to the 
one used in Bushman et al. (2004) and Espenlaub et al. (2012), using a composite variable 
ranking method which takes into account the unweighted average of five different 
measurements. The measures used are (i) the Nomads market share in terms of new issues 
in the year prior to the switch, (ii) the cumulative Nomads market shares in terms of new 
issues in the years prior to the switch, (iii) the Nomads market share in terms of proceeds a 
Nomad backed in the year before the firm market switch, (iv) the cumulative market share 
in terms of proceeds a Nomad backed in the years before the firm market switch and (v) the 
Nomads age in the year prior to the switch. The market share measurement as a proxy for 
reputation and advisor quality is well-established in literature (e.g. Megginson and Weiss, 
1991; Rau, 2000; Kale et al., 2003; Ismail, 2010) while the age of the Nomads prior to the 
switches, proxies for the overall experience and stability of the firm (Espenlaub et al., 2012). 
The ranking is performed on a yearly basis and reputable Nomads are considered those that 
fall in the top five deciles of the composite yearly ranking variable. The results report that 
reputable Nomads reduce the abnormal stock returns prior to the official announcement of 
the switches from the AIM to the MM and vice versa. Suprisigly however, I find that when 
Nomads also act as brokers in the same firms, the effect on the price reductions no longer 
hold, suggesting that this may be a result of not taking the appropriate safeguards in order to 
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mitigate potential conflicts of interest created by the Nomads acting on both roles. The 
results remain robust when I control for different yearly ranking deciles of the composite 
variable such as the top four, top three,top two and top one deciles. 
1.4 Contribution of the thesis 
The contribution of this study is threefold. First, I introduce a new corporate event 
contributing to the information leakage and insider trading literature. Prior studies have 
reported that insiders may leak information to other investors (e.g. Eyssell and Arshadi, 
1993; Holland and Hodgkinson, 1994; Jabbour et al., 2000; Christophe et al., 2004; King, 
2009; Berkman et al., 2016) or trade on their own personal accounts (e.g. John and Larry, 
1991, Karpoff and Lee, 1991; Seyhun and Bradley, 1997; Kahle, 2000; Agrawal and Nasser, 
2012; Agrawal and Cooper, 2015) prior to the public announcements of major corporate 
events such as takeovers, SEOs, MBOs and earnings surprises among others. To the best of 
my knowledge, this is the first study that examines information leakage and insider trading 
activities prior to market switches and more specifically from a light, decentralised and 
exchange regulated market (the AIM) to a traditional regulated market (the MM) and vice 
versa. The market switches between different regulatory markets have become of 
international interest as many countries have introduced or considering introducing 
secondary markets in order to facilitate the needs of firms.  
Second this study contributes to the long lasting literature debate between the opponents 
of insider trading regulation (e.g. Heller, 1982; Carlton and Fischel, 1983; Easterbrook, 
1985; Macey, 1991; Bergmans, 1991) and the proponents of insider trading regulation (e.g. 
Schotland, 1967; Levmore, 1988; King et al., 1988; Ausubel; 1990) supporting the view that 
the lack of regulation and especially enforcement leads to proliferation of market abusive 
techniques and insider trading. Third, I highlight the significance of reputable regulators in 
mitigating any abnormal pre-announcement stock patterns during the market switches, 
extending the work of McLaughlin (1992), Servaes and Zenner (1996), Rau (2000), Kale et 
al. (2003), Ismail (2010) and Golubov et al. (2012) on reputable advisors and the work of 
Espenlaub et al. (2012) on reputable Nomads. 
Apart for the contribution to the literature the results of this study have important 
implications to practitioners, as I point to a new direction which so far lacks focus by both 
the regulators and policy makers. Recent papers published by the FCA, conclude that during 
the last years the UK markets are clearer from insider trading and market abusive behaviours. 
These results however are taking mostly into account two days’ abnormal price actions prior 
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to major trading announcements and takeovers in the FTSE 350 as their benchmark (Dubow 
and Monteiro, 2006; Monteiro, 2007; Goldman et al., 2014). The results of this study suggest 
that the UK regulators should take a wider view when it comes to insider trading and 
information leakage phenomena, as the market investors could fall victims of market abusive 
activities in a plethora of different trading settings such as the moves between the two UK 
markets and therefore should be equally taken into consideration. The results also suggest 
that the UK regulators and the LSE should strive to attract high quality and reputable 
regulatory firms or Nomads in order to maintain the integrity and stability of their light 
regulatory segment. Finally, the results suggest that the LSE might have to consider taking 
actions in order to secure that the reputable Nomad firms take the appropriate safeguards in 
order to reduce any conflicts of interest that might arise from acting in both the Nomad and 
the broker roles. 
1.5 Chapters overview and structure of the thesis 
The following of the thesis is structured as follows: The second chapter provides the 
background of insider trading theory, the debates between scholars on insider trading and 
the insider trading regulation in the UK. Chapter 3 presents a detailed description of the 
history of the UK markets, the regulatory differences between the AIM and the MM and the 
role of advisors and regulators on those markets. Chapter 4 describes the first empirical 
analysis that examines whether firms experience abnormal stock returns and trading volume 
prior to the official announcement of the moves from the AIM to the MM and vice versa, in 
line with the information leakage hypothesis. Chapter 5 reports the second empirical work 
that analyses whether corporate insiders trade on their own personal accounts prior to the 
public announcements of the moves between the two UK markets in order to generate profit. 
Chapter 6 describes the last empirical analysis that examines whether reputable Nomads, 
which are the main regulators and advisors of the AIM, could reduce the levels of abnormal 
stock returns prior to the announcement of the switches between the AIM and the MM. 
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes by providing the implications and limitations of the study as 
well as suggestions for further studies.  
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2. Theoretical background and insider trading debates 
2.1 Introduction 
The three empirical chapters of this thesis are based on the agency and information 
asymmetry theories as these are the fundamental theories that support and explain market 
abusive behaviours and thus insider trading activities. Hence, this chapter provides insights 
on the agency theory and the creation of the agency issue using both theoretical and empirical 
evidence from the literature. It mainly focuses on type one agency problem which is the 
agency issue that could lead to insider trading as it arises from the separation of ownership 
and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), rather than type two agency problem which may 
be initiated by conflicts of interest between controlling and non-controlling shareholders (La 
Porta et al., 1999; Gilson and Gordon, 2003). This chapter further analyses the agency costs 
as well as tools associated with the reduction of the agency issue in firms. It provides insights 
on the information asymmetry theory, focusing on the information differences between 
insiders and outsiders and on how outside investors could mitigate the risk of trading against 
informed investors in the markets. Finally, it provides a literature review of the regulatory 
debates on insider trading, providing arguments from both the proponents and the opponents 
of insider trading regulation. 
2.2 Agency theory 
In his seminal work about the nature of the firm, Coase (1937) examines, the legal 
relationship between the “master and the servant” or the “employer and employee”. Under 
this relationship, the master or the employer, has the right to supervise and control the 
servant’s or employee’s work in person or through another servant or employee. In some 
cases, however, the employee has to perform actions which require his/her own decision 
making in order to maximise the employer’s welfare. These actions make it harder for the 
employer to supervise or even control the employee, especially in large public firms, leaving 
space for the creation of agency problems.  
The first notion about the presence of the agency problem was introduced centuries ago 
by Adam Smith (1776) in his book “the wealth of nations”.  In his work he argues, that when 
people manage the wealth of other individuals, they may not do it as well as they would if it 
was their own, highlighting a potential conflict of interest between the individuals who 
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manage the wealth and the individuals who own it8.  The agency theory was developed with 
the scope to model the relationship between the ownership (principal) and the control 
(agent), who represents the ownership in several corporate matters. The theory is connected 
to economic utilitarianism, which postulates that any rational individual would use 
alternative ways in order to maximise their own utility (Ross, 1973). Furthermore, the 
agency theory has been developed following two different approaches, the positivist and the 
principal-agent. The positivist approach focuses on identifying potential circumstances on 
which the ownership and control are likely to support different aims, while the principal-
agent approach focuses on the general theory of this relationship which involves different 
specifications of assumptions and mathematical proofs (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
According to the agency theory, if both the ownership and the control are utility 
maximisers, there is a high possibility that the agent may not always act for the best benefit 
of the principal. Hence, the essence of agency theory is the inherent conflict between two or 
more individuals with different goals or preferences when they engage in a cooperative 
affair. It is this conflict of interest between the ownership and control that creates the agency 
issue, a phenomenon that is widely studied by several academics in a range of disciplines 
(Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Mitnick, 1975; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Demski and 
Feltham, 1978; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983a; b; Jensen, 1986). However, the 
magnitude of the agency conflicts could vary across different companies depending on 
several factors such as, the complexity under which the firm operates9, the attractiveness of 
perquisites or the resistance managers face when they try to exercise their own preferences 
against the preferences of the owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
A perfect example of an agency relationship is the relationship between a firm’s 
shareholders (principal) and the management (agent). The shareholders role is to supply 
capital, create incentives and to bear risk while on the other hand the role of the management 
is to make the appropriate decisions on behalf of the shareholders and to also bear some risk. 
However, the latter party may take decisions aiming to maximise their own utility rather the 
owner’s welfare creating a conflict of interest between the two parties. The utility 
                                                 
8 As stated by Adam Smith in book IV “The divided capital of the Bank of England amounts, at 
present, to ten millions seven hundred and eighty thousand pounds. The directors of such companies, 
however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be 
expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a 
private copartnery frequently watch over their own”. 
9 For example, in small and less complex companies, expertise and knowledge which is critical for 
decision making and control is clustered in few agents, thus reducing the level of conflict of interest 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983b). 
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maximisation of the agent could be achieved by a range of managerial activities, such as the 
avoidance of optimal investments, the manipulation of the reports for their own benefit (e.g. 
secure bonuses, build or improve reputation) or even the consumption of the firm’s resources 
(Dey, 2008). Another managerial activity that can increase the utility maximisation of the 
agent is insider trading. When insiders engage in insider trading, they act for their own best 
benefit at the expense of the ownership due to the fact that they risk the reputation of their 
firm in order to increase their personal wealth. 
As stated by Lambert (2001), those conflicts of interest between the ownership and 
control usually appear due to lack of effort by the agent, due to lack of concern about the 
future of the company or due to different risk tolerance between the principal and the agent. 
In line, Eisenhardt (1989) argues that the conflicts of interest could be generated due to 
adverse selections which translates to the misleading disclosure of qualities and skills by the 
agent or due to moral hazard which refers to a shirking agent due to minimum effort 
produced on his/her behalf.  
On empirical evidence on the agency issue, Amihud and Lev (1981) examine 
conglomerate mergers in the 309 largest industrial firms in the US from 1961 to 1970. The 
authors suggest that conglomerate mergers is an appropriate event for the examination of the 
agency issue, as they are considered to align with the best interest of the managers since it 
reduces the risk in their firm through diversification, mitigating the possibility of a firm 
default, which will results in losing their managerial position. Contrary to that view, 
conglomerate mergers are not in the best interest of the shareholders, as they can diversify 
their risk through their own stock portfolio. Consistent with the agency theory, the authors 
report that the owner controlled firms tend to engage in less conglomerate mergers than the 
management controlled firms. In a similar vein, Walkling and Long (1984) examine 
managers resistance to takeovers in 95 cash tender offers during the period of 1972-1977. 
The authors support that resistance to takeovers is in the benefit of the ownership, however 
it is not in the interest of the management due to the fact they may lose their position after a 
successful takeover. In line with the agency theory, the authors find that managers that have 
a significant amount of equity positions within their company, they are less likely to cause 
resistance against a takeover bid. 
Along the same lines, Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) study the relationship between 
common stock and stock option holdings of managers and the performance of investment 
decisions (acquisitions by mergers, acquisitions by tender offers and sell-offs) made by 209 
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companies during the period of 1974-1982 in the US. The authors report that the holdings 
of managers are higher (lower) for investments with higher (lower) announcement returns, 
indicating that there is a relation between security holdings of managers and firm’s 
investment decisions. Overall, in line with the agency theory, the authors conclude that 
managerial holdings in common stocks and options could align the managerial and 
shareholders preferences. 
2.2.1 Agency costs and reduction of the agency issue 
In order to mitigate the separation between ownership and control, the ownership of the 
organisation must bear some costs as a wealth reduction with the scope of aligning the 
incentives of the two parties which are known as agency costs. These costs could be incurred 
for external monitoring activities or devices that provide additional information that 
discipline the agents on behalf of the principals (e.g. board of directors, auditors, financial 
analysts), structuring costs and costs from bonding contracts between agents with conflicting 
interests or residual losses from dysfunctional decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Additionally, a firm could also implement feasible payment schemes such as bonus or 
penalty schemes. However, among the two payment schemes, the heavy penalties are 
reported to be superior (Mirrlees, 1999). Establishing controls might prove to be costly for 
the organisations, however, Crutchley and Hansen (1989) point out actions that could reduce 
the costs and align the two parties’ interests towards the same direction. The authors argue, 
that this can be achieved by increasing the management’s stock ownership, by increasing the 
dividends distribution (even though paying higher dividends is not costless) or by using more 
debt financing. Failure from companies to establish the appropriate controls could lead to 
agents that are more likely to engage in actions that deviate from the best interest of the 
ownership (Fama and Jensen, 1983b). 
On empirical evidence, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) analyse seven control mechanism 
against the agency issue on approximately 400 large US firms, by examining the relation 
between the mechanisms and firm performance, measured by Tobin’s Q. The seven control 
mechanism are shareholdings of institutions, large block holders and insiders as they can 
increase managerial monitoring, debt policy which could provide monitoring by the lenders, 
the use of outside directors as a monitoring mechanism, the market for corporate control as 
it can impose discipline to the managers through penalties and the managerial labour market 
as it could potentially motivate the managers. The authors find evidence of interdependence 
among the seven control mechanisms, however when they ignore the interdependence, only 
debt policy, representation on the board from outsiders, insider shareholding and activity in 
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the corporate control market are related to firm performance. Finally, when using a 
simultaneous equations estimation, they report that the only control mechanism that persist 
is the effect of outsiders in the board of directors, indicating that this corporate control could 
potentially be one of the most effective mechanisms against the agency issue. 
Ang et al. (2000) examine a sample of small US firms who are considered to experience 
zero agency costs, since their management owns 100% of their equity, collected from The 
Federal Reserve Board's National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF). The authors 
measure the agency costs using two alternative methodologies. The first methodology is the 
difference in expenses between a company with a certain management and ownership 
structure and the zero agency cost sample companies while the second measure is calculated 
as the ratio of annual sales over total assets. The authors report that the agency costs are 
higher for the firms that are not totally owned by their management while these costs appear 
to rise as the equity share of the owner-manager declines. They also add that bank monitoring 
further reduces the agency costs. Similar results are also reported by Singh and Davidson III 
(2003) who extend the previous results in large public US firms. More specifically, the 
authors find that higher inside ownership aligns the interest of shareholders and 
management. They also report that board composition does not influence the agency 
problems while outside block ownership has only a limited effect in reducing it. 
Contrary to the latter view, Anderson and Reeb (2004) argue that board independence 
plays an important role for the mitigation of the agency issue as they report that when 
independent directors have greater power compared to family blockholders the interest of 
outside investors is better protected. In a similar view Jaggi et al. (2009) examining 391 
Hong Kong firms  from 1998 to 2000, find that a higher proportion of independent directors 
mitigates the agency issue by reducing the levels of earnings manipulation in the firms. A 
finding which is supported by Setia-Atmaja et al. (2011) who examine 462 family firms 
listed in Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) during the period of 2000-2004 and find that 
the presence of independent directors could significantly reduce the agency issues. More 
specifically, the authors report that higher percentages of independent directors reduce 
discretionary accruals which suggests that independent directors mitigate earnings 
management by providing better monitoring, thus reducing the agency issues. 
Apart from the controls that are applied by the ownership of corporations, there are also 
country and market controls that could be implemented in order to mitigate potential agency 
issues. For example, another tool that could reduce the agency problems in public firms, is 
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high quality and reputable stock exchanges. The stock markets act as external monitoring 
devices as they specialise in pricing stocks as well as moving them between shareholders for 
a small fee. This external monitoring mechanism adds additional pressure to the 
corporation’s agents while they orient their decisions towards the interests of the principals 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983b). Another external option that could aid in reducing the agency 
issues is through improving the structure of the society. As stated by Spremann and Bamberg 
(1987), a healthy society could promote and encourage trust between individuals by 
rewarding virtues such as reliability, honesty and selflessness.  
Furthermore, more robust legal environments could enhance the ability of the judiciary 
to supervise and implement shareholders’ contractual rights thereby limiting managerial 
expropriation and offering better monitoring to shareholders at lower costs (Hooper et al., 
2009). This is consistent with the argument that by improving the quality of accounting 
standards and the quality of corporate governance provides more confidence on equity 
financing by firms (La Porta et al., 1997). In line with the previous claims, empirical 
evidence reports that companies that operate under more robust legal systems with higher 
transparency and better monitoring, provide better outside investor protection (La Porta et 
al., 2002), lower ex ante investment uncertainty (Hail and Leuz, 2006) while they also 
contribute to the growth of the economy and the development of the markets (La Porta et al., 
1998); thus reducing the agency issues. 
2.2.2 Information asymmetry 
The agency problem is reported to be exaggerated by the presence of information 
asymmetry. The information asymmetry also known as the “lemons” problem is created by 
the information differences between two parties (Akerlof, 1970). Such parties could be the 
management and the shareholders or in general the insiders and outsiders of a corporation. 
The information asymmetries are generated due to the fact that insiders have better 
information on the firm's past and future economic performance. This issue is observed in 
all companies since the insiders have continuous information about their firm while outsiders 
receive information at discrete points of time. Information asymmetries are reported to be 
more evident on firms with high R&D expenditures, as it is difficult to measure and identify 
the information based on the value and productivity of R&D (Aboody and Lev, 2000). In 
addition, information asymmetries tend to be greater in private and small corporations, 
which oftentimes do not have long institutional history and are not required to disclose 
publicly any firm information (Butler et al., 2007). 
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In firms with high information asymmetry, insiders can take advantage of this issue and 
trade based on information, which is not revealed to outsiders, generating profit on the 
expense of the latter. This action is known as insider trading10. Thus, information for the 
uninformed investors creates a risk, as the trading profits of the informed investors are 
trading losses for the uninformed investors. Since outsiders experience this increased risk on 
trading with informed investors, they demand a return premium in order to compensate for 
the potential losses they may suffer. In order to further reduce their risk, outsiders can 
choose, through their portfolio choices, to trade on stocks that have lower risk of losing again 
better informed investors (O'Hara, 2003). According to literature, the risk of trading against 
investor that possess price sensitive information depends on two variables. The first variable 
is how frequently those investors acquire price sensitive information while the second is how 
intensely they trade based on that information (Brown et al., 2004). As stated by Black 
(1986), informed traders, trade more intensely the farther the stock price gets from its value, 
guiding the price towards its real value over time. The farther the price of a stock from its 
value the faster it moves back to it. 
As reported in Milgrom and Stokey (1982) and Wang (1994), if there is a high possibility 
of trading with informed investors, then uniformed or less informed investors will avoid 
participating in the markets. Of course, trades that are based on price sensitive information 
are extremely difficult to uncover, nevertheless, the presence of informed trading could be 
potentially be inferred from the abnormal number of purchases or sales. However, the 
literature reports several tools that could be used in order to mitigate information asymmetry 
and thus informed trading, such as frequent and better quality accounting disclosures, more 
informative financial reports, frequent conference call activity, high financial analyst 
coverage and rating agencies who uncover insiders’ superior information (Healy and Palepu, 
2001; Brown et al., 2004; Brown and Hillegeist, 2007; Cassar et al., 2015). 
Based on the above theories that explored the agency issue as well as the information 
asymmetry, insiders that are interested on increasing their wealth rather than the 
shareholder’s wealth could use the information asymmetry between them and outside 
investors and trade prior to the official announcements of the market switches in order to 
generate profit at the expense of the firm. However, the regulators responsibility is to 
                                                 
10  According to the FCA’s handbook and more specifically to the Market Abuse Rules (MAR) 
section, insider trading occurs when an insider deals or attempts to deal in the basis of inside 
information. 
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mitigate or even eliminate these actions. Nevertheless, the introduction of insider trading 
regulations has initiated several debates between academics.  
2.3 Debate on insider trading activities 
At the start of the 19th century, after the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the US introduced 
legislation against insider trading for the first time in the world11. This regulation is known 
as Securities Act of 193312. Before that law, it was not illegal for insiders to trade based on 
price sensitive information. This fundamental change initiated a series of debates among 
academics. Legal scholars have attempted to understand whether the benefits of insider 
trading outweigh its costs and have raised many debates as to whether insider trading should 
be considered legal or it should be strictly regulated. They further raised arguments as to 
why allowing the practice of insider trading based on privileged information could be healthy 
or detrimental for a corporation and its’ investors.  
Hence, the majority of scholars arguing on the insider trading legislation, split into two 
main schools of thought, the proponents and the opponents of insider trading regulations. 
However, some scholars remained neutral suggesting that there are both negative and 
positive aspects on insider trading. For instance, Leland (1992) supports that when insider 
trading is permitted, the stock prices better reflect their true value, without however 
neglecting the fact that the markets become less liquid and that insider trading could 
potentially reduce the expected return of the outsiders’ investments as they trade with better 
informed investors. In a similar vein, Fishman and Hagerty (1992) argue that prohibiting 
insider trading on the basis of private information but allowing insider trading on the basis 
of publicly known information, could make the markets more efficient. The authors further 
add that requiring insiders to disclose private information before trading, could lead to more 
efficient markets than entirely banning them from trading. 
2.3.1 The opponents of insider trading regulation 
The first and one of the main supporters of deregulation of insider dealing is Manne (1966). 
In his pioneering work, in favour of insider trading, he argues that the trading by company’s 
insiders allows information to rapidly be incorporated into the share price and thus increases 
the market efficiency thereby leading to higher levels of economic output and reducing 
                                                 
11 https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch221.htm 
12 The Securities Act of 1933, the Glass–Steagall Banking Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 were all passed as a result of the famous Pecora senate hearing before the committee on 
banking and currency, which exposed trading based on inside information and other market abusive 
practices. 
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market uncertainty. In addition, the author supports that unregulated insider trading could 
also promote smoothness to the market, by causing gradual rather than sharp price 
movements, which a disclosure would cause. The author further claims that insider trading 
activities can align the interest between the management and outsiders, as it allows managers 
to profit from the increase in the firms’ value that their work generates. Accordingly, the 
insiders’ profit from the transactions is not a crime, but the cost the society has to pay for 
the acquisition of information and for achieving greater market efficiency13 (Heller, 1982). 
Other opponents of insider trading regulation claim that since investors value the 
information received from regular disclosures, they would also value the information from 
a trade made by an insider as an additional source of information. This way insider trading 
facilitates the stock price to move closer to its real value. Insider trading could also be of 
value to the firm because through it the company can convey information to the investors 
which could be either hard or expensive to disclose. It also gives them another tool that could 
be used to increase or decrease the quantity of information they wish to share with the public. 
In addition, opponents of insider trading regulation suggest that insider trading would assist 
firms to distinguish the high quality managers from the low quality ones, since superior 
managers would be willing to accept a compensation scheme based on insider dealing, due 
to the fact that they would be able to generate valuable information while low performance 
managers would not (Carlton and Fischel, 1983; Easterbrook, 1985).  
In line with the latter views, Macey (1991) and Bergmans (1991) argue that inside 
information is a property that belongs to the firm and thus it can be used to compensate 
managers for their hard work, thereby promoting managerial incentives, innovation and 
managers’ willingness to take risks, which are necessary components for creating economic 
value. Macey (1991) also adds that banning insider trading would not benefit the 
shareholders of the firms but the market professionals. Since insiders will not be able to trade 
on information first, the next group on the ladder that will get the information will be the 
market professionals. Hence, this group will trade on price sensitive information before it is 
known to the public and they will be the ones to generate profit. Consequently, the profits 
will not stay within the firm, which would be the case if insiders traded first, and shareholders 
will then have to pay higher salaries to the management, due to the lack of trading 
opportunities given to them. 
                                                 
13 Insider dealing has also been characterised as a “victimless crime” by Sir Martin Jacob, the head 
of Barclays bank between 1985 and 1993 (Financial Times, 6 December 1986). 
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2.3.2 The proponents of insider trading regulation 
On the other side of the debate, supporters of the insider trading laws, claim that legalising 
insider trading, could possibly create incentives for insiders to delay reporting information, 
through the delay of disclosures, in order to have more time to take advantage of the 
information in their possession. In addition, they argue that insider trading activities may 
create a moral hazard, because they allow insiders to trade on negative news. For instance, 
an insider could short sell before the public announcement of unfavourable news in order to 
benefit from the negative returns the event would trigger. Furthermore, the lack of regulation 
can also create incentives for insiders to manipulate the market by sharing false information 
about their company’s stock in order to purchase at lower prices or sell at higher prices 
(Schotland, 1967; Levmore, 1988). 
In a similar vein, King and Roell (1988) further state that trading is a zero sum game, in 
which any profit accruing to an insider is scaled by a loss of an outside investor or the loss 
of the market participants in general. The authors also postulate that insider dealing can force 
the market makers to increase the bid-ask spreads as a response to the increased risk they 
suffer from the potential losses they might incur from dealing with an insider (who has 
information advantage) and therefore they would rather choose to pass them to other 
uninformed or less informed investors. Thus, in the long run the victims of insider trading 
based on price sensitive information are the ordinary investors. 
Furthermore, insider trading has been characterised unfair and immoral, against good 
business ethics, hurting not only the outsiders but also the public confidence and the market 
as a whole (Brudney, 1979; Scheppele, 1993). In line with the previous arguments, Ausubel 
(1990) supports the view that regulating insider trading would promote public confidence 
and establish fairness to the markets, thus it will mitigate any social and ethical concerns and 
it will allow outsiders to invest freely in the stock markets. Accordingly, the confidence in 
the markets would also promote the welfare of insiders because they would benefit from 
outside investments which is a source of capital for their corporations.  
Consistent with the previous claims, Klock (1993) argues that the opponents of insider 
trading regulations mistreat the meaning of market efficiency by supporting the view that 
the stock prices will adjust faster to their proper value due to insider dealing. The author 
further adds, that market efficiency is not about how fast the price reaches its real value, but 
about how quickly the market adjusts to the announcement of new information. The author 
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also claims that insider trading can reduce competition14 while it is associated with an 
increase in trading costs and loss of stock liquidity. 
Even though academics have widely debated over the pros and cons of insider dealing, 
the UK regulators follow a strict line for market abusive behaviours, as they argue that 
insider dealing based on price sensitive information is a serious crime and must be treated 
as such since it damages the integrity and stability of the UK markets. The UK regulators 
also support the view that insider trading jeopardises the development of proper and fair 
markets while it reduces the confidence investors have in them. In their post-conviction 
announcements, they emphasise that they are not willing to tolerate insider trading while 
they declare that they are determined to take very strong actions against anyone who is 
involved in such practices15. However, the UK regulators and more specifically the FCA has 
also received harsh criticism for their work against market abusive activities and insider 
trading16. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter investigated the main theories behind market abusive and insider trading 
behaviours based on theoretical and empirical evidence. The conflict of interest between two 
or more individuals in combination with the information asymmetries between the insiders 
of a firm and the outside investors could lead to practices that damage the confidence 
investors have in the markets. The chapter further analysed the economic benefits and 
drawbacks of insider trading activities as well as the arguments of the proponents and the 
opponents of the insider trading legislation. However, the insider trading legislations have 
been developed substantially through the years in order to follow the market’s needs. The 
                                                 
14 The reduction of competition is also supported by Fishman and Hegerty (1992) who states that 
insider dealing could discourage outsiders, such as market professionals or market analysts, from 
solely generating information which might lead to lower competition and less informed markets in 
general. 
15 After the prosecution of Matthew Uberoi and his father Neel Uberoi for generating approximately 
£110,000 profit based on non-public information, Margaret Cole, director of enforcement and 
financial crime of the FCA (former FSA), said “Insider dealing is not a victimless crime and we 
remain committed to stamping out this type of fraud by those trusted with inside information. Insider 
dealing damages the very confidence that underpins the integrity of our markets. By continuing to 
prosecute these crimes we believe we are achieving credible deterrence in this area, sending an 
emphatic message that insider dealing is a serious crime and will be treated as such” (Financial 
Times, 4 November 2009). 
16 Andrew Tyrie MP, Chairman of the Treasury Committee, quoted saying “The FCA’s work affects 
millions of consumers, and thousands of firms and their employees throughout the UK. It performs 
a role of the utmost importance: protecting consumers and ensuring that the markets function well. 
We rely on it to do a good job… The FCA needs to do more to satisfy the Parliament, and the 
public…” (https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/treasury-committee/news/fca-pre-briefing-incident-march-2014/). 
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next chapter analytically explains the insider trading regulations in the UK from 1980. 
Furthermore, since different exchanges have different regulatory approaches, the next 
chapter also presents the UK markets and the main difference between the secondary market 
of the UK, the AIM, and the traditional regulated market of the UK, the MM.  
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3. The insider trading regulations and the exchanges in the 
UK 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the background on the insider trading regulations in the UK and their 
development from their introduction in 1980. It provides a detailed description of the history 
of the UK markets and on how they developed through the years. Furthermore, it explains 
all the different segments provided by the LSE in order to facilitate firm needs as well as 
illustrates tables and graphs of the IPOs in the AIM and the MM. It also analyses the 
regulatory differences between the AIM and the MM, both on the eligibility criteria and on 
the ongoing obligations, by presenting the rules of the exchanges as well as country laws. 
Finally, it analyses the role of advisors in the markets, focusing on the unique phenomenon 
of Nomads by providing details on the necessary requirements in order for a firm to become 
a Nomad, as well as the responsibilities that Nomad firms bear.  
3.2 The development of insider trading regulations in the UK 
Until 1980, there was no specific legislation about insider dealing in the UK. The only form 
of regulation in place was the director’s disclosure when dealing on their firm’s securities. 
In the early 70s due to the absence of regulation, professional bodies started to provide a 
form of self-regulated rules, such as the LSE17 and the City Panel of Takeovers and Mergers. 
The introduction of the Companies Act of 1980 was the first time that insider dealing was 
considered as a criminal offence in the UK. According to Part V, section 68 of the Act, 
individuals connected with the firm who are in possession of unpublished price sensitive 
information are not allowed to trade in the firm’s securities or counsel any other individual 
to deal on these securities. 
The insider trading legislation promoted by the Companies Act 1980 was contained in 
the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 and underwent some minor changes by 
the Financial Services Act 1986. In November 1989, the EU published the Council Directive 
89/552 with the purpose of coordinating the insider trading regulation among the European 
Union countries. In accordance with the Council Directive 89/552, the UK repealed the 
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 and introduced the Criminal Justice Act of 
1993, improving the definitions of insiders and securities. In November of 2001, the UK 
                                                 
17 The LSE introduced the Model Code in 1977 which is a set of guidelines rather than rules followed 
on a voluntary basis (Hillier and Marshall, 1998). The Model Code was later adopted by Chapter 9 
of the Listing Rules. 
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parliament introduced a civil offence on market abuse by enacting the FSMA 2000 in order 
to promote investors protection and to reduce market exploitation. According to the section 
118 of the Act, individuals (not only insiders) are prohibited to trade while in possession of 
non-public information, creating false and misleading information or market impressions 
and distorting the market (Alexander, 2001). However, once again in 2003 the UK required 
to broaden the FSMA’s section 118 definitions following the EU Market Abuse Directive 
(MAD). 
After the introduction of the FSMA, in December 2001, the UK Government established 
the FSA (now known as FCA) in order to regulate the financial markets, exchanges and 
firms. The FSA is an independent, non-governmental body, which is given statutory powers 
by the FSMA and is funded by the firms they regulate. The FSA holds accountable to 
Treasury Ministers and through them to the UK Parliament. Its objective is to reduce 
financial crime, to enhance investor protection and market confidence and to promote 
financial stability in the UK markets. The FSA has the power to prosecute insider trading 
cases under criminal law while under the Financial Service Act of 2010 it has the power to 
ban financial professionals for market abuse. However, the Financial Services Act of 2012 
abolished the FSA with effect from the 1st of April 2013 and replaced it with the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA) of the bank of England, which is responsible for the regulation 
and supervision of banks, and the FCA which is responsible for honest and effective markets 
and firms.  
Nevertheless, Dubow and Monteiro (2006) report that the introduction of the FSMA 2000 
and the FSA in 2001 did not decrease the insider trading activities in the UK markets. 
Literature suggests that good laws that deter prohibited activities must have a combination 
of both severity of punishment and high probability of detection (Becker, 1968). In line, 
Beny (2005) finds that strict inside trading laws are more effective than light laws, however 
Frijns et al. (2013) report that the introduction of criminal sanctions in New Zealand in 2008 
was unsuccessful due to the country’s poor enforcement. Similar results are also reported by 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), who examine the impact of the introduction and initial 
enforcement of insider trading laws on the cost of capital. The authors find that the 
introduction of laws has no effect on the cost of capital, but they report a significant reduction 
following the first enforcement. Finally, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2009) find that the 
countries that enact laws but do not enforce them, experience higher costs of capital than 
those that do not enact insider trading laws at all; concluding that for insider laws to work, 
they must be enforceable, else if they are poorly enforced it may be better with no laws at 
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all. Hence, based on the above literature, the low impact of the FSMA on insider trading 
activities could be attributed to the weak enforcement of the UK, compare to that of the US18 
(a detailed analysis on the main regulatory differences between the UK and the US can be 
found in Appendix 2), and the challenges the FCA faces when it comes to criminal 
prosecution cases with regards to insider dealing19. 
3.2.1 Recent insider trading regulations in the UK 
According to section 96b of FSMA, insiders are considered the directors as well as the senior 
executives that have access to inside information and/or have the power to take managerial 
decisions, also called PDMRs and their connected persons. The Disclosure and Transparency 
Rules 3 (DTR) mandate that insiders and their connected persons are to notify their firm for 
all transactions relating to the company shares within four business days. Accordingly, the 
company must notify the LSE as soon as possible and no later than the end of the day from 
the receipt of the information. This short disclosure period characterises insiders trades in 
the UK as very informative, triggering large market reactions (Fidrmuc et al., 2006).  
In addition, according to the Model Code, insiders are not allowed to trade during close 
periods, that is sixty days prior to yearly and interim earnings announcements and thirty days 
prior to quarterly results while it is also prohibited to trade prior to the official public 
announcement of any price sensitive information. However, this measure does not reduce 
the abnormal stock price reaction created by insider trading but rather affects the timing of 
insider dealing (Hillier and Marshall, 2002a). As stated in the Criminal Justice Act 1993 the 
                                                 
18 Paul Barnes, professor of fraud risk management at Nottingham Trent University, who also acts 
as an expert witness in insider dealing court cases has been quoted saying in the London Sunday 
times: “London is a haven for insider dealers because it is large and there is evidence that the 
chances are you will get away with it. It is a theme park for all aspiring insider dealers” (The Sunday 
times, London, 6 June 2010). In addition, Sara George, a lawyer and partner at Allen & Overy who 
achieved a successful FSA criminal prosecution related to market abuse, shared her thoughts about 
the lack of prosecution penalties in the Financial Times “When the worst that can happen is that you 
might lose your job and be fined an amount, you can afford to lose. Prison - and you start off in a 
normal one, it’s not straight to Ford (open prison) - that really will make people think twice” 
(Financial Times, 24 January 2008). 
19 Arun Srivastava, head of the financial services group at Baker and McKenzie LLP who spent a 
year of secondment to the FSA from 1999 to 2000, stated in a Bloomberg interview in 2012 “The 
real challenge for the FCA is not so much the detection of the suspicious trading but actually building 
a credible case to take to a criminal court”. When asked which are the obstacles on building that 
kind of case and how challenging is for the FCA to spot when normal market behaviour crosses the 
line into criminality he replied “The problem for bringing a prosecution as opposed to dealing with 
the issue of insider dealing through FCA civil powers is the need to commit to jury that there has 
been criminality and very often in insider dealing cases all a suspect needs to do, is come up with 
some sort of explanation as to why he is doubt, which is really easy to construct a plausible 
explanation” (Bloomberg Interviews, 23 March 2012). 
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penalties for insider trading could be up to seven years’ imprisonment and unlimited fine20, 
but are not limited only to the insiders of a firm. Any individual who trades knowingly and 
intentionally when in possession of inside information could also face those penalties. 
Recently on 3 July 2016, in another EU’s attempt to harmonize the regulations of 
European markets regarding market abuse, they introduced the EU Market Abuse Regulation 
(MAR) which has effect on all European members. Despite these changes are not in the 
examination period (1996-2015) of this study, I deem appropriate to report them since they 
are the most recent insider trading legislation changes. Although the MAR had many 
similarities with the previous insider trading regulation, there are some major differences 
which resulted to the abolishment of the Model Code (Chapter 9 of the Listing Rules) and 
the repel of Part VIII of the FSMA 2000. First, the MAR introduces a new prohibition on 
market abuse; any attempt to engage in market manipulative actions even if it is not 
completed for different reasons is considered as market abuse. Second, the introduction of 
MAR broadened the general definition of inside information21 and introduced inside 
information definitions in relation to commodity derivatives, emission allowances and 
individuals charged with financial instrument executions. Third, it extends the market abuse 
regime to MTF22 and Organised Trading Facility (OTF)23 markets. Finally, it reduces the 
PDMRs (and individuals closely related to them) notification period to the FCA when 
trading on their firm shares to three days from four days while it reduces the close period 
from sixty days to thirty days. Hence, after 2016 the UK has significantly stricten the insider 
trading regulations. 
                                                 
20 The longest imprisonment conviction that have been handed down for insider dealing it was in 
May of 2016 for 4.5 years to Martyn Dodgson, a former senior investment banker, who passed inside 
information to other individuals and made millions of profit.  
21 As stated in the MAR, inside information is the “information of a precise nature, which has not 
been made public, relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers or to one or more financial 
instruments, and which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect on the 
prices of those financial instruments or on the price of related derivative financial instruments”. 
22 According to the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive I (MiFID I), an MTF market is an 
investment service alternative to regular markets which is operated by a market operator or an 
investment firm and brings together multiple third-parties buying and selling interests in a non-
discretionary way. The AIM is included in this category of markets. 
23 According to the MiFID II, an OTF market is an investment service different from a regulated 
market and an MTF which brings together multiple third-party buying and selling interests in bonds, 
derivatives, structured finance products and emission allowances. 
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3.3 The History of the UK markets and the introduction of the Alternative Investment 
Market (AIM) 
A security market existed in the city of London long before the establishment of the LSE. 
There is evidence of shares exchange from the sixteenth century, years before the creation 
of an official market. The MM of the LSE was officially established in 1698 and ever since 
it has been the market for some of the largest and most famous companies not only of the 
UK but also of the entire world24 (London Stock Exchange, 2010). A listing to the MM 
provided firms with a high profile, access to capital and commitment to high standards, 
however the strict regulation structure and demanding eligibility criteria discouraged small 
and medium sized firms to list in such a prestigious market. The Over the Counter (OTC) 
markets took advantage of this weakness and under the rule 535.225 attracted firms that were 
too small for the official list. In order to stay in line with the competition, the LSE had to 
either let the OTC markets flourish or create a market suitable for small and high growth 
firms. The possibility of creating such a market immediately raised concerns about the risks 
that this market could be exposed to, such as insider trading and market manipulations that 
could jeopardize the prestige of the LSE (Michie 1999, p. 614-628) 
Hence, in 1980 the LSE introduced the Unlisted Securities Market (USM), a market with 
less stringent admission requirements26 that would attract small and high growth firms. By 
1986 the USM had attracted more than 500 firms raising approximately £1bn while 71 of 
those firms had moved to the MM. After this impressive success, in 1987 the LSE decided 
to introduce yet another market for even smaller and riskier firms called the Third Market. 
However, in October of 1987 the Black Monday crash hit harshly the small and riskier firms 
reducing greatly the new issue numbers in both markets and lead to the merge of the USM 
and the Third Market in 1990. Consequently, in 1993 the LSE announced its plans to close  
down the USM (Acrot et al., 2007). 
The announcement of the closure of the USM created the opportunity for the 
establishment of other markets that wanted to benefit from the lack of an organized market 
for small firms. In 1995, John Jenkins an expert in small company shares introduced the Off 
                                                 
24 In 1801 the LSE started to attract members on a subscription basis and in 1923 it was awarded by 
its own coat of arms with the words “Dictum Meum Pactum” which means My word is My Bond 
(London Stock Exchange, 2009). 
25 Under the rule 535.2 (later replaced by the rule 4.2) the stock exchange members had the right to 
exchange securities that were not part of the official list. This rule was functional from the 1950s 
until 1994. 
26 The USM floating requirements were 10% and the trading record requirements were three years 
compared to 25% and five years respectively in the MM (Acrot et al., 2007). 
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Exchange (OFEX)27, a new market that focused on small and high growth companies 
established in the UK (Michie 1999, p. 619). This new domestic rival28 along with the 
government concerns about the future of LSE without a segment that would attract small 
firms lead to the launch of the AIM in 17 June of 1995 and to the abolition of the rule 4.2 
(former 535.2). The AIM concept had many differences from its predecessor, it started as a 
separate market from the MM with its own management and regulations (Acrot et al., 2007). 
The AIM standards had to be different from those of the MM and the USM since AIM’s 
primary target was to attract small firms which by nature were recently created with lack of 
track record and little experience. Thus, the AIM followed a light touch regulation with no 
minimum percentage of float, no requirements for track record, no minimum market 
capitalisation and with a distinctive element called Nomads, which oversight, advice and 
regulate the AIM firms during their Initial Public Offering (IPO) as well as during their entire 
life time in the market (London Stock Exchange, 2015a). 
Apart from OFEX, the domestic competitor which until 1996 had attracted approximately 
300 firms, the AIM had also to compete with overseas light regulated markets such as the 
French Nouveau Marche, the German Nueuer Markt, the Italian Nuovo Mercato and the 
European EASDAQ among others. However, during the dot.com bubble in 2000, all of those 
markets were hit hard since they were internet and technology based and eventually 
collapsed. Even though the AIM was severely affected, it was the only European secondary 
market that was left after the big shock. This was due to the prior LSE’s experience on light 
regulated markets and because the AIM was less dependent on technology stocks compared 
to the other markets. This event had a positive outcome for the AIM due to the fact that it 
eliminated its rival markets and raised its profile among the LSE and to the entire world as 
a stable yet growth market (Acrot et al., 2007). 
Soon after the dot.com crash the AIM started to attract international firms and an 
important number of the MM firms. First it started to attract firms from the Commonwealth 
countries which had the same legal systems with the UK such as Canadian and Australian 
firms. The visibility of the AIM and the MM was also enhanced in 2002 after the 
                                                 
27 In 2006 the OFEX was renamed to PLUS Market and in 2012 it was acquired by ICAP plc and 
renamed into Icap Securities and Derivatives Exchange (ISDX).  
28 Patrick Birley, CEO of the ISDX (former OFEX) in a recent interview said “We are very much the 
newer, younger and I hope cooler version of a stock exchange. We are not a stepping stone to AIM, 
we are very much an alternative” and when asked about the future plans of ISDX he replied, “We 
are also targeting to take companies away from AIM and other market places because we believe 
that we can offer them exactly the same service but at a much better price point” (Proactive Investors 
interview, 21 July 2016). 
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implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the US. The strict regulations and the 
expensive disclosure rules of the act made the London’s markets an even more attractive 
destination. By 2003 the AIM had fully recovered from the dot.com crash and started to form 
its own identity, becoming a respected market not only within the UK but also in an 
international level. However, from 2005 the AIM had to face several new competitors such 
as the French Alternext, the German Entry Standard from Deutsche Börse and the Polish 
NewConnect while it also started to attract harsh criticism and envy from the European as 
well as international countries, especially from the US29 (Acrot et al., 2007). 
After a series of years that the AIM had more than 150 IPOs per year, it faced another hit 
from the financial crisis of 2007. The new issues once again began to shrink; however, the 
AIM had already been tested from previous shocks and was no longer a new unexperienced 
market; making it easier for it to withstand the new financial crisis hit. In response to this 
crisis the AIM revamped its rules into two rulebooks, namely “AIM rules for companies” 
and “AIM rules for Nomads”. Since then the AIM is stable, characterised as one of the most 
popular and successful secondary markets in the developed world (London Stock Exchange, 
2015b; Doukas and Hoque, 2016), it mostly underwent some tweaks in regulations 
depending on the market needs with the last one being the introduction of the MAR, which 
was implemented in the July of 2016 and brought some additional rules on the disclosure of 
inside information. 
3.4 The markets provided by the London Stock Exchange  
The LSE provides a wide variety of markets in order to facilitate every type of firm and a 
plethora of different investors. It is separated in two major categories, the MM which is the 
oldest and more respected market, attracting already developed medium and large firms and 
the AIM which is the secondary, exchange regulated market, specifically created for small 
and high growth firms. The MM is a world leading market with companies from more than 
sixty countries across forty sectors. A listing to the MM provides the firms with a wide and 
knowledgeable pool of investors along with high reputation and prestige, yet it also means 
                                                 
29 John Thain, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) executive was quoted at the World Economic 
Forum in Davos Switzerland in January 2007 referring to AIM "did not have any standards at all 
and anyone could list" (Financial Times, 27 January 2007). Moreover, Roel Campos a Securities and 
Exchange Commission member was quoted on a Dow Jones newswire in March 2007 saying “I am 
concerned that 30% per cent of issuers that list in AIM are gone in a year. That feels like a casino to 
me and I believe investors will treat it as such” (Financial Times, 8 March 2007). Finally, Kate 
Burgess, a journalist of the FT, wrote “AIM’s numerous corporate collapses and scandals have 
earned the market its label as a wild west exchange where cowboys are allowed to roam free” 
(Financial Times, 15 October 2017). 
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commitment to its high regulatory standards. In addition, it offers different types of listing 
categories depending on the needs of the firm such as the Premium listing, the Standard 
listing, the High Growth Segment (HGS) and the Special Fund Segment (SFS) (London 
Stock Exchange, 2009; 2010).  
The Premium listing is only available for equity shares, it has stricter standards than the 
minimum European requirements including the UK’s corporate governance code, but 
provides a broader range of investors, lower cost of capital through greater transparency and 
through higher investor confidence, exceptional profile and the potential for inclusion in the 
FTSE 100 series30. Mase (2007) reports that the firms that are included or excluded from the 
FTSE 100 index experience no abnormal announcement returns. More specifically, the 
returns reported for inclusions are -0.1% and for exclusion -0.2%. However, the 10 day pre-
announcement period returns are reported to be 3.6% and -5.2% for the inclusion and 
exclusion respectively, indicating that the investors anticipate the events. The author also 
finds a reversal in the cumulative average abnormal returns after the effective dates for both 
inclusions and exclusions. These evidence are in contrast with the studies from the US which 
examine inclusions in the S&P 500 index and report positive and significant returns on the 
announcement and post announcement of the inclusion to the index (Shleifer, 1986; Harris 
and Gurel, 1986; Dhillon and Johnson, 1991; Beneish and Whaley, 1996) and negative 
returns after the exclusion from the S&P 500 (Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997). 
Another listing choice in the LSE is the Standard listing, which is available to shares, 
debt, securitised derivatives and Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs). Firms in this market 
are obliged to comply only with the minimum European requirements. The HGS is a new 
market for equity shares of medium sized companies that present significant growth and 
have aspirations to join the Premium market, while its listing requirements follow the same 
principles as the Standard market with some minor differences. The SFS (formally known 
as Specialist Fund Market) is a market which is created for specialised firms that aim to 
attract institutional and highly knowledgeable investors. The listing requirements for SFS 
are the same as the Standard listing. Furthermore, there are some additional segments in the 
LSE which target only  specific pools of firms such as the techMARK which focuses on 
                                                 
30 The name FTSE was developed by the cooperation of the Financial Times (FT) Index with the 
LSE in 3 January 1984 (Michie,1999, p. 573). The FTSE consists by three types of series, the FTSE 
100 also known as blue chip which consists of the 100 largest companies listed on the Premium 
market and is the indication of the market performance, the FTSE 250 which is composed by the 250 
largest firms after the FTSE 100 and the FTSE 350 which is the FTSE 100 and the FTSE 250 
combined. 
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technology and healthcare firms and the Professional Securities Market (PSM) which offers 
an alternative documentation regime for issuers of convertibles, GDRs, and debt (London 
Stock Exchange, 2010). 
The newest market of the LSE is the AIM, which offers an exchange regulated regime 
for companies that are not able to join a traditional regulated market or for companies that 
prefer a light regulated oriented market, filling the gap for growing firms to develop. Unlike 
other growth markets, the AIM is not a specific sector market, hence it is supported by a 
wide range of advisers such as the Nomads, brokers, lawyers and registrars, among others. 
It offers a significant regional and sector diversity with firms from twenty eight different 
countries and forty different industries while it is one of the most popular and successful 
public equity growth markets in the world (London Stock Exchange, 2015b; Doukas and 
Hoque, 2016). In a recent report that surveyed seventy five AIM firms asking them to rate 
the benefits they acquired since their listing on the AIM, 86% replied that they have seen 
some benefit on their profile/credibility, 79% have seen benefit from the access to capital, 
68% have realised benefit from the liquidity while only 44% found benefits from the AIM’s 
tax incentives31 (Baker Tilly, 2011). 
In the UK, an exchange regulated market is the market that is regulated by the LSE while 
it has to be recognized from the FCA by meeting the Recognised Investment Exchanges 
(REC) and the MiFID32. These legislations require among others, the markets to have 
available financial resources for the proper operation of their functions, to ensure investors’ 
protection and prevent market exploitation, to ensure that any necessary actions are made 
for recording transactions effected by their facilities, to notify the FCA for any changes on 
the market and to promote as well as maintain high quality standards of integrity and fair 
                                                 
31 AIM firms’ investors that hold their shares in an Individual Savings Account (ISA) do not pay 
taxes on dividends or on the profits they make. Furthermore, from 28 April 2014, direct purchases 
of AIM shares are free from the 0.5% stump duty. However, if the investments are not held in a tax 
efficient wrapper, investors are taxed on profits that are above the Capital Gains Tax (CGT) 
allowance. In addition, investors of the AIM stocks are exempt from Inheritance Tax (IHT) if they 
hold their stocks for more than two years. Finally, there are also some additional schemes that 
investors could use if they meet certain criteria. For example, the Entrepreneur’s relief where if 
investors hold more than 5% of a firm’s ordinary shares they can reduce the CGT from 28% to 10%, 
or the Enterprise Investment Scheme (EIS) where if investors invest more than £1 million in 
aggregate in a tax year, they receive a 30% initial income tax relief on their investment, loss relief 
and exemption from CGT on disposal (London Stock Exchange, 2014b). 
32 According to the FCA, MiFID is the European legislation that regulates firms which provide 
services to clients linked to financial instruments. It was applied in November 2007 but is now being 
revised into a new legislation known as MiFID- II which took effect from 3 January 2018. 
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dealing. The FCA has the right to issue instructions to the market or even to derecognise it 
for not meeting the requirements.  
Table 3-1 reports the new listings to the MM from 1998 to 2015 and the new listings to 
the AIM from 1995 to 2015. The table presents different starting years as the LSE does not 
provide new listings data for the MM prior to 1998. The table shows that the IPOs in the 
AIM are almost double in number (with a total of 2074 IPOs) than those in the MM (with a 
total of 1095 IPOs), showing that the AIM is an extremely popular market. More specifically, 
there is an increased activity in the AIM IPOs from 2000 to 2007 with a maximum number 
of 335 IPOs in 2005. The IPOs in the MM are stable throughout the years with a maximum 
of 148 IPOs in 2000 and a minimum of 10 IPOs 2009. However, the new money raised is 
significantly more in the MM with a total of £179,418 million compared to a total of £35,827 
million in the AIM. This is due to the fact the AIM mostly attracts small and high growth 
firms while the MM attracts already developed firms. In addition, it could be attributed to 
the minimum market capitalisation and percentage of free float requirements of the MM.  
Figure 3-1 also shows a graphical representation of the new listings in both markets. 
Table 3-1: New listings in the MM and the AIM 
Panel A: IPOs in the MM Panel B: IPOs in the AIM 
Year 
Number of 
IPOs 
Funds raised 
(£ millions) Year 
Number of 
IPOs 
Funds raised 
(£ millions) 
1995 - - 1995 16 69.09 
1996 - - 1996 94 503.53 
1997 - - 1997 70 296.83 
1998 90 11,184.69 1998 37 185.10 
1999 87 11,282.50 1999 59 274.39 
2000 148 16,358.61 2000 179 1,395.35 
2001 82 10,089.99 2001 94 434.94 
2002 40 5,076.24 2002 61 433.00 
2003 20 3,562.72 2003 67 989.83 
2004 52 4,930.41 2004 243 2,412.28 
2005 88 10,674.12 2005 335 5,632.53 
2006 89 20,123.56 2006 278 9,314.73 
2007 87 20,449.70 2007 182 6,262.40 
2008 35 6,299.12 2008 38 917.27 
2009 10 964.07 2009 13 610.07 
2010 48 8,190.05 2010 47 1,012.02 
2011 32 15,556.80 2011 45 525.11 
2012 24 4,168.75 2012 43 642.91 
2013 42 11,247.39 2013 61 973.59 
2014 58 12,084.21 2014 79 2,472.48 
2015 63 7,175.27 2015 33 470.00 
Total 1095 179,418.20 Total 2074 35,827.45 
This table presents the new issues and money raised in the MM and in the AIM during the period of 1995-
2015. The data are retrieved from the “New issues and IPO summary” spreadsheet which can be downloaded 
from the LSE website. The spreadsheet does not provide new listings for the MM prior to 1998. The funds 
raised are in millions. 
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Figure 3-1: New listings in the MM and the AIM 
 
This figure shows the new listings in the MM and the AIM from 1995 to 2015. The horizontal axis represents 
the years and the vertical axis represents the number of IPOs. The data are retrieved from the “New issues and 
IPO summary” spreadsheet which can be downloaded from the LSE website. The spreadsheet does not provide 
new listings for the MM prior to 1998. 
 
3.5 Regulatory differences between the Main Market (MM) and the Alternative 
Investment Market (AIM) 
The two markets have several differences, both in the listing criteria as well as the costs 
associated with the listings. The criteria for being admitted to the AIM are less stringent 
compared to those of the official list. For instance, under the “AIM rules for companies” the 
listing requirements of the AIM are (1) no minimum percentage of float33; (2) no requirement 
of audited financial statements in the years prior to the listing, however there is a requirement 
for a minimum of three years of audited financial statements for the companies that have 
been trading in other exchanges; (3) no minimum market capitalisation. In contrast, 
according to the Listing Rules (LR) the admission requirements for the MM are (1) minimum 
percentage of float of 25%; (2) minimum of three years of audited financial statements 
before the admission; (3) minimum market capitalisation of £700,000 (London Stock 
Exchange, 2010; 2015a; b; 2016).  
In addition, the firms listed in the AIM have to prepare the AIM admission document34 
which does not have to be pre-vetted by the UK Listing Authority (UKLA) or the Exchange 
while the firms listed in the MM have to prepare a prospectus which has to be approved by 
a European Economic Area (EEA) competent authority or UKLA and the Exchange. This 
                                                 
33 In practice at least 10% of the shares is expected to be floated by investors (Arbuthnot Securities, 
2007). 
34 The AIM admission document requires specific information dictated by the “AIM rules for 
companies” such as a business overview, a legal disclosure, historic financial information and a risk 
disclosure. 
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difference makes the AIM listing process much faster than the one in the MM as the 
reviewing35 and approval of the prospectus could take up to several months. The admission, 
annual and compliance costs between the two markets are also different with the AIM being 
a less expensive market following its principles on facilitating small firms in need of finance. 
For example, the admission fees in the AIM could be from £7,900 to £89,180 while in the 
MM could be from £7,900 to £457,600 depending on the market capitalisation. Moreover, 
the annual fees in the AIM are £6,250 plus the Nomads’ fee while in the MM are from £5,200 
to £52,000 depending on the market capitalisation. Finally, the further insurance costs for 
the AIM are £3,952 to £44,590 for more than £5m market capitalisation while there is no 
charge for less than £5m market capitalisation and in the MM are the same as the admission 
fees with several discounts depending on the issue (London Stock Exchange, 2010; 2015a; 
b; 2016).  
Apart for the listing criteria and the costs, there are also significant differences in the 
regulations of the two markets. First, an AIM firm must at all times attain a Nomad while in 
the MM the firms must have a listing sponsor only during their listing. Second, the MM 
firms have to “comply or explain” to the UK Corporate Governance Code while the AIM 
firms do not have to comply with the code, however they are expected to adhere to a 
recognised corporate governance code which most of the times is the Quoted Companies 
Alliance (QCA), a governance code for small and medium firms (London Stock Exchange, 
2012). Corporate governance differences play a vital role as a strong corporate governance  
can mitigate any agency issues between the ownership and control (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997; Bushman and Smith, 2001) and thus insider trading activities (Rozanov, 2009). Third, 
in order for a MM firm to switch to another market, it must receive at least 75% shareholder 
approval while in the AIM no shareholder approval is needed. Fourth, unlike the MM firms, 
the AIM firms are not required to produce an insider list or to notify the FCA and keep a 
detailed record for the delayed disclosures36. Fifth, an AIM firm must disclose any 
substantial transactions that exceed 10% of the class tests and any related party transactions 
that exceeds 5% in any of the class tests, compared to 5% and 0.25% for the MM firms 
respectively (London Stock Exchange, 2016). This more relaxed regulatory approach 
regarding insider trading could potentially create an incentive for insiders to exploit the 
                                                 
35 In large IPOs the reviewing and commenting by the UKLA can involve five or even more 
substantive drafts (London Stock Exchange, 2010). 
36 The introduction of MAR in July 2016 requires an insider listing, the notification of FCA for 
delayed disclosures as well as a detailed record for them, but these rules do not apply for the period 
under examination of this study. 
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abnormal stock returns that are reported during the announcement of  a moves from the AIM 
to the MM and vice versa (Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2013; Campbell and Tabner, 2014). 
Finally, the two markets are regulated by different regulatory bodies. The AIM is 
regulated by the LSE through the Nomads (see section 3.7.2 for an analysis of the role of 
Nomads in the AIM) while the MM is regulated by UKLA. Table 3-2 shows analytically the 
eligibility criteria and continuing obligations of the two UK markets. The light exchange 
regulated environment of the AIM was partly the reason of its enormous success and 
popularity. In a recent survey in 2011, approximately 75% of 75 AIM firms and 20 
institutional investors agreed that the self-regulation of the AIM market is effective, however 
only 15% of them agreed that further increases in the AIM regulations are not required 
(Baker Tilly, 2011), meaning that the future of AIM is definitely bright but it might not be 
light. 
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Table 3-2: Eligibility criteria and continuing obligations of the MM and the AIM 
Market   MM AIM 
Regulation  Traditional Regulated Market Multilateral Trading Facility 
Exchange rules  Admission & Disclosure Standards AIM rules 
Eligibility criteria 
Minimum market capitalisation £700,000 (LR 2) 
No minimum market capitalisation 
(AIM rules) 
Minimum percentage of free float 25% in public hands (LR 6) 
No minimum percentage of free float 
(AIM rules) 
Trading record 3 years (LR 6) 3 years or shorter period (AIM rules) 
Designated adviser Listing Sponsor required (LR 8) 
Nominated Adviser required  
(AIM rule 1) 
Admission documentation 
Prospectus & eligibility letter to UKLA, 
submitted by the sponsor (A&Ds) 
AIM admission document & Nomad 
declaration of suitability (AIM rules) 
Admission fees (2015) 
From £7,900 to £457,000 depending on 
the market capitalisation  
(Fees for issuers, 2015) 
From £7,900 to £89,180 depending on 
the market capitalisation  
(AIM fees for companies, 2015) 
Ongoing obligations 
Annual fees (2015) 
From £5,200 to £52,000 depending on 
the market capitalisation  
(Fees for issuers, 2015) 
£6,250 plus Nomads’ fee  
(AIM fees for companies, 2015) 
Further issuance cost (2015) 
Same as admission fees with 25% 
discount for issuers capitalised £500m 
and below and 10% for issuers 
capitalised at above £500m. No charge 
for issuers capitalised £100m and below 
(Fees for issuers, 2015) 
From £3,952 to £44,590 for more than 
£5m market capitalisation. No charge 
for less or equal than £5m  
(AIM fees for companies, 2015) 
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Ongoing obligations 
Designated adviser 
Listing Sponsor for certain transactions 
(LR 8) 
Nomad required at all times the issuer is 
on market (AIM rule 1) 
Corporate governance 
Comply or Explain to the Combined 
Code (LR 9) 
Disclosure of whether a code is 
followed (AIM Rule 26) 
Eligible for electronic settlement Yes (A&Ds 2.7) Yes (AIM rule 36) 
Insider list 
Yes (DTR2/MAR article 18 from 3 July 
2016) 
No before MAR, (Yes after MAR 
article 18 from 3 July 2016) 
Accounts preparation EU-IFRS or equivalent (DTR 4) 
EEA firms: IAS or national GAAP if 
not a parent company. Non-EEA firms: 
IAS, US GAAP, Canadian GAAP, 
Japanese GAAP, Australian IFRS (AIM 
rule 19) 
Financial reports Annual & half year reporting (DTR 4) 
Annual & half year reporting 
(AIM rules 18 & 19) 
Publication of inside information as 
soon as possible 
Yes (DTR 2/MAR article 17 from 3 
July 2016) 
Yes (AIM rule 11/MAR article 17 from 
3 July 2016) 
Significant transactions (class tests) 
notifications 
class 2 - 5%, class 1 - 25% (requires 
shareholders’ approval) (LR 10), 100% 
reverse (LR 5) 
10% in any of the class tests, 100% 
reverse (AIM rules 12 & 15) 
Related party transactions notifications 0.25 % in any of the class tests (LR 11) 
5% in any of the class tests 
(AIM rule 13) 
Cancelation 
75% shareholder approval required 
(LR 5) 
75% shareholder approval (AIM rule 
41) 
Indices LSE indices FTSE UK series FTSE AIM series 
This table reports the major eligibility and ongoing obligations of the AIM and the MM. For the construction of the table, I use the regulatory and guidance handbooks provided by the LSE 
website. LR stands for “Listing Rules”, DTR for “Disclosure and Transparency Rules”, MAR for “Market Abuse Regulation” and A&D standards for “Admission and Disclosure standards”. 
The AIM rules are available in the “AIM rules for companies” handbook.
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3.6 The switching process between the two markets  
The switch between the two UK markets involves two different steps. The first step is the 
delisting from the market where the firm is currently listed, and the second step is the 
admission to the new market. The two steps occur simultaneously, on the same day. 
According to the LR 5.2 and the AIM rule 41 the firms that delist from the two markets must 
notify Regulatory Information Service (RIS) and send a circular to the shareholders, giving 
at least a twenty business days’ notice of the intended delisting. Importantly, the decision of 
the delisting and subsequent market switch is at the discretion of the management. In fact, 
for the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM there is not even a need for subsequent 
shareholders’ approval. More specifically, although in 2003 the delisting became conditional 
on the approval of at least 75% of the shareholders, this shareholder consent is not required 
when the AIM securities are admitted to trading on an EU regulated market or an AIM 
designated market that enable shareholders to trade their AIM securities in the future (AIM 
rule 41). A similar rule came into force in 2007 for the firms that intent to move from the 
MM to the AIM. In particular, according to the LR 5.2, the firms that intent to delist form 
the MM must receive approval from at least 75% of the shareholders. However, the meeting 
for the approval typically takes place after the announcement of the intention of the firm to 
switch markets. Finally, only the firms that move from the AIM to the MM must prepare a 
prospectus which has to be pre-vetted and approved by the UK Listing Authority (UKLA). 
This obviously becomes available to the public after the announcement of the intention to 
switch.  
The main reason for the upgrade to the MM is that it offers better analyst coverage, 
larger investor pool and higher prestige, at a higher cost. However, a switch to the AIM 
provides lower costs and greater flexibility. While, the two markets are reported to attract 
different firms that have different financing and investment priorities, the decision to list 
either to the AIM or to the MM is not due to the different regulations of the markets but 
rather a self-selection choice just as any other corporate choice (Doukas and Hoque, 2016). 
3.7 The role of advisers in the markets 
The role of advisers is to guide and advise the firms during their listing in the markets but 
also to provide guidance once the companies are listed in the markets. Selecting the right 
advisers is of vital importance for the companies since they work closely together in order 
to minimise any kind of disruptions. This is the reason that the companies often hold the so 
called “beauty parades”, in which they invite potential advisers and discuss with them. Some 
of the criteria the firms usually take into account are the quality of the advisor team and their 
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commitment, their credentials and distribution capabilities, their industry knowledge, the 
quality of the adviser’s research analysts and the level of the fees. For its proper operation a 
firm must assign many advisers such as registrars, lawyers, bookrunners, market makers, 
reporting accountants, sponsors for the firms listed in the MM and Nomads for the firms 
listed in the AIM (London Stock Exchange, 2010; 2015b). 
3.7.1 The role of brokers, registrars and other advisors 
Among the most important advisors for the companies listed in the UK markets are the 
brokers which must be a member of the stock exchange and must be retained during the 
entire public life of the firm.  The broker is a vital instrument for the support of the financing 
needs of the firm as it publishes research in order to provide analyses of the firms to 
investors. Furthermore, the brokerage firms assess the investors’ interest levels during the 
floating process and they provide financial and trading guidance during further issues while 
they offer ongoing advice on pricing and investment related matters (London Stock 
Exchange, 2010; 2015b).  
Another important advisor for the UK companies is the registrar. The relationship 
between the registrar and the firm is a long term one and it has to be retained at all times. 
The registrars work is to keep and maintain the shareholders register up to date, to make sure 
that the appropriate documentation is in place during an IPO in order to effectively deliver 
the shares to investors, to create the share certificates and to provide shareholder information 
to the other advisers when it is appropriate. In addition, the registrar assists the firms with 
different growth aspects of essential corporate parts such as takeovers while it provides any 
necessary information to the other advisors of the firms. Finally, the registrar might also 
provide some additional services such as holding formal regulatory communications with 
the shareholders of the firm or secretarial services. Even though the registrar is an important 
part of the advisory teams, it is not a requirement under the rules of the AIM. However, most 
of the AIM firms appoint a registrar prior to their listing in the market (London Stock 
Exchange, 2010; 2015b). 
Another vital advisor is the lawyer/law firm which conducts legal due diligence on the 
business of the firm while it advises and guides the firms on the drafting process of the 
admission documents and on the legal aspects of the flotation process. In addition, the 
companies may seek the law firm advice on various matters such as acquisitions, compliance 
with legislation or commercial contracts. The public relation firm is another advisor that its 
main role is to provide communication via media and other sources, produce institutional 
  
 
53 
 
roadshow presentations and build and maintain media interest about the firm. Finally, the 
market maker is the advisor that is responsible for pricing the securities and ensuring that 
investors have all the required means to purchases or sell securities. It is an important advisor 
especially for the AIM firm as they are the providers of liquidity. The brokerage firms can 
also have the role of the market maker but they will have to be registered with the LSE 
(London Stock Exchange, 2010; 2015b). 
3.7.2 The role of Nominated Advisers (Nomads) 
The Nomads are the key regulator and advisor for the AIM. All firms admitted to the AIM 
must appoint a Nomad twelve to twenty four weeks prior to their admission and retain one 
during their lifetime to the market. In case an AIM firm doesn’t have a Nomad, either 
because of a Nomad resignation or because of dismissal, its shares are being suspended and 
if the firm does not appoint a new Nomad within thirty days, its shares are cancelled. The 
Nomads are different from the sponsors which are required during the listing in the premium 
segment with the key difference being the ongoing obligations a Nomad has after a firm’s 
admission. However, many Nomads are also sponsors (Acrot et al., 2007; London Stock 
Exchange, 2014a).     
There are certain criteria that have to be met, for an entity to become a Nomad, but even 
if the criteria are met by the entity, the LSE has the right to reject the application if there is 
a possibility that the applicant will harm the reputation and integrity of the AIM. First, the 
entity must be a firm37, since individuals are not eligible for the position of a Nomad. Second, 
the firm must have practised corporate finance for at least the last two years and must have 
acted on at least three relevant transactions38 during that period and third the company must 
employ at least four qualified executives39 of whom the quality will be examined by the LSE 
as a team and on an individual basis. The applicants must pay an application fee of £21,000 
for 2015 and in case the application is successful they have to pay an annual fee to the 
exchange that starts from £14,000 to £55,000 depending on the number of the firms they 
oversight. However, the quality and the eligibility of Nomads is being assessed even after 
                                                 
37 Most of the times the Nomads are accountancy firms, investment banks or corporate finance firms 
(London Stock Exchange, 2015b). 
38 A relevant transaction is a transaction that requires a prospectus or equivalent, or a takeover of a 
public firm (London Stock Exchange, 2014a). 
39 A qualified executive is a person who has a deep understanding of the AIM market as well as the 
UK’s corporate finance. The qualified person must have also acted as a corporate finance advisor for 
at least three years and must have completed at least three relevant transactions during that period 
(London Stock Exchange, 2014a). 
 
  
 
54 
 
their approval. The exchange may at any time request information from the Nomad or even 
conduct interviews to ensure that the high quality of service is maintained and in case the 
Nomad firm breaches its responsibilities, the exchange can issue a warning notice, fine or 
even remove the Nomad (London Stock Exchange, 2014a). 
The Nomad is the centre pillar of the AIM regulation and it should assign at least two 
qualified staff to oversee each AIM company, of whom one must be qualified executive. Its 
role is to assess the appropriateness of an applicant to the AIM by undertaking due diligence 
procedures and by examining whether the directors of the firm are suitable for the AIM. 
Moreover, it should regulate, guide and advise the AIM firms during the floatation process 
by coordinating the preparation of the admission document and by preparing the firm for 
listing. Hence the firms that switch form the MM to the AIM are advised and regulated from 
their Nomads well before their listing to the AIM. The responsibilities of the Nomad do not 
stop on the admission of a firm. The Nomad must have regular contact, guide and oversight 
the AIM firms during their entire existence in the AIM. It consults the AIM firms regarding 
their corporate governance and when a corporate, regulatory or market issue arises it is the 
first contact for the directors of the AIM firms. However, the Nomad also regulates the firms 
and must ensure that the company fully understands its obligations under the “AIM rules for 
companies” and in case a firm has breaches those rules it must inform the exchange to take 
the necessary actions (London Stock Exchange, 2014a).  
The choice of Nomad plays an important role for the firms as it has an impact on their 
survivability after the IPO (Espenlaub et al., 2012), while it could potentially reduce any 
market abusive activities since the Nomad’s quality of work and reputation is likely to be of 
vital importance in eliminating informational asymmetry between the insiders of the AIM 
firms it supervises and outside investors. The Nomad of an AIM firm can also act as a broker, 
providing them with more knowledge and control over the company, but it has to take the 
necessary safeguards in order to avoid any conflicts of interest. However, firms that have the 
same advisor in both roles do not experience higher level of disclosure compliance with the 
QCA (Mallin and Ow-Yong, 2012) which could result in lower levels of information 
asymmetry.  
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter explained the developed of insider trading regulations in the UK as well as the 
most recent changes. It has also set the background of the UK markets by providing 
information about them and explaining the main regulatory differences between them. These 
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admission and ongoing obligation differences as well as the different costs are the main 
incentives for market switches. For example, when firms listed in the AIM are ready to move 
to a more traditionally regulated market with better analyst coverage, larger investor pool 
and higher prestige, they move to the MM. On the other hand, firms listed in the MM that 
cannot afford the high costs of the MM’s demanding regulations, transfer to a less costly 
market with lower regulations and tax advantages for their investors. Prior literature reports 
abnormal stock returns on the announcements of the market switches between the two UK 
markets (Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2013; Campbell and Tabner, 2014). The next chapter 
examines empirically whether those abnormal announcement stock returns could create 
incentives for insiders to leak the market switching information to other investors in order 
to generate profit.  
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4. Information leakage prior to the announcement of the 
UK market switches 
4.1 Introduction 
This empirical chapter provides the analysis for answering the first research question of this 
thesis. It is motivated by the literature of corporate events’ impact on firms’ value and equity 
valuations (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990; Loughran and Ritter, 1995; Spiess and Affleck-
Graves, 1995; Hertzel et al., 2002) and the fact that individuals that are aware of the 
forthcoming event prior to the public announcement, could generate profit by trading 
towards the direction of their information (e.g. Karpoff and Lee, 1991; Kahle, 2000; Agrawal 
and Nasser; 2012). A recent event that is reported to exhibit abnormal stock announcement 
returns are the market switches, and more specifically, the market transitions from the AIM 
to the MM and vice versa. A move to the MM is considered to be a market upgrade triggering 
positive abnormal announcement stock returns while a move to the AIM is believed to be a 
market downgrade triggering negative abnormal announcement stock returns (Jenkinson and 
Ramadorai, 2013; Campbell and Tabner, 2014).  
Informed by the evidence in the literature regarding information leakage prior to major 
corporate announcements (Mandelker, 1974; Keown and Pinkerton, 1981; Eyssell and 
Arshadi, 1993; Holland and Hodgkinson, 1994; Jabbour et al., 2000; King, 2009), this 
empirical chapter assesses whether the market switches could create space for market 
abusive techniques. More specifically, it examines whether the firms that move between the 
two UK markets experience abnormal stock price and trading volume reactions prior to the 
public announcement of their transition, as a sign of leakage of inside information. This 
study differs from the studies of Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2013) and Campbell and Tabner 
(2014) as I focus on the price and volume reactions prior to the announcement of the switches 
as well as the reasons of those activities while the latter studies mostly focus on the 
announcement and post-announcement returns. Hence, the main aim of this study is to 
examine whether market switches are susceptible to informed trading and to provide new 
insights on the information leakage literature. 
The notion that abnormal stock returns is a sign of abnormal trading comes from the law 
of supply and demand. Since, purchases increase the demand and sales increase the supply 
of a certain stock, it is assumed that trading affects stock prices (Fischel and Ross, 1991). As 
stated by Kyle and Viswanathan (2008), trades that possess private information, incorporate 
their informational advantage into the prices, creating a positive externality for the investors 
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who follow prices as signals and driving the prices towards the direction consistent with the 
private information. Hence, trading on positive private information pushes the stock prices 
upwards, whereas trading on negative private information pushes the stock prices 
downwards. 
The UK offers a unique environment for the market switches examination as it provides 
a largest to date number of firms that move between a secondary market and a main market, 
with 287 moves from the MM to the AIM and 119 moves from the AIM to the MM. The 
light regulated markets have become increasingly popular during the last two decades with 
the introduction of secondary markets in Spain and Slovakia in 2008 and Japan in 2009 
among others. The US is also considering the establishment of a secondary market that 
would serve the purpose of facilitating small firms in need of capital with the JOBS Act of 
2012 being the first steps towards this direction. Hence, the market moves are attracting 
interest internationally.  
This chapter’s contribution is twofold. First, it contributes to the existing literature by 
examining abnormal stock price reactions before the transition from a secondary, 
decentralised regulated market to a traditionally regulated market and vice versa, shedding 
light as to whether those events create incentives for market abusive behaviours. Thus, it 
extends the information leakage literature which mostly focuses on other major corporate 
events. Second, this study reflects on both good and bad news, providing evidence that 
insiders could take advantage of their private information and leak it prior to both positive 
and negative occasions, highlighting the conflict of interests between firm’s ownership and 
control. For example, insiders could increase their wealth by sharing information prior to 
both a market upgrade and a market downgrade, however, this action would seriously hurt 
the reputation of the firms if the market discovers the presence of informed trading.  
This study also gives rise to policy implications as I point to a new direction where 
informed trading might be lurking. Thus, the findings of this study are of major importance 
to the UK regulators as I introduce the information leakage hypothesis on a new financial 
event which so far has lacked focus by them but has a high potential of triggering illegal 
activities. The results are also of interest to investors, as they could potentially avoid market 
abusive behaviours and exploitation. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 describes the literature 
review and hypothesis development. Section 4.3 describes the data collection and presents 
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the summary statistics. Section 4.4 explains the methodology of this chapter. Section 4.5 
reports the results of the empirical tests. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
The presence of information asymmetry creates informational differences between investors 
who possess private information about the value of the firms and investors who only have 
access to public information, thus creating an adverse selection problem in the markets, 
where informed investors trade based on price sensitive information (Brown and Hillegeist, 
2007). Individuals who make managerial decisions in the firms, also known as insiders, 
usually possess more information about their firm than outside investors. This is due to the 
periodically disclosure of information to the latter (Aboody and Lev, 2000). This information 
advantage could create incentives for insiders to pass information to other investors in order 
to trade on their behalf or to sell private information to other individuals for profit; actions 
that are especially difficult or even impossible for regulators to monitor40. The sharing of 
price sensitive information to other trusted individuals for the purpose of trading is known 
as information leakage. The information chain usually originates from high ranked members 
of the board, such as executives, while the second parts of the information chain are close 
friends and family and then business associates (Ahern, 2017). Prior literature has 
documented systematic abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading volume as a proxy for 
leakage of inside information prior to the public announcements of major corporate events.  
For example, in the US, Mandelker (1974) examines abnormal stock price reactions prior 
to mergers in the NYSE using monthly trading data during the period of 1941-1968. The 
author finds abnormal stock returns that reach approximately 14%, seven months prior to 
the official announcement of the mergers due to leakage of inside information. However, 
this seminal research has a major limitation which is the calculation of returns on a monthly 
basis. By calculating monthly returns, all daily returns that occur before the mergers during 
the same month are ignored. Keown and Pinkerton (1981) eliminate this limitation by 
calculating daily stock returns prior to takeover announcements. In their research they focus 
on 194 successfully acquired firms in the NYSE and OTC markets during the period of 1975-
1978. The authors find positive abnormal stock returns, 25 trading days prior to the public 
announcements of the events, accompanied by significant abnormal trading volume in line 
                                                 
40 As stated by Margaret Cole, FSA's former managing director of enforcement and financial crime, 
insider trading cases are always difficult, time-consuming and expensive (Bloomberg, 28 June 2016). 
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with the information leakage hypothesis. The authors also claim that the trading is carried 
out thought third parties in order for insiders to escape detection. 
In a similar vein, Cornell and Sirri (1992) investigating illegal insider trading data of 38 
traders obtained from court records on Anheuser-Burch’s acquisition of Cambpell Taggart 
case in 1982 in the US, find that the positive abnormal stock returns prior to the event public 
announcements occur only when illegal insider trading is evident. Furthermore, Meulbroek 
(1992) with a sample that consists of 320 cases of investors charged with illegal insider 
trading by the SEC during the period of 1980-1989, finds that 43% of the price run-ups prior 
to takeover announcements, are related to illegal insider trading indicating that trading based 
on price sensitive information is an important factor to the pre-announcement price run-ups. 
In another specific case research, Chakravarty and McConnell (1997) assess Ivan Boesky 
trades, an investor who was charged for trading illegally based on price sensitive information 
with regards to the acquisition of Carnation by Nestle in 1984. Using daily and hourly data 
of Boesky’s trades, the authors report that his purchases are positively and significantly 
corelated with the price run-ups in Carnation stock price. 
Similar results are reported by Eyssell and Arshadi (1993), who examine 133 firms 
targeted for tender offers in the NYSE and the AMEX stock exchanges over the period of 
1982-1985. In line with the previous evidence, the authors find price run-ups and positive 
abnormal trading volume 50 days prior to the official announcement dates of tender offers 
and a significant and positive relationship between the abnormal stock returns and the 
abnormal trading volume which as they claim is in line with the “informed outsiders”41 
hypothesis. The authors also find a positive relationship between abnormal trading volume 
and net insider purchases 25 days prior to the announcement date, showing evidence of the 
registered insiders’ hypothesis. 
On more recent US studies on short selling before negative events, Christophe et al. 
(2004) examining short sell activity prior to negative earnings surprises on 913 NASDAQ 
firms in 2000, find an increase in short selling that could be attributed to informed trading in 
anticipation of negative news and a decrease in the firms share price. In line with the previous 
claims, Berkman et al. (2016) assess private placements on common stock and convertibles 
in the US during the period of 2007-2011. The authors report increases in short selling prior 
to the public announcements of private placements, which are negatively associated with the 
                                                 
41 The informed outsider’s hypothesis is similar to the information leakage hypothesis. 
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announcement stock returns, providing evidence that the trades are based on price sensitive 
information. 
In Canada where the insider trading regulations are weaker compared to that of the US42, 
just like in the UK (the main differences between the UK and the US insider trading 
regulations and enforcement are presented in Appendix 2), Jabbour et al. (2000) examining 
a sample of 128 acquisitions on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) from 1985 to 1995, find 
Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAARs) of approximately 12%, two months prior 
to the public announcements of the events. In addition to the price run-ups, the authors report 
a positive and significant relation between abnormal trading volume and abnormal stock 
returns which is consistent with the information leakage hypothesis. In a similar vein, King 
(2009) examines 399 takeover announcements in the TSE from 1985 to 2002. Consistent 
with the previous findings, the author finds price run-ups and abnormal trading volume 50 
days prior to the announcements of the takeovers and a positive and significant association 
between them. The author concludes that this evidence is in line with possible illegal insider 
trading activities. 
In the UK, Holland and Hodgkinson (1994) investigate the existence of abnormal stock 
returns prior to the announcements of takeover targets on a sample of 86 targets from 1988 
to 1989. By splitting the sample into firms which are discussed in the news prior to the 
takeover announcement and firms without any pre-announcement news, the authors report 
that the companies with rumours prior to the takeover announcements experience high 
abnormal stock returns. However, they also claim that the firms without any rumours about 
the forthcoming takeovers, also experience abnormal stock returns that reach approximately 
4%, which according to the authors, it could be attributed either to stake building or illegal 
insider trading.  
Moreover, Dubow and Monteiro (2006) have introduced the “market cleanliness 
statistic” in the UK, a statistic which is included in the FCA’s annual reports. This 
measurement is an indicator of insider dealing in the UK markets and a decrease in it, 
translates that the UK markets are clearer from informed trading even though it only covers 
a small percentage of the market. In their research, they examine abnormal stock price 
                                                 
42 Even though the Canadian corporate laws have been inspired by the US (Buckley, 1997), the 
Canadian enforcement is weaker compared to that of the US. The main issue of the Canadian 
enforcement is the lack of a single regulatory body such as the SEC. For example, the regulation of 
securities in Canada is shared by 13 different regulators. In addition, in Canada it is very difficult to 
prove the existence of insider trading, as the Canadian courts have to prove that the investors 
willingly and knowingly traded based on price sensitive information (King, 2009). 
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reactions two days prior to major announcements in FTSE 350 listed firms and prior to 285 
takeover announcements. The period under examination for the FTSE 350 analysis is from 
1998 to 2003 excluding 2001 due to the introduction of FSMA 2000. For the takeover 
analysis, the authors examine the years of 2000 and 2004. They find abnormal stock returns 
prior to the announcements of approximately 30%. Additionally, they report that the 
introduction of the FSMA 2000 does not reduce the insider trading activities. Monteiro 
(2007) updated and improved the “market cleanliness statistic”, by including the 
examination of abnormal trading volume prior to the announcements. In addition, the author 
extended the dataset by adding the year of 2005 for the FTSE 350 analysis and the years of 
2001, 2002 and 2003 for the takeover analysis. The author finds both abnormal stock returns 
and abnormal trading volume prior to the public announcements in both analyses supporting 
the results of the previous research. However, the author finds a poor relationship between 
abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading volume.  
Finally, similar results are reported in another UK study from Siganos and Papa (2015), 
who assess 783 UK merger target firms for the period of 1998-2010. The authors explore 
whether the pre-announcement price run-ups and abnormal trading volume are attributed to 
the FT coverage prior to the public announcements of the events. They find that the news 
coverage partly explains the abnormal trading volume and abnormal stock returns and 
suggest that there is also evidence of potential illegal trading activities. In addition, the 
authors report a strong relationship between abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading 
volume for the firms without media coverage which is consistent with possible leakage of 
insider information. 
Prior literature primarily focusses on trading based on information leakage prior to the 
announcements of takeovers, omitting other events that could potentially generate arbitrage 
opportunities. In addition, the UK regulators mostly focus on takeovers when it comes to 
insider trading, as approximately 70% of the criminal sanctions related to insider trading in 
the UK are due to insider dealing prior to takeovers43, an action that could create space for 
investors to engage in market abusive behaviours in other less notorious, yet profitable 
events. A popular phenomenon in the UK that has been reported to exhibit abnormal 
announcement stock returns and that could be exploited by market investors and insiders, 
are the switches between the two different regulatory markets of the UK, and more 
                                                 
43 An example of a UK criminal sanction case and hyperlinks for other UK criminal sanctions can be 
found in the following link (https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/three-charged-insider-
dealing). 
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specifically the switches from the MM to the AIM and vice versa. For instance, Jenkinson 
and Ramadorai (2013) examining the performance of the firms that move between the two 
markets provide evidence of significant announcement effects associated with the switches. 
The authors report that the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM, which is considered 
to be good news, experience positive abnormal announcement stock returns of 4.6%, while 
the firms that move from the MM to the AIM, a move which is characterised as bad news, 
experience negative abnormal announcement stock returns of -4.3%. Similarly, Campbell 
and Tabner (2014) examining the moves from the MM to the AIM and vice versa during the 
period of 1996-2010, find abnormal announcement stock returns for both the up-switchers 
and the down-switchers. The authors also add, that after the announcement the pattern is 
reversed, meaning that the firms that move to the MM experience lower stock returns after 
the switch and the firms that move to the AIM experience higher stock returns after the 
switch. 
The abnormal announcement stock returns of those events along with the weak regulatory 
environment of the AIM, as managers in the AIM firms have been documented to be more 
prone to disregarding the regulations or laws by engaging in more earnings management 
prior to IPOs compared to other markets (Gerakos et al., 2013; Alhadab et al., 2016), could 
create space for investors to trade based on information advantage prior to the public 
announcement of the switches in order to generate profit. Hence, my hypotheses are: 
Hypothesis 4.1: Firms that switch from the MM to the AIM experience abnormal stock price 
reductions as well as abnormal trading volume prior to the announcement 
of the transitions as a sign of leakage of information.  
Hypothesis 4.2: Firms that switch from the AIM to the MM experience price run-ups as 
well as abnormal trading volume prior to the announcement of the 
transitions as a sign of information leakage. 
4.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
The firm names as well as the transition dates have been identified from the “New issues and 
IPO summary” spreadsheet, which is offered by the LSE website44. However, the 
spreadsheet does not provide any identifier codes (e.g. ISIN or SEDOL codes), hence they 
have been hand collected from Investegate and Nexis databases based on the firm name 
provided by the “New issues and IPO summary”. I further used the latter databases along 
                                                 
44 https://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/new-issues-further-issues/new-issues-further-
issues.htm (last accessed October 2018). 
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with Perfect Information database in order to manually collect the announcement dates of 
the moves between the AIM and the MM.  As announcement of the switch I consider the 
first time that a company officially announces its intention to switch market (some examples 
of announcements are reported in Appendix 3). The stock prices, stock volume and the FTSE 
All Share and FTSE AIM All Share indices are employed from Datastream. The accounting 
data have been downloaded from Worldscope.  
However, Ince and Porter (2006) raise concerns over the coverage and quality of 
Datastream international data due to data errors. Hence, in order to clean the data from 
potential typos or mistakes I follow Karolyi et al. (2012) and Manconi et al. (2017) and 
censor the data below the 1st and above the 99th percentiles. In addition, in the stock and 
volume data I replace all zeros with missing values starting from the bottom, until I reach a 
non zero value in order to remove zero returns due to firms delisting. Finally, due to many 
missing data on the size and on the M/B variables I complement the dataset by hand 
collecting, where possible, the missing size and M/B values from the annual reports of the 
firms downloaded from the Perfect Information database. 
The initial sample consists of 448 moves between the two UK markets45. More 
specifically, it consists of 303 transitions from the MM to the AIM and 145 transitions from 
the AIM to the MM during the period of 1996-2015. Out of this sample, and although my 
efforts to minimize any loss of data through manual collection, I exclude four firms due to 
the lack of identifiers, three firms due to missing announcement dates, and thirty-five firms 
due to missing or incomplete stock return data on Datastream. The final sample consists of 
287 firms that switch from the MM to the AIM and 119 from the AIM to the MM. Table 4-
1 analytically presents the breakdown of the sample selection process.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45 Similar studies that have examined the switches between the two UK markets report a similar 
number of firms during different periods. For instance, Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2013) use a base 
sample of 329 switches between the two UK markets during the period of 1997-2006, while 
Campbell and Tabner (2014) have a base sample of 373 transitions during the period from 1996 to 
2010. 
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Table 4-1: Sample selection process 
Description 
 (1) 
MM to AIM 
(2) 
AIM to MM 
Initial Sample  303 145 
(-) Missing identifiers  3 1 
(-) Missing announcement dates  1 2 
Clear Sample  299 142 
(-) Firms with no stock data/non available on Datastream  12 23 
Final Sample  287 119 
This table shows the sample selection process. The initial sample is retrieved from the “New issues and IPO 
summary” spreadsheet provided by the LSE website. The identifiers and announcement dates are manually 
collected from InvestEgate, Nexis and Perfect Information databases. The stock prices and stock volume data 
are retrieved from Datastream. 
 
Table 4-2 shows the distribution of the switches and the corresponding proceeds across 
the sample period. Panel A reports the numbers of transitions per year from the AIM to the 
MM and panel B shows the number of switches per year from the AIM to the MM. The first 
switch from the MM to the AIM occurred in 1996 while the first switch from the AIM to the 
MM occurred in 1998 due to the fact that the listing requirements of the MM require at least 
three years of audited financial statements. Approximately 36% of the moves from the AIM 
to the MM occurred during the period of 1998-2001 supporting the claim that the AIM was 
indeed a stepping stone of the MM during its first years (Acrot et al., 2007). On the contrary, 
only circa 13% of the switches from the MM to the AIM occurred between 1996 and 2000. 
The majority of the firms that moved from the MM to the AIM was during the period of 
2001-2006, indicating that the AIM started to form its own identity and gained respect from 
well-established firms since 2001. However, the total proceeds of the firms that upgrade to 
the MM are approximately three times higher than those that downgrade to the AIM. 
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Table 4-2: Market switches between the two UK markets 
Panel A: Switches from the MM to the AIM Panel B: Switches from the AIM to the MM 
Year 
Number of 
moves 
Proceeds 
(£m) 
Year 
Number of 
moves 
Proceeds 
(£m) 
1996 1 2.4 1996 0 0.0 
1997 4 9.4 1997 0 0.0 
1998 3 0.0 1998 17 26.1 
1999 10 6.0 1999 13 45.0 
2000 20 58.1 2000 13 230.2 
2001 32 4.3 2001 6 40.5 
2002 37 2.2 2002 5 0.0 
2003 43 5.8 2003 2 0.0 
2004 20 3.0 2004 1 0.0 
2005 35 0.0 2005 1 0.0 
2006 29 56.0 2006 3 0.0 
2007 6 1.5 2007 10 0.0 
2008 10 14.0 2008 12 0.0 
2009 3 0.0 2009 10 104.9 
2010 6 0.0 2010 6 0.0 
2011 6 1.8 2011 8 0.0 
2012 3 5.4 2012 3 0.0 
2013 8 7.0 2013 0 0.0 
2014 6 9.0 2014 5 229.4 
2015 5 49.9 2015 4 20.0 
Total 287 235.8 Total 119 696.1 
This table shows the final sample switches and proceeds between the two UK markets from 1996 to 2015. 
Panel A shows the moves from the MM to the AIM and Panel B presents the moves from the AIM to the MM. 
The market switches and proceeds are retrieved from the “New issues and IPO summary” spreadsheet provided 
by the LSE website. 
 
Panels A and B of table 4-3 show the industry classification for the firms that move from the 
MM to the AIM and from the AIM to the MM respectively. In order to categorize the firms 
into different industries, I use the ICB industry classification which is available through 
Datastream. The majority of the firms that move from the MM to the AIM are from the 
categories of industrials which is almost 30% of the sample, consumer services (17.07%), 
consumer goods (14.63%), technology (13.94%) and financials (13.94%). Similarly, the 
majority of the firms that move from the AIM to the MM are from the categories of financials 
(31.09%), consumer services (14.29%), technology (13.45%), industrials (11.76%) and 
basic materials (10.08%). Overall, there is not a major clustering on specific industries in 
both events. 
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Table 4-3: Industry classification 
Panel A: Switches from the MM to the AIM       
  Frequency % Cum.% 
Basic Materials 10 3.48 3.48 
Consumer Goods 42 14.63 18.12 
Consumer Services 49 17.07 35.19 
Financials 40 13.94 49.13 
Health Care 14 4.88 54.01 
Industrials 85 29.62 83.62 
Oil & Gas 4 1.39 85.02 
Technology 40 13.94 98.95 
Telecommunications 3 1.05 100 
Total 287 100   
Panel B: Switches from the AIM to the MM       
  Frequency % Cum.% 
Basic Materials 12 10.08 10.08 
Consumer Goods 1 0.84 10.92 
Consumer Services 17 14.29 25.21 
Financials 37 31.09 56.30 
Health Care 9 7.56 63.87 
Industrials 14 11.76 75.63 
Oil & Gas 9 7.56 83.19 
Technology 16 13.45 96.64 
Telecommunications 2 1.68 98.32 
Utilities 2 1.68 100 
Total 119 100 
 
This table shows the industry distribution among the firms that move between the two UK markets from 1996 
to 2015. Panel A shows the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and panel B shows the firms that move 
from the AIM to the MM. I use the ICB industry classification system available on Datastream. 
 
 
Table 4-4 depicts the summary statistics of the sample firms during the year prior to the 
announcement of the firms’ transitions. Panel A reports the statistics for the firms that move 
from the MM to the AIM, panel B shows the statistics for the firms that move from the AIM 
to the MM and panel C illustrates the differences between the two samples. I find that the 
firms that move towards the MM are significantly larger firms, with higher growth. The 
average market capitalization of the up-switches is 245m, with a mean M/B equal to 2.91, 
while for the counterpart figures of the down switchers are 28m and 2.91, respectively. The 
firms that switch to the MM appear to have significantly higher stock liquidity compared to 
the firms that switch to the AIM. However, the stock volatility between the two samples is 
reported to be the same. Finally, firms moving to the AIM raise on average 4.48m more 
funds. 
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Table 4-4: Summary statistics 
Panel A: Switches from the MM to the AIM       
 Mean Median Min Max SD N 
Size     27,770 13,311      1,099  552,147    49,987 226 
M/B 1.923 1.060 -7.780 20.380 3.442 226 
Stock Liquidity 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.076 0.006 226 
Volatility 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.001 226 
Proceeds (£m) 0.929 0.000 0.000 53.000 4.422 226 
Panel B: Switches from the AIM to the MM 
Min Max SD N  Mean Median 
Size   245,537   115,162       2,669 2,630,773  417,826 96 
M/B 2.912 2.070 -44.210 27.500 8.637 96 
Stock Liquidity 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.064 0.008 96 
Volatility 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.001 96 
Proceeds (£m) 5.418 0.000 0.000 170.000 24.525 96 
Panel C: Differences between the two samples       
 Mean   P-value Median     P-value   
Size  -217,837*** (0.000) -101,851*** (0.000)   
M/B -0.989 (0.142) -1.010*** (0.000)   
Stock Liquidity -0.001* (0.087) 0.000** (0.022)   
Volatility 0.000 (0.413) 0.000 (0.369)   
Proceeds (£m) -4.489*** (0.008) 0.000 (0.604)   
This table shows the summary statistics of the firms that move between the two UK markets from 1996 to 
2015. Panel A presents the firms that move from the MM to the AIM, panel B shows the firms that move from 
the AIM to the MM and panel C depicts the differences between the two samples. Size is measured by the 
market capitalisation and it is scaled in thousands. M/B is the market to book ratio. Stock liquidity is the daily 
average of the trading volume to shares outstanding ratio over the days (-250, -81) prior to the announcement 
of the switch. Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock returns over the days (-250, -81) before the 
announcement of the switch. Proceeds are the funds raised during the switch in millions and are collected from 
the “New issue and IPO summary” spreadsheet offered by the LSE website. The financial data are retrieved 
from Worldscope. Stock and volume data are retrieved from Datastream. The numbers in italic represent the 
number of observations. P-values are reported in the parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
 
4.3.1  Control firms’ sample 
In order to compare the event firms with other similar firms that did not switch markets 
during that period, I perform a matching method following a similar methodology as Brophy 
et al. (2009). To perform the matching with the control firms, I first download the yearly 
FTSE All Share and FTSE AIM All Share constituents lists from Datastream at the end of 
each calendar year along with the market capitalisation (size), M/B ratio and ICB codes of 
the constituent firms. I use the yearly FTSE AIM All Share lists for the firms that move from 
the AIM to the MM and the yearly FTSE All Share lists for the firms that move from the 
MM to the AIM. I match each event firm with a control firm that is in the same constituents 
list, it is under the same industry classification and it has the smallest difference in the one 
year lagged market capitalisation and M/B ratio. For the years that there are no available 
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constituents lists on Datastream, I match them with the closest available list46. If the size or 
M/B values of the control firm is missing, I match the firm with another company that has 
the same industry group with non-missing size and M/B values. In total I match 279 out of 
the 287 firms from the MM to AIM dataset and 104 out of the 119 firms from the AIM to 
the MM dataset. Lastly, I download the stock returns of the matched firms from Datastream. 
Table 4-5 shows the breakdown of the control firms matching. 
Table 4-5: Control firms matching process 
Description 
 (1) 
MM to AIM 
(2) 
AIM to MM 
Initial Sample  303 145 
(-) Missing Identifiers  3 1 
(-) Missing Announcement dates  1 2 
(-) Firms with no stock data/non available on Datastream  12 23 
Final Sample   287 119 
(-) Sample firms with no market cap or M/B data  8 15 
Matched Sample  279 104 
This table reports the control firms matching process. The initial sample is retrieved from the “New issues and 
IPO summary” spreadsheet provided by the LSE website. The identifiers and announcement dates are manually 
collected from InvestEgate, Nexis and Perfect Information databases. The matching is based on their industry 
(ICB), market capitalisation (size) and M/B following Brophy et al. (2009). 
 
4.3.2 Market anticipation and concurrent announcement samples collection 
In order to control for abnormal stock returns that could be attributed to market anticipation, 
as suggested by Jensen and Ruback (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989b) and Sanders and 
Zdanowicz (1992), I search whether there are news or rumours of the moves up to one year 
prior to the public announcement of the switches. The rumours are hand collected from the 
FT archive and Nexis databases. For the hand collection I use the name of the company as 
described by the “New issues and IPO summary” spreadsheet provided by the LSE website 
and the following key words: AIM, Alternative Investment Market, Main Market, MM, 
official list, official market, move, switch, list, delist and transition. I search through the full 
articles rather than just the headlines. The difference between rumours and the 
announcement dates is that the rumours are unofficial discussions about a potential switch 
on the media while the announcements dates are official announcements of the switches 
from the companies.    
Table 4-6 presents the rumours summary statistics. Panels A shows the number of firms 
with rumours, Panel B reports the day differences between the rumours and the official 
                                                 
46 The FTSE All Share constituents’ lists are available from 1996 while the FTSE AIM All Share 
constituents are available from 2001. 
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announcements and Panel C shows the impact of those rumours in the firms’ stock prices. 
More specifically, in Panel C I report the returns of the firms during the announcement of 
the rumour (-1, 1) and ten days after the rumours (1, 10). For both the sample of the up-
switchers and the sample of the down-switchers a total of 15 firms in each respective group 
have rumours. This constitutes about 5% of the firms that upgraded market and 13% of the 
firms that downgraded market. The average (median) days between the rumours and the 
actual announcement is circa 72 (66) days for the firms that move from the MM to the AIM 
and approximately 157 (143) days for the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM. I also 
find that the impact of rumours in stock returns is -0.9% for the firms that switch from the 
MM to the AIM and 2.1% for the firms that move from the AIM to the MM. The results are 
significant at the 10% and 1% level respectively. This evidence suggests that rumours can 
potentially explain some of the abnormal stock returns prior to market switches. 
Table 4-6: Rumours summary statistics 
Panel A: Firms with rumours     
  
(1) (2) 
MM to AIM AIM to MM 
Financial Times archive 5 6 
Nexis database 10 9 
Total 15 15 
% of rumours 0.052 0.126 
Panel B: Day difference between rumours and official announcements   
  
(1) (2) 
MM to AIM AIM to MM 
Average days 72 157 
Median days 66 143 
Panel C: Impact of rumours on returns   
Windows 
(1) (2) 
MM to AIM AIM to MM 
(-1, 1) -0.009* 0.021*** 
 (0.057) (0.004) 
(1, 10) -0.017*** 0.023*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
This table reports the summary statistics of the rumours. Panel A shows the number of firms with rumours, 
panel B shows the day differences between the rumours and the actual announcement of the switches and panel 
C shows the impact of those rumours in the firm’s stock prices. The rumours are manually collected from the 
Financial Times archive and Nexis databases. The abnormal stock returns are calculated by employing an OLS 
market model following Brown and Warner (1985). The symbols * and *** denote statistical significance at 
the 10 and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
 I further create another group of the firms that simultaneously announced another major 
corporate event (e.g. takeovers, mergers, annual and half year results) on the same day or 
one month prior to the switch announcement in order to examine whether the abnormal stock 
prices are attributed to the market transitions or to other major corporate announcements. I 
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use a one month window as I also want to eliminate firms that announced a major corporate 
event only few days prior to our event. This group is called Concurrent Announcement (CA). 
For the hand collection of other major corporate events I use Nexis and InvestEgate 
databases. Hence, I create three sub-sample; the first group includes the firms which 
announced more than one major corporate events (CA), the second group includes the firms 
which are discussed in the press regarding the switch prior to the actual announcement of 
the transition (rumours) and the third group includes the firms without any rumours or CAs 
which I call “free sample”.  
Table 4-7 presents the sub samples of the three different groups. The firms that announced 
a major corporate event are 186 for the MM to the AIM dataset and 74 for the AIM to the 
MM dataset. The firms that are discussed in the news before the official announcement are 
15 for the MM to the AIM and AIM to the MM datasets respectively. Finally, the firms that 
have no rumours or CAs are 86 for the MM to the AIM group and 30 for the AIM to the MM 
group. Some examples of rumours and CAs are presented in Appendix 3. 
Table 4-7: Breakdown of the sub-groups 
Description 
 (1) 
MM to AIM 
(2) 
AIM to MM 
CA sample  186 74 
Rumours sample  15 15 
Free sample  86 30 
Total sample  287 119 
This table shows the breakdown of the three subgroups. The CA sample includes the firms that announced a 
major corporate during the switch announcement or one month prior to the announcement. The rumours sample 
includes the firms that are mentioned in the press with regards to the move one year prior to the official 
announcement of the switch. The free sample includes the firms that do not have any rumours or CAs. The 
rumours and CAs are hand collected from the FT archive, Nexis and InvestEgate databases using the name of 
the firm as provided by the “New issues and IPO summary” spreadsheet, downloaded from the LSE website, 
and a series of key words. 
 
4.4 Methodology 
Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) argue that the CAPM residuals are on average negative 
for large firms and positive for small firms. In my samples, the size gap between the AIM 
firms and the MM firms is large, since AIM firms are generally larger than MM firms prior 
to their move to the other market. Seyhun (1986) argues that this systematic risk could lead 
to biases in estimating abnormal stock returns. The author also supports the use of the market 
model for the measurement of the returns due to the fact that market model prediction errors 
have an expected value of zero for firms of any size, avoiding the bias introduced by CAPM. 
Accordingly, I measure the abnormal stock returns prior to the announcements of the moves 
from the AIM to the MM and vice versa using an event study methodology, employing an 
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OLS market model following Brown and Warner (1985). In order to measure the abnormal 
trading volume, I follow Bris (2005) and King (2009) using a conservative model which 
considers as abnormal trading volume only the movements of trading volume that are higher 
than the average trading volume plus two standard deviations. The t = 0 is the first public 
announcement of the transitions. 
4.4.1 Calculation of abnormal stock returns 
The abnormal stock returns are calculated as follows: 
    𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 ∗ 𝑅𝑀,𝑡         (4.1) 
Where ARi,t is the excess return of a security i at day t, Ri,t is the logarithmic return of 
security i at day t and RM,t is the return of the market at the day t.  Following Jabbour et al. 
(2000), Betton and Eckbo (2000) and Siganos and Papa (2015), the event window is 60 
trading days prior to the public announcements and ends 20 days after the announcements (-
60 +20). Another reason that I use this window is due to the fact that the UK regulators 
prohibit insider trading during close periods, that is 60 days prior to yearly or half yearly 
results, due to the fact that they deem this time period especially sensitive for illegal insider 
trading activities. The estimation window is 250 to 81 trading days prior to the first public 
announcement (-250 -81). Following King (2009) and Siganos and Papa (2015), I leave a 
gap between the event and control window in order to make sure that the estimation window 
is not contaminated by the event window. I calculate the daily abnormal stock returns using 
the FTSE All Share index for the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM and the FTSE 
AIM All Share index for the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM as a proxy for the 
market. 
4.4.2 Calculation of abnormal trading volume 
The abnormal trading volume is calculated as follows: 
𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − (?̅?𝑖 + 2𝑆𝑣𝑜𝑙) 𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑖,𝑡 >  ?̅?𝑖 + 2𝑆𝑣𝑜𝑙 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 0       (4.2) 
Where AVi,t  is the excess volume of a firm i at day t, Vi,t is the volume of the firm i at day 
t divided by the number of the common shares outstanding and  ?̅?𝑖 and Svol are the mean and 
standard deviation of a firm i over the estimation window (-250, -81). The event and 
estimation windows are the same as for the calculation of abnormal stock returns. 
This methodology is based on prior theoretical assumptions on US and Canadian studies 
on takeovers or other major corporate events (e.g. Keown and Pinkerton, 1981, Meulbroek, 
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1992, Jabbour et al., 2000, King, 2009) and on methods the LSE uses in order to generate 
alerts for possible trading on price sensitive information (Dubow and Monteiro, 2006; 
Monteiro, 2007; Goldman et al., 2014). In addition, this methodology is used by the SEC, as 
they may require evidence of abnormal stock returns in the courts for some insider trading 
cases based on information leakage, when they seek to prove that a firm or an individual has 
engaged in market abusive behaviours (Mitchell and Netter, 1994). Its power is that it 
captures abnormal stock price and trading volume actions which could be attributed to 
leakage of inside information that are undetected by the regulators. However, its limitation 
is that it is unable to identify the insiders who trade prior to the events and their strategies. 
Testing for insider trading by examining the volume of disclosed trades by insiders 
eliminates this limitation (Chapter 5 examines for abnormal insider trading activity based on 
insiders disclosed trades). 
4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 Results on abnormal stock returns  
Table 4-8 reports the Average Abnormal Returns (AAR) and the CAARs of the entire sample 
during the event window (-60, +20). Panel A shows the firms that move from the MM to the 
AIM and panel B presents the firms that move from the AIM to the MM. The CAARs of 
panels A and B are also graphically presented in Figures 4-3 and 4-4 respectively. As shown 
in panel A the AARs of the firms that switch to the AIM fluctuate around zero and become 
significantly negative mostly on the days around the event date. The CAARs are negative 
and significant, mostly at the 1% level, from day -59 reaching -3.88% at day -1. In contrast, 
as shown in panel B, the AARs of the firms that switch to the MM appear to be mostly 
positive and start to become significant from day -42. The CAARs start to become positive 
and significant from day -53 and reach 5.82% on day -1. The ARRs on the announcement 
day (day=0) are statistically significant at the 1% level on both events, indicating that the 
date of the first public announcement has been correctly captured in the manually collected 
sample.  More specifically, the announcement returns (-1, +1) are -1.5% for the firms that 
downgrade to the AIM and 1.7% for the firms that upgrade to the MM. The announcements 
returns are lower compared to the study of Jenkinson and Ramadorai (2013) who find 
announcement abnormal returns of -4.3% for the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM 
and 4.6% for the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM. This difference could be 
attributed to the different time frame that we use as well as the different methodology. 
In addition, I perform an event study methodology using a 90 trading days window prior 
to the public announcement of the switches in order to examine whether the 60 trading day 
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period captures the abnormal stock price activity. I calculate the returns using the market 
model. Further, in order to isolate the firms that switch markets, I exclude the firms with 
rumours and the firms that simultaneously announced a takeover or a merger which 
according to the literature are the main events that are known to trigger significant abnormal 
stock returns prior to their announcements (Jabbour et al., 2000; King, 2009). Figure 4-3 
presents the CAARs of the firms, 90 trading days prior to the move from the MM to the AIM 
and Figure 4-4 shows the 90 trading day CAARs of the companies that move from the AIM 
to the MM. As shown in Figure 4-3, the abnormal stock returns for the switches from the 
MM to the AIM start approximately 64 trading days prior to the official announcement while 
Figure 4-4 shows that the abnormal returns start approximately 53 trading days prior to the 
public announcement. The figures report that the 60 day event period captures the price run-
ups and price reduction actions.  
Overall, the results show that the firms that move from the MM to the AIM experience 
negative abnormal stock returns prior to the announcement of their switch which is in line 
with the first hypothesis. On the contrary, the firms that move from the AIM to the MM 
experience price run-ups prior to the announcement of their transition which is in line with 
the second hypothesis. However, the results could be attributed either to the information 
leakage hypothesis or to the market anticipation hypothesis. In order to disentangle whether 
the abnormal stock reactions are due to market anticipation or to information leakage I 
perform an additional test which is reported in section 4.5.3.  
4.5.2 Results on abnormal trading volume 
Bris (2005) argues that another sign of potential illegal trading is the abnormal trading 
volume. In this section I explore the abnormal trading volume prior to the public 
announcement of the moves. Apart from the returns, Table 4-8 also presents the Average 
Abnormal Volume (AAV) and the Cumulative Average Abnormal Volume (CAAV) over 
the event window (-60, +20). Panel A shows the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM 
while panel B presents the firms that move from the AIM to the MM. Panel’s A and B CAAV 
are also graphed in Figure 4-5 and 4-6 respectively. The CAAV on day -1 is 3.40% for the 
firms that move from the MM to the AIM and 3.63% for the firms that move from the AIM 
to the MM, suggesting that the firms that switch between the two UK markets experience 
abnormal pre-announcement trading volume. The CAAV of the firms that switch from the 
MM to the AIM is statistically significant from day -58 while the CAAV for the firms that 
move from the AIM to the MM is positive and significant from day -53. The high and 
significant AAV on the announcement date (day=0) on both events, once again suggests that 
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the announcement dates are captured correctly. A further analysis on the relation between 
abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading volume is reported in section 4.6.4. 
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Table 4-8: Average abnormal stock returns and trading volume prior to the switch announcements between the two UK markets 
Panel A: Switches from the MM to the AIM 
Day AAR % AAV % CAAR % CAAV % Day AAR % AAV % CAAR % CAAV % 
-60 -0.0023 0.0005** -0.0023 0.0005 -19 -0.0002 0.0005** -0.0288*** 0.0256*** 
-59 -0.0013 0.0004*** -0.0036*** 0.0009 -18 -0.0009 0.0002* -0.0297*** 0.0258*** 
-58 0.0022 0.0005*** -0.0014* 0.0014* -17 -0.0018 0.0005** -0.0315*** 0.0263*** 
-57 0.0001 0.0006** -0.0013* 0.0020*** -16 0.0028* 0.0006*** -0.0287*** 0.0269*** 
-56 0.0003 0.0004 -0.0011* 0.0024*** -15 0.0005 0.0005** -0.0282*** 0.0274*** 
-55 -0.0014 0.0002** -0.0024*** 0.0026*** -14 0.0015 0.0007** -0.0267*** 0.0281*** 
-54 0.0007 0.0003* -0.0018*** 0.0029*** -13 -0.0035** 0.0004** -0.0301*** 0.0285*** 
-53 0.0006 0.0008** -0.0012** 0.0038*** -12 -0.0017 0.0009*** -0.0319*** 0.0295*** 
-52 -0.0005 0.0012** -0.0017*** 0.0050*** -11 -0.0006 0.0006** -0.0325*** 0.0301*** 
-51 -0.0011 0.0007 -0.0027*** 0.0057*** -10 -0.0029* 0.0009** -0.0354*** 0.0310*** 
-50 -0.0002 0.0007** -0.0030*** 0.0064*** -9 -0.0023 0.0004** -0.0377*** 0.0314*** 
-49 0.0006 0.0008* -0.0024*** 0.0072*** -8 0.0011 0.0003** -0.0366*** 0.0317*** 
-48 -0.0010 0.0004* -0.0034*** 0.0076*** -7 0.0009 0.0004** -0.0357*** 0.0322*** 
-47 0.0009 0.0007* -0.0025*** 0.0083*** -6 -0.0002 0.0003* -0.0359*** 0.0324*** 
-46 -0.0013 0.0002* -0.0038*** 0.0086*** -5 -0.0009 0.0003** -0.0368*** 0.0327*** 
-45 -0.0023 0.0006 -0.0061*** 0.0092*** -4 -0.0016 0.0004* -0.0384*** 0.0331*** 
-44 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0061*** 0.0093*** -3 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0380*** 0.0333*** 
-43 -0.0021 0.0003** -0.0082*** 0.0096*** -2 -0.0035** 0.0001** -0.0415*** 0.0334*** 
-42 -0.0013 0.0023 -0.0095*** 0.0119*** -1 0.0027* 0.0006** -0.0388*** 0.0340*** 
-41 -0.0024 0.0016* -0.0119*** 0.0135*** 0 -0.0130*** 0.0049*** -0.0518*** 0.0389*** 
-40 -0.0023 0.0005** -0.0142*** 0.0140*** 1 -0.0046* 0.0032** -0.0565*** 0.0421*** 
-39 -0.0028 0.0003** -0.0170*** 0.0143*** 2 -0.0040* 0.0015*** -0.0605*** 0.0436*** 
-38 0.0005 0.0006*** -0.0165*** 0.0149*** 3 -0.0041* 0.0007*** -0.0646*** 0.0443*** 
-37 -0.0035** 0.0005*** -0.0200*** 0.0154*** 4 -0.0031 0.0010*** -0.0677*** 0.0452*** 
-36 -0.0009 0.0007** -0.0209*** 0.0161*** 5 -0.0054*** 0.0019*** -0.0731*** 0.0471*** 
-35 0.0008 0.0009** -0.0201*** 0.0169*** 6 -0.0007 0.0009*** -0.0738*** 0.0481*** 
-34 -0.0014 0.0002* -0.0216*** 0.0171*** 7 -0.0034** 0.0006** -0.0772*** 0.0487*** 
-33 -0.0010 0.0003* -0.0226*** 0.0175*** 8 -0.0061*** 0.0008*** -0.0833*** 0.0495*** 
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Day AAR % AAV % CAAR % CAAV % Day AAR % AAV % CAAR % CAAV % 
-32 0.0010 0.0003 -0.0216*** 0.0178*** 9 0.0000 0.0005*** -0.0834*** 0.0499*** 
-31 0.0011 0.0003** -0.0205*** 0.0181*** 10 0.0019 0.0018 -0.0814*** 0.0512*** 
-30 -0.0002 0.0013 -0.0207*** 0.0195*** 11 -0.0004 0.0014 -0.0818*** 0.0531*** 
-29 -0.0012 0.0004** -0.0219*** 0.0199*** 12 -0.0032* 0.0012*** -0.0850*** 0.0543*** 
-28 -0.0027* 0.0002* -0.0246*** 0.0201*** 13 -0.0021 0.0005*** -0.0871*** 0.0548*** 
-27 0.0022 0.0006** -0.0223*** 0.0207*** 14 -0.0015 0.0006** -0.0886*** 0.0555*** 
-26 -0.0003 0.0004** -0.0226*** 0.0211*** 15 -0.0012 0.0014* -0.0898*** 0.0569*** 
-25 0.0008 0.0006** -0.0218*** 0.0216*** 16 -0.0012 0.0017*** -0.0910*** 0.0586*** 
-24 -0.0021 0.0006** -0.0239*** 0.0222*** 17 0.0009 0.0006*** -0.0901*** 0.0593*** 
-23 0.0022 0.0007* -0.0217*** 0.0229*** 18 0.0011 0.0013** -0.0890*** 0.0606*** 
-22 -0.0027 0.0012** -0.0244*** 0.0241*** 19 0.0012 0.0015*** -0.0878*** 0.0621*** 
-21 0.0007 0.0006** -0.0237*** 0.0247*** 20 -0.0048*** 0.0007*** -0.0926*** 0.0627*** 
-20 -0.0049*** 0.0004** -0.0286*** 0.0251***      
Panel B: Switches from the AIM to the MM 
Day AAR % AAV % CAAR % CAAV % Day AAR % AAV % CAAR % CAAV % 
-60 0.0007 0.0012 0.0007 0.0012 -19 0.0011 0.0000 0.0341*** 0.0308*** 
-59 -0.0032 0.0005* -0.0025 0.0016 -18 -0.0001 0.0003 0.0339*** 0.0311*** 
-58 -0.0019 0.0007** -0.0044*** 0.0024** -17 0.0042** 0.0001 0.0382*** 0.0311*** 
-57 -0.0030 0.0005* -0.0074*** 0.0029*** -16 -0.0023 0.0002** 0.0358*** 0.0313*** 
-56 0.0020 0.0007* -0.0055** 0.0036*** -15 -0.0010 0.0003 0.0348*** 0.0316*** 
-55 0.0034 0.0009 -0.0021 0.0045*** -14 0.0000 0.0004 0.0347*** 0.0320*** 
-54 0.0020 0.0024 -0.0001 0.0068*** -13 0.0049** 0.0001 0.0397*** 0.0321*** 
-53 0.0015 0.0019 0.0014* 0.0087*** -12 -0.0005 0.0002 0.0392*** 0.0322*** 
-52 0.0007 0.0016** 0.0021*** 0.0104*** -11 0.0025 0.0004 0.0417*** 0.0326*** 
-51 0.0001 0.0009* 0.0023*** 0.0113*** -10 -0.0008 0.0002* 0.0409*** 0.0328*** 
-50 -0.0018 0.0008** 0.0005 0.0121*** -9 0.0006 0.0003 0.0415*** 0.0331*** 
-49 0.0008 0.0006 0.0013* 0.0127*** -8 0.0045* 0.0005** 0.0461*** 0.0336*** 
-48 0.0006 0.0009*** 0.0019*** 0.0137*** -7 -0.0018 0.0004** 0.0443*** 0.0339*** 
-47 0.0001 0.0006* 0.0020*** 0.0142*** -6 0.0033 0.0006* 0.0476*** 0.0345*** 
-46 0.0000 0.0003** 0.0020*** 0.0145*** -5 0.0064** 0.0007*** 0.0540*** 0.0352*** 
-45 0.0011 0.0002 0.0030*** 0.0148*** -4 0.0012 0.0005** 0.0552*** 0.0357*** 
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Day AAR % AAV % CAAR % CAAV % Day AAR % AAV % CAAR % CAAV % 
-44 -0.0010 0.0005 0.0020*** 0.0153*** -3 0.0000 0.0002** 0.0552*** 0.0359*** 
-43 0.0007 0.0011 0.0027*** 0.0164*** -2 0.0031 0.0000 0.0583*** 0.0359*** 
-42 0.0033* 0.0009** 0.0060*** 0.0173*** -1 -0.0001 0.0004* 0.0582*** 0.0363*** 
-41 0.0032 0.0010** 0.0081*** 0.0184*** 0 0.0111*** 0.0026*** 0.0693*** 0.0389*** 
-40 0.0032 0.0005 0.0113*** 0.0189*** 1 0.0062* 0.0019** 0.0755*** 0.0408*** 
-39 0.0001 0.0001 0.0114*** 0.0190*** 2 -0.0003 0.0008* 0.0752*** 0.0416*** 
-38 -0.0008 0.0001 0.0106*** 0.0191*** 3 -0.0016 0.0002 0.0735*** 0.0418*** 
-37 0.0017 0.0005 0.0123*** 0.0196*** 4 -0.0013 0.0008* 0.0723*** 0.0426*** 
-36 0.0003 0.0004 0.0126*** 0.0199*** 5 0.0036 0.0004** 0.0759*** 0.0430*** 
-35 -0.0016 0.0003 0.0110*** 0.0202*** 6 -0.0015 0.0004** 0.0744*** 0.0434*** 
-34 0.0022 0.0001 0.0132*** 0.0203*** 7 0.0026 0.0003* 0.0770*** 0.0437*** 
-33 0.0014 0.0002** 0.0145*** 0.0205*** 8 -0.0020 0.0002* 0.0750*** 0.0439*** 
-32 0.0037* 0.0003 0.0182*** 0.0208*** 9 -0.0058** 0.0003** 0.0692*** 0.0442*** 
-31 0.0038 0.0002* 0.0220*** 0.0210*** 10 0.0022 0.0006* 0.0714*** 0.0448*** 
-30 0.0019 0.0027 0.0239*** 0.0237*** 11 -0.0012 0.0003 0.0702*** 0.0451*** 
-29 0.0007 0.0004** 0.0246*** 0.0241*** 12 -0.0013 0.0009*** 0.0689*** 0.0460*** 
-28 0.0045 0.0007* 0.0291*** 0.0248*** 13 -0.0017 0.0003* 0.0672*** 0.0464*** 
-27 0.0033 0.0025 0.0325*** 0.0273*** 14 -0.0022 0.0007* 0.0650*** 0.0471*** 
-26 0.0001 0.0006** 0.0326*** 0.0279*** 15 -0.0014 0.0005** 0.0635*** 0.0476*** 
-25 -0.0004 0.0004* 0.0322*** 0.0283*** 16 0.0009 0.0008* 0.0644*** 0.0484*** 
-24 0.0007 0.0004 0.0329*** 0.0287*** 17 -0.0024 0.0001* 0.0621*** 0.0485*** 
-23 -0.0009 0.0005* 0.0320*** 0.0292*** 18 -0.0006 0.0000 0.0614*** 0.0486*** 
-22 0.0012 0.0006 0.0332*** 0.0297*** 19 0.0001 0.0009 0.0615*** 0.0495*** 
-21 0.0014 0.0004* 0.0346*** 0.0302*** 20 -0.0021 0.0004* 0.0594*** 0.0499*** 
-20 -0.0017 0.0006* 0.0329*** 0.0308***           
This table reports the average abnormal returns (AAR)/average abnormal volume (AVV) and the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs)/cumulative average abnormal volume 
(CAAV) of the firms that switch between the two UK markets during the event window (-60, +20). For the calculation of abnormal stock returns I use an OLS market model following Brown 
and Warner (1985) while for the calculation of the abnormal trading volume I use the following model AVi,t = Vi,t -(V̅i + 2Svol) if Vi,t > V̅i + 2Svol  otherwise zero following Bris (2005). Panel 
A reports the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and panel B shows the firms that move from the AIM to the MM. The stock prices, volume and indices prices are retrieved from 
Datastream. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
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Figure 4-1: Cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the firms that switch 
from the MM to the AIM 
This figure shows the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the firms that move from the MM to the 
AIM from day -60 to day +20 for the time period of 1996 to 2015. The horizontal axis represents the days and 
the vertical axis represent the abnormal stock returns. For the calculation of the returns I use an OLS market 
model following Brown and Warner (1985). The stock data and indices are retrieved from Datastream. The 
event day is t=0. 
 
Figure 4-2: Cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the firms that switch 
from the AIM to the MM 
This figure shows the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the firms that move from the AIM to the 
MM from day -60 to day +20 for the time period of 1996 to 2015. The horizontal axis represents the days and 
the vertical axis represent the abnormal stock returns. For the calculation of the returns I use an OLS market 
model following Brown and Warner (1985). The stock data and indices are retrieved from Datastream. The 
event day is t=0. 
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Figure 4-3: Extended cumulative average abnormal stock returns prior to the 
announcement of the move from the MM to the AIM (90 days) 
This figure presents the cumulative average abnormal returns 90 trading days prior to the move announcement 
and 20 days after the announcement of the switch from the MM to the AIM for the period of 1996-2015. The 
horizontal axis represents the days and the vertical axis represent the abnormal stock returns. The stock returns 
are calculated using the market model following Brown and Warner (1985). For the calculation of the returns 
I exclude the firms with rumours and the firms that simultaneously announced a takeover or a merger. The 
stock data are retrieved from Datastream. The rumours are hand collected through the FT archive and Nexis 
databases. The market switches announcements are manually collected from InvestEgate and Nexis databases. 
 
Figure 4-4: Extended cumulative average abnormal stock returns prior to the 
announcement of the move from the AIM to the MM (90 days) 
This figure shows the cumulative average abnormal returns 90 trading days prior to the move announcement 
and 20 days after the announcement of the switch from the AIM to the MM for the period of 1996-2015. The 
horizontal axis represents the days and the vertical axis represent the abnormal returns. The stock returns are 
calculated using the market model following Brown and Warner (1985). For the calculation of the returns I 
exclude the firms with rumours and the firms that simultaneously announced a takeover or a merger. The 
stock data are retrieved from Datastream. The rumours are hand collected through the FT archive and Nexis 
databases. The market switches announcements are manually collected from InvestEgate and Nexis 
databases. 
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Figure 4-5: Cumulative average abnormal trading volume of the firms that switch 
from the MM to the AIM 
This figure shows the cumulative average abnormal trading volume of the firms that switch from the MM to 
the AIM from day -60 to day +20 for the time period of 1996 to 2015. The horizontal axis represents the days 
and the vertical axis represent the abnormal trading volume. For the calculation of the abnormal trading volume 
I use the following model AVi,t = Vi,t -(V̅i + 2Svol) if Vi,t > V̅i + 2Svol  otherwise zero following Bris (2005). The 
volume data are retrieved from Datastream. The event day is t=0.  
 
 
Figure 4-6: Cumulative average abnormal trading volume of the firms that switch 
from the AIM to the MM 
 
This figure shows the cumulative average abnormal trading volume of the firms that switch from the AIM to 
the MM from day -60 to day +20 for the time period of 1996 to 2015. The horizontal axis represents the days 
and the vertical axis represent the abnormal trading volume. For the calculation of the abnormal trading volume 
I use the following model AVi,t = Vi,t -(V̅i + 2Svol) if Vi,t > V̅i + 2Svol  otherwise zero following Bris (2005). The 
volume data are retrieved from Datastream. The event day is t=0. 
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4.5.3 Empirical results after controlling for market anticipation and other major 
corporate announcements 
In this section I investigate whether the pre-announcement abnormal stock reactions are 
attributed to market anticipation or to information leakage. Jensen and Ruback (1983) argue 
that the pre-announcement price run-ups could be attributed to the market anticipation over 
the upcoming corporate event. This market anticipation over an event stems from 
information provided in various press releases. Thus, investors anticipation of a particular 
event, accurate or not, could drive the prices up or down depending on the news.  In addition, 
studies report market anticipation to be based on the presence of rumours in the media 
(Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989b; Sanders and Zdanowicz, 1992).  In order to control for market 
anticipation, I split the sample into firms with rumours about the switch and firms without 
rumours one year prior to the announcement of the event. Furthermore, in order to isolate 
the effect of private information on the switches between the two markets, I create another 
sub-sample with the firms that announced another major corporate on the same day or one 
month prior to the official switch announcement. The rumours and CA collection is 
analytically discussed in section 4.3.2. Hence, the sample is divided into three sub-groups. 
The first group is the firms with rumours, the second group is the firms with CAs, and the 
third group is the firms without rumours or CAs which I call “free sample”. 
Table 4-9 reports the returns of the three sub-samples during a 60 and a 30 trading day 
window as well as during the announcement date. In addition, it shows the differences 
between the three sub-groups. Panel A presents the firms that move from the MM to the 
AIM and panel B shows the firms that move from the AIM to the MM. The firms with 
rumours (column 4) experience the higher returns on all three windows on both events. The 
differences between the free sample and the rumours (column 7) are statistically significant 
at the 10% level for the 60 day window for the firms that move from the MM to the AIM 
and for the 60 and 30 day windows for the firms that move from the AIM to the MM. The 
companies with CAs (column 3) also experience abnormal stock returns that reach -3.9% 
and 3.4% for the down-switchers and up-switchers respectively. However, the differences 
are not significantly different from the free sample firms. Finally, the 60 day returns of the 
free sample (column 2) remain at -2.6% for the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM 
and at 4.2% for the firms move from the AIM to the MM, indicating the presence of possible 
leakage of inside information on both events even after the exclusion of rumours and CAs.  
Overall, the results report that the rumours and other major corporate events can partly 
explain these abnormal stock patterns, with a significant percentage of abnormal stock 
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returns being unexplained. Hence, the results show evidence of potential leakage of insider 
information prior to the market switches above what it could have been predicted based on 
rumours available on media or other major corporate events. The CAARs for the three 
groups are also illustrated in Figures 4-7 and 4-8 for the firms that move from the MM to the 
AIM and for the firms that move from the AIM to the MM respectively. 
Table 4-9: Cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the sub-groups 
Panel A: Switches from the MM to the AIM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CAAR 
 
Full 
Sample 
Free 
Sample 
C. 
Announce
ment Rumours (2) - (3) (3) - (4) (2) – (4) 
(-60, -1) -0.038*** -0.026*** -0.039*** -0.107*** 0.013 0.068 0.081* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.666) (0.121) (0.081) 
(-30, -1) -0.018*** -0.005*** -0.023*** -0.040*** 0.017 0.017 0.034 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.386) (0.635) (0.359) 
(-1, 1) -0.015*** -0.019*** -0.010*** -0.054*** -0.009 0.044 0.035 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.293) (0.124) (0.219) 
N    287     86   186    15       
Panel B: Switches from the AIM to the MM 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CAAR 
 
Full 
Sample 
Free 
Sample 
C. 
Announce
ment Rumours (2) - (3) (3) - (4) (2) – (4) 
(-60, -1) 0.058*** 0.042*** 0.034*** 0.211*** 0.009 -0.178* -0.169* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.879) (0.081) (0.096) 
(-30, -1) 0.036*** 0.021*** 0.018*** 0.154*** 0.003 -0.136** -0.133* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.930) (0.049) (0.053) 
(-1, 1) 0.017*** 0.010*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.016 -0.003 -0.013 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.326) (0.889) (0.579) 
N    119    30    74    15    
This table presents the cumulative average abnormal stock returns on different event windows dividing the 
sample into three sub samples. Panel A presents the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and panel B the 
firms that move from the AIM to the MM. The first column shows the cumulative average abnormal stock 
returns of the full sample. The second column reports the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the 
free sample which is the sample without rumours or CAs. The third column shows the cumulative average 
abnormal stock returns of the CAs which are the firms that announced another major corporate event on the 
event date or one month prior to the switch date. The fourth column presents the cumulative average abnormal 
stock returns of the firms that have rumours which are the firms that their move is discussed in the press one 
year prior to the official announcement of the event. Column five shows the difference between the free sample 
and the CAs groups. Column six reports the differences between the CAs and rumours samples and column 
seven shows the differences between the free sample and rumours sub-groups. For the calculation of the returns 
I use an OLS market model following Brown and Warner (1985). P-values are reported in the parentheses. The 
numbers in italic represent the number of observations. The stocks and indices prices are retrieved from 
Datastream. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
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Figure 4-7: Cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the sub groups, firms 
switching from the MM to the AIM 
This figure shows the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the firms that move from the MM to the 
AIM divided into three categories from day -60 to day +20 for the time period of 1996-2015. The solid line 
represents the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the free sample which are the firms without 
rumours or CAs, the dotted line shows the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the firms with rumours 
which are the firms that their switch is discussed in the press up to one year prior to the official announcement 
of the company and the dashed line depicts the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the firms with 
CAs which are the firms that announced another major corporate event along with the market switching 
announcement or one month prior to the announcement. For the calculation of the returns I use an OLS market 
model following Brown and Warner (1985). The horizontal axis represents the days and the vertical axis 
represents the abnormal stock returns. The event day is t=0. 
 
Figure 4-8: Cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the sub groups, firms 
switching from the AIM to the MM 
 
This figure shows the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the firms that move from the AIM to the 
MM divided into three categories from day -60 to day +20 for the time period of 1996-2015. The solid line 
represents the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the free sample which are the firms without 
rumours or CAs, the dotted line shows the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the firms with rumours 
which are the firms that their switch is discussed in the press up to one year prior to the official announcement 
of the company and the dashed line depicts the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the firms with 
CAs which are the firms that announced another major corporate event along with the market switching 
announcement or one month prior to the announcement. For the calculation of the returns I use an OLS market 
model following Brown and Warner (1985). The horizontal axis represents the days and the vertical axis 
represents the abnormal stock returns. The event day is t=0. 
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4.5.4 The contemporaneous relation between abnormal stock returns and abnormal 
trading volume 
In this section, I explore the interaction between the abnormal stock returns and abnormal 
trading volume. Prior literature reports that the relation between stock returns and trading 
volume could indicate potential trading on price sensitive information (e.g. Eyssell and 
Arshadi 1993, Jabbour et al., 2000, King, 2009, Siganos and Papa 2015). In order to 
investigate the interaction, I use the following panel regression on daily frequency data using 
firm random effects. 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐴𝑉𝑖.𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5 ∗
𝑀
𝐵 𝑖,𝑡−1
+  𝛽6 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽8 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +
 𝛾 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜗 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡                       (4.3) 
The dependent variable is the AR, which represents the abnormal stock returns. The 
independent variable of interest is the AV which is the abnormal trading volume. In order to 
support the information leakage hypothesis, the parameter coefficient of AV should be 
positive and significant in the interval period from -1 to -60 trading days prior to each move 
towards the MM. Instead, the relevant parameter coefficient should be negative and 
significant prior to each firm move towards the AIM.  
Informed by the literature, I add a number of control variables. Jensen and Ruback (1983), 
Jarrell and Poulsen (1989b) and Sanders and Zdanowicz (1992) support that the abnormal 
stock returns prior to major corporate events are related to market anticipation which is based 
on rumours in the media prior to the announcements. Hence, I control for rumours using a 
binary variable that takes the value of one if the move had at least one rumour during the 
year prior to the announcement of the event, otherwise zero (Rumours). Further, Siganos and 
Papa (2015) find that the relation between abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading 
volume is higher in firms with rumours. Thus, I include an interaction variable between the 
rumours and abnormal trading volume in order to explore whether firms with rumours 
experience higher abnormal volume activity (Rumours*AV). This result would potentially 
support the market anticipation hypothesis. Atiase (1985) and Diamond and Verrecchia 
(1991) suggest that stock prices in large firms incorporate information faster than in small 
firms. On reflection of this, I control for firm size measured as the natural logarithm of the 
market capitalization one year prior to the announcement of the switches (Size).  
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Fama and French (1992) report that value and small cap firms outperform the markets on 
a general basis. I control for firm growth computed by the market to book ratio one year 
prior to the announcement of the moves (M/B). Keown and Pinkerton (1981), Jabbour et al. 
(2000) and King (2009) find a strong positive relation between abnormal stock returns and 
trading volume prior to major corporate events. Thus, I control for other major corporate 
events using a binary variable that takes the value of one if the firm announced another 
corporate event (e.g. takeovers, mergers, final and half year results) on the announcement 
day or one month prior to the announcement and zero otherwise (CA). I include an interaction 
variable between the CA and abnormal trading volume to further explore the relation of 
abnormal trading volume and other major corporate events (CA*AV).  
Meulbroek (2000) reports that insiders tend to sell securities more aggressively in risky 
companies. I control for volatility measured by the standard deviation of the stock returns 
over the estimation window (-250, -81) (Volatility). Kyle (1985) and Holmström and Tirole 
(1993) argue that insiders tend to trade when stock liquidity is higher due to the fact that 
there are more uninformed insiders in the market. In addition, when stock liquidity is high, 
informed traders can easily camouflage their trades (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). Hence, I 
control for stock liquidity measured as the daily average of the trading volume to shares 
outstanding ratio over the estimation window (-250, -81) (Stock liquidity). I also include 
industry and year fixed effects to control for different industries and for time varying factors. 
Finally, all variables in the regressions are tested for correlations but none of the variables 
are highly significantly correlated except for the relation between the rumours and CA and 
the interaction terms between Rumours*AV and AV and CA*AV and AV as it is expected due 
to the nature of the variables. The results are presented in Tables 4-10 and 4-11. 
Table 4-12 reports the regression results for the firms that switch from the MM to the 
AIM. Column 1 shows the results during the event period (-60, -1) and column 2 during the 
control period (-80, -61). As shown in column 1, the relationship between abnormal stock 
returns and abnormal trading volume, which is the variable of interest, is negatively 
correlated and significant at the 5% level with a parameter coefficient of -0.348, indicating 
that the price decreases are due to increased selling activity based on potential leakage of 
inside information. The table reports a stronger relation between abnormal stock returns and 
abnormal trading volume for the firms that have rumours prior to the announcement of the 
event with a parameter coefficient of -0.696, offering evidence that part of the pattern is 
driven by investors who manage to predict the event using rumours. The firms with CA 
follow the opposite direction with a parameter coefficient of 0.900 which is in line with the 
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literature that supports that major corporate events experience a strong positive relation 
between stock returns and trading volume (King, 2009; Siganos and Papa, 2015). It is also 
important to notice that during the control period (column 2) there is no significant 
relationship between the abnormal stock returns and the abnormal trading volume which is 
another sign of abnormal trading due to potential leakage of inside information. Finally, the 
table reports a negative and significant (p-value of 0.054) relationship between the variables 
M/B and AR, supporting the view that value firms overperform the market (Fama and French, 
1992). However, the coefficient is low. 
Table 4-13 presents the estimates of the regressions on the firms that switch from the AIM 
to the MM.  As in the previous table, column 1 reports the results of the event period (-60, -
1) and column 2 shows the results of the control period (-80, -61). The relation between 
abnormal stock returns and trading volume is positive and significant (coefficient of 0.742) 
at the 5% level which highlights an increase in stock purchases potentially on price sensitive 
information prior to the announcement of the moves from the AIM to the MM. In line with 
the previous results the interaction between abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading 
volume is no longer significant on the control period (-80, -61), highlighting that the effect 
evidenced in the event period is abnormal. However, I do not find increased trading volume 
for firms with rumours and CA on the event period. This could be attributed to the smaller 
and less sophisticated investor pool of the AIM who do not consistently follow the news or 
corporate announcements. In addition, consistent with the literature I find that the abnormal 
stock returns increase with lower levels of risk as shown by the volatility coefficients. 
Finally, the R2 on both events is relatively low. The literature reports that asset prices respond 
not only to news or events but also to irrational trading behaviours such a noise trading, 
which can lead to a large gap between asset prices and fundamental values (De Long et al., 
1989; 1990). Hence, noise trading adds noise into the stock prices, which reflect both 
information from informed trades and noise from noise traders (Black, 1986) and potentially 
lead to low R2 due to the fact that the changes in the prices cannot be fully justified by 
fundamental values or events. As stated by Roll (1988) stock prices movements are known 
to be unpredictable, confirming the view of low R2 in daily stock returns. 
In Table 4-14 I assess whether the free sample coefficient differences in AV between the 
event and control periods as shown in Tables 4-12 and 4-13 respectively are significant. The 
Control variable is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the day falls within the 
control period (-81, -60) and zero otherwise. The Control*AV is an interaction variable 
between the Control variable and AV and basically examines whether the differences 
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between the event and control period are significant. Column 1 shows the firms that switch 
from the MM to the AIM and column 2 presents the firms that move from the AIM to the 
MM. The control period and AV interaction (Control*AV) is positive and significant at the 
10% level for the MM to the AIM specification (column 1) and negative and significant at 
the 5% level for the AIM to the MM specification (column 2), showcasing that on the event 
period the relationship between abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading volume is more 
pronounced. Overall, the results show that on both moves the relation between abnormal 
stock returns and abnormal trading volume is significant during the event period and 
insignificant during the control period consistent with the information leakage hypothesis.
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Table 4-10: Correlation matrix of the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM 
  
    AR AV Rumours Rumours*AV Size M/B CA CA*AV Volatility 
Stock 
Liquidity 
AR 1.000          
           
AV 0.046*** 1.000         
 (0.000)          
Rumours -0.009 -0.009 1.000        
 (0.238) (0.345)         
Rumours*AV -0.017* 0.109*** 0.132*** 1.000       
 (0.091) (0.000) (0.000)        
Size -0.017** 0.011 0.036*** 0.038*** 1.000      
 (0.026) (0.261) (0.000) (0.000)       
M/B -0.025*** 0.032*** -0.048*** 0.001 0.157*** 1.000     
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.922) (0.000)      
CA -0.000 0.019* -0.327*** -0.041*** -0.034*** 0.005 1.000    
 (0.985) (0.058) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.565)     
CA*AV 0.074*** 0.844*** -0.021** -0.003 -0.010 0.003 0.067*** 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.778) (0.296) (0.787) (0.000)    
Volatility -0.022*** 0.017* 0.009 0.025** -0.056*** 0.146*** 0.095*** 0.025*** 1.000  
 (0.005) (0.088) (0.222) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009)   
Stock Liquidity 0.009 0.067*** 0.001 0.023** 0.087*** 0.041*** -0.029*** 0.062 0.209*** 1.000 
  (0.225) (0.000) (0.894) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
This table reports the correlations among the variables used in the regression analysis for the MM to AIM dataset. The abnormal stock returns (AR) are calculated using an OLS market model 
following Brown and Warner (1985). The AV is computed using the following model AVi,t = Vi,t -(V̅i + 2Svol) if Vi,t > V̅i + 2Svol  otherwise zero following Bris (2005). Size is measured by the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization, M/B is the market to book ratio, Rumours is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is a rumour about the move one year prior to 
the announcement of the event and zero otherwise, Rumours*AV is the interaction between the Rumours and AV, CA is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm simultaneously 
announced another corporate event (e.g. takeovers, mergers, final and half year results) during the announcement day or one month prior to the announcement and zero otherwise, CA*AV is 
the interaction between CA and AV, Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock returns over the estimation window (-250, -81) and  Stock liquidity is the daily average of the trading 
volume to shares outstanding ratio over the estimation window (-250, -81). P-values are reported in the parentheses. The stock prices, indices and volume are retrieved from Datastream. 
Accounting data are collected from Worldscope. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4-11: Correlation matrix of the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM 
  
    AR AV Rumours Rumours*AV Size M/B CA CA*AV Volatility 
Stock 
Liquidity 
AR 1.000          
           
AV 0.111*** 1.000         
 (0.000)          
Rumours 0.032*** 0.041*** 1.000        
 (0.006) (0.002)         
Rumours*AV 0.042*** 0.728*** 0.099*** 1.000       
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)        
Size 0.010 -0.030** 0.210*** -0.001 1.000      
 (0.412) (0.023) (0.000) (0.932)       
M/B -0.004 -0.024* -0.112*** -0.024* 0.047*** 1.000     
 (0.774) (0.071) (0.000) (0.064) (0.000)      
CA -0.018 -0.007 -0.497*** -0.053*** -0.209*** 0.215*** 1.000    
 (0.137) (0.599) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
CA*AV 0.112*** 0.655*** -0.039*** -0.004 -0.049*** 0.006 0.073*** 1.000   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.765) (0.000) (0.627) (0.000)    
Volatility -0.002 0.032** 0.046*** 0.016 0.075*** 0.088*** 0.149*** 0.040*** 1.000  
 (0.174) (0.016) (0.000) (0.243) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)   
Stock Liquidity 0.006 0.115*** 0.127*** 0.139*** 0.043*** -0.112*** -0.107*** 0.019 0.132*** 1.000 
  (0.639) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.144) (0.000)  
This table reports the correlations among the variables used in the regression analysis for the AIM to MM dataset. The abnormal stock returns (AR) are calculated using an OLS market model 
following Brown and Warner (1985). The AV is computed using the following model AVi,t = Vi,t -(V̅i + 2Svol) if Vi,t > V̅i + 2Svol  otherwise zero following Bris (2005). Size is measured by the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization, M/B is the market to book ratio, rumours is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is a rumour about the move one year prior to 
the announcement of the event and zero otherwise, Rumours*AV is the interaction between the Rumours and AV, CA is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm simultaneously 
announced another corporate event (e.g. takeovers, mergers, final and half year results) during the announcement day or one month prior to the announcement and zero otherwise, CA*AV is 
the interaction between CA and AV, Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock returns over the estimation window (-250, -81) and  Stock liquidity is the daily average of the trading 
volume to shares outstanding ratio over the estimation window (-250, -81). P-values are reported in the parentheses. The stock prices, indices and volume are retrieved from Datastream. 
Accounting data are collected from Worldscope. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4-12: The relation of abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading volume 
for the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM 
 Dependent: Abnormal stock returns 
  (1) (2) 
 (-60, -1) (-80, -61) 
AV -0.348** 0.403 
 (0.035) (0.246) 
Rumours -0.000 0.000 
 (0.783) (0.941) 
Rumours*AV -0.696** -0.241 
 (0.031) (0.574) 
Size 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.555) (0.620) 
M/B -0.000* -0.000 
 (0.054) (0.140) 
CA -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.993) (0.623) 
CA*AV 0.900*** -0.377 
 (0.000) (0.574) 
Volatility -0.652 -1.428*** 
 (0.194) (0.006) 
Stock Liquidity -0.002 0.053 
 (0.983) (0.792) 
Constant -0.012** -0.005 
  (0.012) (0.482) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
R2-adjusted 0.013 0.013 
N               10,420 3,610 
This table presents the estimates of the panel regressions on the firms that move from the MM to the AIM 
during the period of 1996-2015. Column 1 presents the event window (-60, -1) and column 2 shows the control 
window (-80, -61). The dependent variable is the abnormal stock returns for firm i on day t which are calculated 
using an OLS market model following Brown and Warner (1985). The abnormal trading volume (AV) is 
computed using the following model AVi,t = Vi,t -(V̅i + 2Svol) if Vi,t > V̅i + 2Svol  otherwise zero following Bris 
(2005). Size is measured by the natural logarithm of market capitalization, M/B is the market to book ratio, 
Rumours is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is a rumour about the move one year prior 
to the announcement of the event and zero otherwise, Rumours*AV is the interaction between the Rumours and 
AV, CA is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if  the firm simultaneously announced another major 
corporate event (e.g. takeovers, mergers, final and half year results) during the announcement day or one month 
prior to the announcement and zero otherwise, CA*AV is the interaction between the CA and AV, Volatility is 
the standard deviation of the stock returns over the estimation window (-250, -81) and  Stock liquidity is the 
daily average of the trading volume to shares outstanding ratio over the estimation window (-250, -81). P-
values are reported in the parentheses. The numbers in italic represent the number of observations. The stock 
prices, indices and volume data are retrieved from Datastream. Financial data are collected from Worldscope. 
The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4-13: The relation of abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading volume 
for the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM 
 Dependent: Abnormal stock returns 
   (1) (2) 
  (-60, -1) (-80, -61) 
AV 0.742** -0.125 
 (0.026) (0.745) 
Rumours 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.186) (0.729) 
Rumours*AV -0.490 0.473 
 (0.174) (0.223) 
Size -0.000 0.001 
 (0.860) (0.207) 
M/B 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.547) (0.704) 
CA -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.150) (0.624) 
CA*AV 0.132 0.865** 
 (0.721) (0.030) 
Volatility -2.056** -0.892 
 (0.020) (0.279) 
Stock Liquidity 0.031 -0.004 
 (0.621) (0.681) 
Constant 0.006 -0.005 
 (0.423) (0.655) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
R2-adjusted 0.028 0.075 
N  5,508 1,816 
This table presents the estimates of the panel regressions on the firms that move from the AIM to the MM 
during the period of 1996-2015. Column 1 presents the event window (-60, -1) and column 2 shows the control 
window (-80, -61). The dependent variable is the abnormal stock returns for firm i on day t which are calculated 
using an OLS market model following Brown and Warner (1985). The abnormal trading volume (AV) is 
computed using the following model AVi,t = Vi,t -(V̅i + 2Svol) if Vi,t > V̅i + 2Svol  otherwise zero following Bris 
(2005). Size is measured by the natural logarithm of market capitalization, M/B is the market to book ratio, 
Rumours is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is a rumour about the move one year prior 
to the announcement of the event and zero otherwise, Rumours*AV is the interaction between the Rumours and 
AV, CA is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if  the firm simultaneously announced another major 
corporate event (e.g. takeovers, mergers, final and half year results) during the announcement day or one month 
prior to the announcement and zero otherwise, CA*AV is the interaction between the CA and AV, Volatility is 
the standard deviation of the stock returns over the estimation window (-250, -81) and  Stock liquidity is the 
daily average of the trading volume to shares outstanding ratio over the estimation window (-250, -81). P-
values are reported in the parentheses. The numbers in italic represent the number of observations. The stock 
prices, indices and volume data are retrieved from Datastream. Financial data are collected from Worldscope. 
The symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4-14: Abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading volume interaction with the 
control period 
 Dependent: Abnormal stock returns 
  (1) (2) 
 MM to AIM   AIM to MM 
AV -0.352** 0.754** 
 (0.043) (0.027) 
Control 0.000 0.001 
 (0.946) (0.521) 
Control*AV 0.737* -1.083** 
 (0.083) (0.028) 
Size 0.002** -0.002 
 (0.028) (0.134) 
M/B -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.269) (0.025) 
Volatility -1.796 -0.889 
 (0.174) (0.585) 
Stock Liquidity 0.130 -0.524 
 (0.225) (0.309) 
Constant -0.023** 0.026* 
  (0.034) (0.087) 
Year fixed effects                   Yes                   Yes 
Industry fixed effects                   Yes                   Yes 
R2-adjusted 0.019 0.019 
N                 3,910                 1,716 
This table presents the estimates of the panel regressions on the firms that move between the two UK markets 
during the period of 1996-2015. Column 1 shows the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and column 2 
shows the firms that move from the AIM to the MM. The dependent variable is the abnormal stock returns for 
firm i on day t. The abnormal stock returns are computed using an OLS market model following Brown and 
Warner (1985). The abnormal trading volume (AV) is computed using the following model AVi,t = Vi,t -(V̅i + 
2Svol) if Vi,t > V̅i + 2Svol  otherwise zero following Bris (2005). Control is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one if the day falls within the control period (-80, -61) and zero otherwise. Control*AV is the 
interaction between the Control and AV variables. Size is measured by the natural logarithm of market 
capitalization, M/B is the market to book ratio, Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock returns over the 
estimation window (-250, -81), Stock liquidity is the daily average of the trading volume to shares outstanding 
ratio over the estimation window (-250, -81). P-values are reported in the parentheses. The numbers in italic 
represent the number of observations. The stock prices, indices and volume data are retrieved from Datastream. 
Accounting data are collected from Worldscope database. The symbols *, and ** denote statistical significance 
at the 10 and 5% levels respectively. 
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4.5.5 Control firms matching 
In order to further examine the results, I match the firms that move between the two UK 
markets with similar firms that did not switch markets during the same time period. For the 
control firms sample process see section 4.3.1. I calculate the matched firms returns using 
an event study methodology with the same event (-60, +20) and estimation windows (-250, 
-81). I use two different event study methodologies for the calculation of the abnormal stock 
returns. I initially use the same methodology that I used for the abnormal stock returns 
calculation of the event firms by employing an OLS market model, in line with Brown and 
Warner (1985) (see section 4.4.1). I also perform a benchmark performance by using a single 
control firm for each firm that moves between the two markets following Barber and Lyon 
(1997). 
The benchmark returns are calculated as follows: 
   𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 ∗ 𝑅𝑐,𝑡           (4.4) 
Where ARi,t is the excess return of a security i at day t, Ri,t is the logarithmic return of 
security i at day t and Rc,t is the logarithmic return of the matched control firm at the day t. 
Table 4-15 presents the results of the CAARs following the first methodology, using an 
OLS market model separately on the event and on the matched firms during three different 
windows. Panel A presents the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and panel B shows 
the firms that move from the AIM to the MM. Column 1 shows the CAARs of the sample 
firms, column 2 the CAARs of the control firms and column 3 the differences between the 
two groups. As shown in panel A, the event firms experience lower CAARs in all three 
windows compared to the firms that do not switch markets with the differences being 
significant at the 1% level. More specifically, the CAARs of the control firms are 9.7% in 
the 60 day window, while on the same window the returns for the event firms are -3.8%. On 
the contrary, the AIM to the MM event firms experience higher returns in the 60, 30 and 3 
day windows in comparison to the firms that do not move from the AIM to the MM with the 
differences being significant from 10% to 1% levels. For example, as shown in column 3, in 
the 60 day window the difference between the two groups is 7%. The results confirm the 
previous findings by showing that similar firms that do not switch markets experience 
significantly different CAARs from the event firms, prior to the announcement of the 
switches. 
 
  
 
94 
 
Table 4-15: Cumulative average abnormal stock returns, event and matched firms 
against the market 
Panel A: Switches from the MM to the AIM 
CAAR (1) (2) (1) - (2) 
Event windows Event firms Control firms Difference 
(-60, -1) -0.038*** 0.097*** -0.135*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(-30, -1) -0.018*** 0.052*** -0.070*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
(-1, 1) -0.015*** 0.011*** -0.026*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
N 287 279   
Panel B: Switches from the AIM to the MM 
CAAR (1) (2) (1) - (2) 
Event windows Event firms Control firms Difference 
(-60, -1) 0.058*** -0.012*** 0.070* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.069) 
(-30, -1) 0.036*** -0.015*** 0.051** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) 
(-1, 1) 0.017*** -0.008*** 0.025*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
N 119 104   
This table shows the cumulative average abnormal stock returns using an OLS market model following Brown 
and Warner (1985) on the event and control firms during three different windows. Panel A presents the firms 
that move from the MM to the AIM and their matched firms and panel B shows the firms that move from the 
AIM to the MM and their matched firms. Column 1 reports the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of 
the event firms against the market. Column 2 presents the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the 
control firms against the market and column 3 [(1)–(2)] shows the mean difference of the returns between the 
event and the control firms. P-values are reported in the parentheses. The numbers in italic represent the number 
of observations. The stocks and indices prices are retrieved from Datastream. The symbols *, ** and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4-16 reports the CAARs using the second methodology, following Barber and 
Lyon (1997) during three different windows. Panel A presents the firms that move from 
the MM to the AIM and panel B the firms that move from the AIM to the MM. The 
abnormal stock returns hold significant at the 1% level on all three windows on both events. 
More specifically, the CAARs on the 60 day window prior to the announcement of the 
moves are -8.3% and 11.2% for the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM and from 
the AIM to the MM respectively. The two remaining windows follow the same pattern. 
Once again, this test shows abnormal pre-announcement stock returns validating the 
previous results. 
 
Table 4-16: Cumulative average abnormal stock returns, event firms against the 
matched firms 
CAAR 
Event windows  
(1) (2) 
MM to AIM AIM to MM 
(-60, -1) -0.083*** 0.112*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(-30, -1) -0.041*** 0.067*** 
 (0.000)      (0.000) 
(-1, 1) -0.018*** 0.014*** 
 (0.000)          (0.000) 
N 279 104 
This table shows the cumulative average abnormal stock returns of the sample firms against the matched firms 
on three different windows. The cumulative average abnormal stock returns are computed using a benchmark 
performance following Barber and Lyon (1997). Column 1 shows the firms that move from the MM to the 
AIM and panel B shows the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM. The stocks prices are retrieved from 
Datastream. P-values are reported in the parentheses. The numbers in italic represent the number of 
observations. The symbol *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
4.5.6 Robustness tests 
In this section I perform a battery of robustness checks. First, I calculate the returns using 
the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) method as in Barber and Lyon (1997). The 
BHAR are calculated as follows: 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡) − ∏ (1 + 𝑅𝑀,𝑡)
𝑁
𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑡=1          (4.5) 
Where BHARi,t are the daily Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns of security i, on day t, Ri,t 
is the logarithmic return of security i, on day t and RM,t is the daily return of the market, on 
day t. I use the same benchmarks as in the CAARs specification (see section 4.4.1). The 
event window is (-60, -1) days and the estimation window is (-250, -81) days. 
Second, I calculate the abnormal trading volume using the mean adjusted volume model 
following Chae (2005). The mean volume is calculated as follows: 
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𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑉𝑖,𝑡 −  ?̅?𝑖,𝑡          (4.6) 
Where AVi,t is the excess volume of a firm i on day t, Vi,t is the volume of the firm i at day 
t divided by the number of the common shares outstanding ?̅?𝑖,𝑡 is the mean of a firm i over 
the estimation window (-250, -81). The event and estimation windows are the same as for 
the calculation of returns. 
Finally, I re-estimate the CAARs of the entire sample using the rumour dates instead of 
the announcement dates for the firms that are discussed in the news prior to the official 
announcement of the events. For the calculation of the returns for this test I use an OLS 
market model as Brown and Warner (1985) using  model (4.1) as discussed in section 4.4.1. 
Table 4-17 shows the CAARs using an OLS market model (column 1) and the BHARs 
(column 2). Panel A reports the results for the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and 
panel B the results for the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM. The results are 
statistically significant and qualitatively similar using both methods confirming their 
robustness. For example, the 60 day abnormal stock returns for the firms that switch from 
the MM to the AIM are -3.8% using the OLS market model and -3.7% using the BHAR 
model. Similarly, the 60 day abnormal stock returns for the firms that switch from the AIM 
to the MM are 5.8% and 5.7% using the OLS market model and BHAR model respectively. 
Table 4-18 presents the CAAV using Bris (2005) model (column 1) and the mean adjusted 
volume method (column 2). Panel A shows the results for the switches from the MM to the 
AIM and panel B the results for the switches from the AIM to the MM. The results are 
statistically significant and relatively similar using both models. For instance, as reported in 
panel A, the 60 day abnormal trading volume for the firms that downgrade to the AIM is 
3.4% when using the Bris (2005) model and 1.6% when using the mean adjusted model. 
Similarly, as shown in panel B, the firms that upgrade to the MM experience abnormal 
trading volume of 3.6% when using the Bris (2005) model and 5.8% when using the mean 
adjusted model. 
  
  
 
97 
 
Table 4-17: Cumulative average abnormal returns using the OLS market model and 
the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns model 
Panel A: Switches from the MM to the AIM  
 (1) (2) 
Event windows 
OLS market model 
(CAAR) 
BHAR 
(-60, -1) -0.038*** -0.037*** 
 (0.000) (0.003) 
(-30, -1) -0.018*** -0.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.018) 
(-1, 1) -0.015*** -0.018*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
N 287 287 
Panel B: Switches from the AIM to the MM  
  (1) (2) 
Event windows 
OLS market model 
(CAAR) 
BHAR 
(-60, -1) 0.058*** 0.057** 
 (0.000) (0.023) 
(-30, -1) 0.036*** 0.031** 
 (0.000) (0.046) 
(-1, 1) 0.017*** 0.019*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
N 119 119 
This table shows the cumulative average abnormal stock returns using an OLS market model following Brown 
and Warner (1985) and the buy and hold abnormal stock returns following Barber and Lyon (1997), on three 
different windows. Panel A presents the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and panel B shows the firms 
that move from the AIM to the MM. Column 1 reports the cumulative average abnormal stock returns and 
column 2 shows the buy and hold abnormal stock returns. P-values are reported in the parentheses. The 
numbers in italic represent the number of observations. The stocks and indices prices are retrieved from 
Datastream. The symbols **, *** denote statistical significance at the 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4-18: Measurement of abnormal trading volume using the Bris (2005) and the 
mean adjusted models 
Panel A: Switches from the MM to the AIM   
 (1) (2) 
Event windows Bris model (CAAV) Mean volume (CAAV) 
(-60, -1) 0.034*** 0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(-30, -1) 0.016*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(-1, 1) 0.009*** 0.015*** 
  (0.000) (0.003) 
N 228 228 
Panel B: Switches from the AIM to the MM   
 (1) (2) 
Event Windows Bris model (CAAV) Mean volume (CAAV) 
(-60, -1) 0.036*** 0.058*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(-30, -1) 0.015*** 0.032*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(-1, 1) 0.005*** 0.013*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
N 102 102 
This table shows the trading volume using the following model  AVi,t = Vi,t -(V̅i + 2Svol) if Vi,t > V̅i + 2Svol  
otherwise zero following Bris (2005) and the mean abnormal trading volume method using the following mean 
adjusted model AVi,t = Vi,t - V̅i ,t following Chae (2005), on three different windows. Panel A shows the firms that 
move from the MM to the AIM and panel B the firms that move from the AIM to the MM. Column 1 reports 
the volume following the Bris (2005) model and column 2 shows the mean adjusted volume model. P-values 
are reported in the parentheses. The numbers in italic represent the number of observations. The volume and 
number of shares are retrieved from Datastream. The symbol *** denotes statistical significance at the 1% 
level. 
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Table 4-19 reports the CAARs using the rumour dates as events dates for the firms that 
are rumoured about the switch one year prior to the public announcement. Panel A reports 
the results for the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and panel B the results for the 
firms that move from the AIM to the MM. Column 1 presents the CAARs using the actual 
event dates for all firms and column 2 the CAARs using the rumour dates. The abnormal 
stock returns are lower when I use the rumour dates for both events as expected. For instance, 
as shown in panel A, the firms that switch for the MM to the AIM experience abnormal stock 
returns of -3.8% when using the official announcement dates and -3.4% when using the 
rumour dates for the firms are discussed in the news prior to the official announcement. In a 
similar vein, as reported in panel B, the firms that upgrade to the MM experience abnormal 
stock returns of 5.8% when using the official announcement dates and 4.5% when using the 
rumours dates. In line with the literature, the results show that the rumours play indeed an 
important role on the pre-announcement abnormal stock returns (Jensen and Ruback, 1983; 
Jarrell and Poulsen, 1989b; Sanders and Zdanowicz, 1992), however the returns remain 
significant even after switching the public announcement dates with the rumours dates, 
highlighting that rumours cannot fully explain the patterns. Overall, the results remain robust 
even after employing a series of alternative specifications. 
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Table 4-19: Cumulative average abnormal returns using the rumour dates as 
announcement dates 
Panel A: Switches from the MM to the AIM   
 (1) (2) 
Event windows CAAR (event dates) CAAR (rumour dates) 
(-60, -1) -0.038*** -0.034*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(-30, -1) -0.018*** -0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(-1, 1) -0.015*** -0.013*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
N 287 287 
Panel B: Switches from the AIM to the MM   
 (1) (2) 
Event Windows CAAR (event dates) CAAR (rumour dates) 
(-60, -1) 0.058*** 0.045*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(-30, -1) 0.036*** 0.031*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
(-1, 1) 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
N 119 119 
This table shows the cumulative average abnormal returns on three different event windows using different 
dates as event dates. The cumulative average abnormal returns are calculated using an OLS market model 
following Brown and Warner (1985). Panel A shows the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and panel 
B the firms that move from the AIM to the MM. Column 1 presents the cumulative average abnormal returns 
using the official announcement dates of the switches as the event date while column 2 shows the cumulative 
average abnormal returns using the rumour dates as the event date for the firms that are discussed in the media 
prior to the announcement of the moves. P-values are reported in the parentheses. The numbers in italic 
represent the number of observations. The stocks and indices prices are retrieved from Datastream. The symbol 
*** denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter documents abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading volume 60 trading 
days prior to the announcement of the moves from a secondary, light regulated market to a 
main market and vice versa in the UK for the period of 1996-2015, events that have become 
increasingly popular during the last two decades. I examine 287 firms that switch from the 
MM to the AIM and 119 firms that move from the AIM to the MM. A move from the MM 
to the AIM is characterised as bad news triggering negative announcement stock returns, 
while a move from the AIM to the MM is considered to be good news triggering positive 
announcement stock returns (Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2013; Campbell and Tabner, 2014). 
These abnormal announcement stock returns generated by the switches could create 
incentives for insiders or other individuals to trade based on price sensitive information prior 
to public announcement of the events.  
In line with previous findings on other major corporate events (e.g. Keown and Pinketon, 
1981; Jabbour et al., 2000, King, 2009; Siganos and Papa, 2015), I find abnormal reductions 
in the share prices that reach -3.8% and abnormal trading volume of 3.4% 60 trading days 
prior to the switches from the MM to the AIM. In addition, I find price run-ups of 5.8% and 
abnormal trading volume of 3.6% 60 trading days prior to the switches from the AIM to the 
MM. The results are robust after controlling for market anticipation based on rumours on 
the media and other major corporate announcements. More specifically, I find that rumours 
and other major corporate events can only explain part of these patterns, showing that the 
market anticipation hypothesis may be valid, but it cannot fully explain the patterns present 
in the markets. The results thus are in line with the information leakage hypothesis. 
 Furthermore, I find a negative contemporaneous relation between abnormal stock returns 
and abnormal trading volume for the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and a positive 
association between abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading volume for the firms that 
switch from the AIM to the MM during the 60 trading day window. These relations are not 
present in the control window, highlighting that the effect evidenced in the testing period is 
abnormal. After matching the switching firms with a group of control firms, I find that the 
firms that move to the MM outperform the matching firms while the firms that move to the 
AIM underperform the matching firms. Finally, the results are robust when using different 
methods for the calculation of abnormal stock returns and abnormal trading volume. 
The findings suggest that insiders as well as other investors may trade on an information 
advantage prior to the official announcements of the switches between the AIM and the MM. 
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These results highlight the presence of information asymmetry in the markets which could 
lead to lower market participation from less informed or uninformed investors (Milgrom and 
Stokey, 1982; Wang, 1994). They also highlight the increased need for strict regulations as 
supported from the proponents of insider trading regulation (e.g. Schotland, 1967; Levmore, 
1988; King et al., 1988; Klock, 1993). 
This study contributes to the information leakage literature as it provides evidence of 
potential trading based on price sensitive information during the switches between the two 
UK markets, and more specifically between a light regulated market and a traditionally 
regulated market. The findings of this study could be of importance to the UK regulators and 
regulators of other countries that have established, or they are under discussions to establish 
similar secondary markets, as I point out to a new corporate event that lacks focus by both 
the academics and the regulators, yet it could create incentives for profit generation, through 
market abusive techniques. Finally, the findings of this study could be of importance to 
market participants as I highlight a corporate event that could trigger informed trading, 
thereby they can be proactive and avoid potential price manipulation.  
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5. Corporate insider trading prior to the announcement 
of the UK market switches 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The existence of abnormal stock price and trading volume patterns prior to the 
announcement of the market switches, increases our understanding over firms’ transitions 
and confirms the hypothesis that these particular events are susceptible of market abusive 
techniques. Motivated by these findings, this chapter assesses whether insiders adjust their 
trading behaviours on their own personal accounts based on the privileged information over 
the switches between the two UK markets. Hence, this chapter provides the analysis for 
answering the second research question. 
As reported in the literature a downgrade to the AIM is characterised as bad news and 
triggers negative abnormal stock returns while a move to the MM is considered to be good 
news, a market upgrade, and it triggers positive abnormal stock returns (Jenkinson and 
Ramadorai, 2013; Campbell and Tabner, 2014). Since the listing process could take up to 
several months (London Stock Exchange, 2010; 2016), insiders are informed about the 
market switch and work towards it many months prior to the official announcement which 
usually happens one to two months prior to the move. Hence, the firm insiders could use this 
tempting opportunity in order to generate profit by increasing their net purchases (either by 
increasing their purchases or by decreasing their sales) prior to the switch to the MM or 
avoid losses by decreasing their net purchases (or increasing their net sales) prior to the 
announcement of the move to the AIM.  
Thus, in this chapter I examine the insider trading levels in approximately 350 firms that 
switch from the AIM to the MM and vice versa during the period of 1999-201547, using both 
time series and control firms’ benchmarks. I examine separately insiders’ purchases, 
insiders’ sales and insiders’ net purchases while I also use a difference in difference (DiD) 
methodology which simultaneously takes into account both the times series and cross 
sectional controls following Agrawal and Nasser (2012) and Agrawal and Cooper (2015). 
                                                 
47 The examination of this chapter starts from 1999 due to the fact that the DirectorsDeals data start 
from this date. 
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This chapter contributes to the insider trading literature by providing systematic evidence 
on the levels of corporate insider trading prior to market switches, shedding light on the 
abnormal trading activities on a corporate event that lacks focus by both academics and 
regulators. The findings of this study could be of importance to policy makers and regulators, 
as I introduce a new financial that could be susceptible to market abusive activities.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 describes the literature review 
and hypotheses development. Section 5.3 describes the data collection and the summary 
statistics. Section 5.4 analyses the methodology used. Section 5.5 presents the results and 
empirical tests. Section 5.6 concludes.  
5.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
The strong form of the efficient market hypothesis assumes that all available and relevant 
information is fully reflected in a stock’s market price and that no individual traders can use 
their monopolistic access to information in order to earn higher profits compared to other 
investors (Fama, 1970). Early studies on insider trading have assessed whether markets are 
truly efficient and indicated that in general insiders outperform the market. For instance, 
Jaffe (1974) examining insider trades in 200 firms during the period of 1962-1968 in the US, 
finds that insider trades contain undisclosed information and that insiders are able to predict 
future stock returns and exploit them. The author also reports evidence of abnormal stock 
returns immediately after the insiders’ trades which indicates that insiders use their 
information advantage, violating the regulations in place, in order to generate profit.  In 
addition, Finnerty (1976) investigating a much greater sample of approximately 30,000 
disclosed insider trades from the SEC's Official Summary of Stock Transactions for NYSE 
firms during the period of 1969-1972, reports that insiders’ trades outperform the market 
and that insiders earn above the average returns when they purchase stocks of their own firm. 
The author further argues that when insiders sell their holdings in their own firm, the stock 
falls more than the average market decline, attributing this behaviour to the information 
advantage of insiders.  
Similar results are reported by Seyhun (1986), who examines circa 60,000 insider trades 
from 1975 to 1981 in the US. More specifically, the author finds positive abnormal stock 
returns when buying and negative abnormal stock returns when selling in the months after 
the insiders’ trades and that higher ranked insiders perform better than the lower ranked ones. 
Finally, taking into account the bid-ask spreads and the transaction costs, the author 
concludes that outsiders cannot generate profit by copying insiders’ trades after their first 
  
 
105 
 
public announcement. A view which is also supported by Rozeff and Zaman (1988), who 
find significant abnormal stock returns after insiders’ trades but when assuming a 2% 
transactions cost, the authors report that outsiders cannot generate profits by following those 
trades. Contrary to these results, Bettis et al. (1997) suggest that net of transaction costs, 
outsiders can generate profit by following large trades from top executives and imply that 
the markets are not efficient in their semi-strong form48. 
In more recent US studies, Lakonishok and Lee (2001) using a massive database that 
includes more than one million insider trades in the NYSE, the AMEX and the NASDAQ 
stock exchanges from 1975 to 1995, report 7.8% positive abnormal stock returns twelve 
months after the insiders’ purchases; a result that decreases to 4.8% when controlling for 
size and book to market effects. In addition, the authors report that insiders’ sales are not 
associated with low stock returns and that they are not generally informative due to fact that 
insiders could sell their stocks for liquidation reasons. Furthermore, the authors argue that 
the insider trading activities are more informative for smaller firms when compared to the 
large ones. In line, Jeng et al. (2003) following a portfolio based approach, report significant 
abnormal stock returns for insider purchases, yet insignificant for insider sales. More 
specifically, the authors create a purchase portfolio composed of all insider buys and a sell 
portfolio for all insider sales and they assume that the stocks are hold for six months. They 
report approximately 6% abnormal stock returns for purchases. Finally, they argue that 
outsiders have little to fear from the trades of insiders as they only account for 0.03% of the 
entire market which translates that on average outsiders lose $0.10 for a $10,000 inside 
transaction. 
In Canada, Baesel and Stein (1979) confirm the previous findings by examining insider 
trades on 111 TSE listed firms from 1968 to 1972. The authors come in contrast with the 
strong form of the efficient market hypothesis by providing evidence that both ordinary 
insiders and bank directors49 outperform the market, with the bank directors earning even 
larger premiums than those of the ordinary insiders. Another Canadian study from Fowler 
and Rorke (1988) which investigates a sample of 145 firms listed in the TSE during the 
period of 1967-1977, reports that not only insiders earn abnormal profits but also the 
outsiders who follow them, without however subtracting the transaction costs. A 
                                                 
48 According to Fama (1970), the semi-strong efficient market hypothesis assumes that historical 
prices and all publicly available information is reflected in the stock’s price. 
49 Baesel and Stein (1979) consider as ordinary insiders, the insiders who are required to disclose 
their trades under the Ontario Securities Act and as bank directors the insiders who are also directors 
of Canadian chattered banks. 
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counterexample of the previous findings in the US and Canada is the study from Eckbo and 
Smith (1998) who used over 18,000 insiders’ trades in the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) 
during the period of 1985-1992. The authors find no evidence of abnormal stock returns after 
insider trades. 
In an attempt to assess whether similar results hold within the UK context, King and Roell 
(1988) using data reported on the Financial Times during the period of 1987-1988, find 
significant positive abnormal stock returns of approximately 50% after insider purchases but 
insignificant abnormal stock returns for insider sales. In a similar vein, Pope et al. (1990) 
investigate directors transactions obtained from the Weekly Official Intelligence of the LSE 
during two different periods, from 1997 to 1981 and from 1983 to 1984. In contrast to the 
previous UK results, they confirm sharp abnormal stock returns after the insider transactions 
for sales but not for purchases. Further work in the UK, by Gregory et al. (1994) and  Gregory 
et al. (1997) provide evidence of significant abnormal stock returns after director’s trades 
for both purchases and sales. However, after controlling for size effects they report 
significant abnormal stock returns only for purchases (which are effectively reduced) but not 
for sales.  
More recent UK studies report similar evidence with the previous literature. For instance, 
Friederich et al. (2002) examining firms listed in the LSE from 1986 to 1994, report that 
insiders have the ability to predict short run future stock returns. More specifically, the 
authors find significantly negative stock returns 20 days prior to insider purchases which 
become significantly positive following the purchase and exactly the opposite pattern for 
insider sales. However, the authors conclude that the economic significance of those returns 
should not be of major concern for the regulators. In line with the latter study, Fidrmuc et al. 
(2006) covering 35,439 transactions during the period of 1991-1998, confirm the 
significantly negative (positive) stock returns prior to director’s buys (sells) which change 
sign after the purchase (sale). The stock returns, however, are higher than those of the US 
studies, which is justified by the higher information content the UK trades contain. Finally, 
the authors support that the market takes into account both the director’s ownership and the 
firm’s ownership structure when reacting to insider’s transactions. 
Taking the insider trading literature one step further, Kallunki et al. (2018) investigate 
whether personal traits of  insiders’ play a role in their willingness to trade on private 
information. More specifically, the authors analyse whether insider’s wealth is associated 
with inside trading. They use a Swedish dataset due to the availability of insiders’ income, 
  
 
107 
 
wealth, and other demographic variables which consists of 14,672 insider trades in 393 
Swedish firms from 2000 to 2008. The authors report that less wealthy insiders are more 
prone to increase their sales prior to stock declines compared to their wealthy counterparts. 
However, when examining insider purchases the authors report that regardless of insider’s 
wealth, insiders tend to increase their purchases prior to stock increases. The authors claim 
that this is due to the lower costs and risk associated with purchases. 
Several studies have also examined whether insiders trade abnormally prior to major 
corporate announcements, in order to benefit from the announcement returns while others 
conclude that insider trading could act as a joint signal along with other corporate signals 
(John and Mishra, 1990). For example, John and Larry (1991) examining dividend changes 
and dividend initiations, on a sample of 265 firms from 1975 to 1985 in the US, report intense 
insider buying prior to significantly positive dividend announcement stock returns of 2.2% 
and intense selling prior to non-significant negative dividend announcement stock returns of 
-0.5%, indicating that insiders use their information advantage prior to corporate 
announcements. On new issue announcements, Karpoff and Lee (1991) using a sample of 
179 new security issues during the period of 1975-1982, find increases in net selling 12 
months prior to the announcement of common stock and convertible debt issues which are 
known to trigger negative abnormal stock returns. However, the authors do not find any 
signs of increased selling prior to straight debt issues. They conclude, that market penalties 
do not deter insider trading, at least partly, prior to new issue announcements. Similar results 
are reported by Kahle (2000), who finds increases in insider selling and decreases in insider 
buying 6 months prior to new issue announcements. The author also reports a significant 
negative relationship between abnormal insider trading and the long term performance of 
the firms that issue new equity. 
Harlow and Howe (1993) introduce a different form of insider trading, the passive insider 
trading, in which instead of aggressively buying shares prior to an announcement of a 
positive event, insiders reduce their sales and keep their purchases steady, hence increasing 
their net purchases. More specifically, the authors examine 303 LBOs from 1980 to 1989 
and report abnormal net purchases, due to decreases of sales, 12 months prior to MBOs but 
not prior to third party LBOs. In line with the previous study, Agrawal and Nasser (2012) 
show evidence of passive insider trading prior to takeovers. The authors examine a sample 
of 3,701 target firms in completed takeovers, which is considered to be a positive 
announcement, during the period of 1988-2006 in the US and report that insiders instead of 
increasing their purchases, they decrease them; however, they reduce their sales even more 
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which results to increasing the total net purchases. They conclude that profiting through 
passive insider trading highlights the limits of insider trading regulations as regulators can 
easily follow purchases, but they cannot act against decreases in sales.  
On negative events, Seyhun and Bradley (1997) examine insider trading activity prior to 
the filing date of bankruptcy petition in the US for the years of 1975-1992. Contrary to 
previous studies on bankruptcy, that find no evidence of abnormal insider activity prior to 
the filing date (Loderer and Sheehan, 1989; Gosnell et al., 1992), they report that insider 
selling starts five years prior to filing date and gradually increases as it gets closer to the 
event date. The authors also report that the top executives and officers sell more aggressively 
compared to other corporate insiders. Finally, they highlight the importance of examining 
insider trading prior to major corporate events as it raises concerns as to whether insiders are 
really interested in maximising shareholders wealth. Similar results are reported by Agrawal 
and Cooper (2015), who analyse over 500 US public firms that made an announcement of 
earnings decreasing restatements in order to correct false financial statements50 during the 
period of 1997-2002. When taking into account the entire sample, the authors find only weak 
evidence of insider selling in the misstated period. However, when they examine sub-
samples of insiders that had greater incentive to engage in selling prior to the revelation of 
false statements, they find strong evidence that insiders aggressively sell their stocks during 
the misstated period. 
Prior literature has well documented that insiders possess price sensitive information and 
use it for their own benefit. It is evident that insiders can predict future returns as well as that 
they increase their sales prior to negative corporate announcements and their purchases prior 
to positive corporate events. A corporate event that has become popular during the last 
twenty years but lacks focus from the insider trading literature is the market switches from 
a secondary market to a primary market and more specifically the switches from the AIM to 
the MM and vice versa. Recent literature reports that when firms move to a more renowned 
market with better analyst coverage, more investors and higher prestige, namely a market 
upgrade (a move from the AIM to the MM), is considered to be good news for the market 
and triggers positive announcement stock returns, while a market downgrade to a secondary 
market (a move from the MM to the AIM) is considered to be bad news, triggering negative 
announcement stock returns (Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2013; Campbell and Tabner, 2014). 
                                                 
50 Misstatements as well as other accounting scandals are deemed as negative news as they are 
followed by large stock price declines. 
  
 
109 
 
Directors can take advantage of those abnormal announcement stock returns triggered by the 
market switches by trading prior to their public announcement and generate profit or avoid 
potential losses. For instance, insiders could increase their purchases and decrease their sales 
prior to the announcement of the switch from the AIM to the MM or the opposite, for a move 
from the MM to the AIM. Hence, my hypotheses are as follows: 
Hypothesis 5.1: Firms that switch from the MM to the AIM experience decreases in net 
purchases prior to the official announcement of the move. 
Hypothesis 5.2: Firms that switch from the AIM to the MM experience increases in net 
purchases prior to the official announcement of the switch. 
5.3 Data and descriptive statistics 
The initial sample of the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM and vice versa are 
retrieved from the “New issues and IPO summary” spreadsheet, which is offered by the LSE 
website51. Since the spreadsheet does not report any identifier codes, they have been hand 
collected from Investegate and Nexis databases. For the hand collection of the announcement 
dates I use the Investegate, Nexis and Perfect Information databases. The stock prices, stock 
volume and indices prices (FTSE All Share and FTSE AIM All Share) are downloaded from 
Datastream. The accounting data are retrieved from Worldscope and are also complemented 
by hand collecting, where possible, the missing market capitalization (size) and M/B values 
from the annual reports using the Perfect Information database. The disclosed trades are 
retrieved from DirectorDeals database and are matched with the hand collected data by using 
the ISIN code.  
The initial sample consists of 291 firms that move from the MM to the AIM and 191 
firms that move from the AIM to the MM during the period of 1999-2015. I use 1999 as the 
starting year as this is the year that DirectorsDeals data start. From the initial sample I 
exclude one firm from both the MM-AIM and AIM-MM datasets due to missing identifiers. 
I also exclude one firm from the MM to AIM dataset due to missing announcement date. In 
addition, I exclude the firms that are not available in DirectorDeals database which are thirty 
five and twenty two for the MM-AIM dataset and AIM-MM dataset respectively. I focus on 
the trades from executives, non-executives and PDMRs. Finally, it is important to note that 
                                                 
51 https://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/new-issues-further-issues/new-issues-further-
issues.htm (last accessed October 2018). 
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I focus on open market stock trades excluding transactions from former directors52 and trades 
that are made due to option exercise, transferred or given away and awards made to 
directors53, following Gregory et al. (1997), Korczak et al. (2010) and Gębka et al. (2017). 
Table 5-1 provides a breakdown of the sample selection process.  
 
Table 5-1: Sample selection process 
Description   MM to AIM AIM to MM 
Initial Sample  291 121 
(-) Missing Identifiers  1 1 
(-) Missing Announcement dates  1 0 
Clear Sample  289 120 
(-) Firms with no Director's Deals data  35 22 
Final Sample   254 98 
This table shows the sample selection process for both the MM to AIM and the AIM to MM datasets. The 
initial sample is retrieved from the “New issues and IPO summary” spreadsheet provided by the LSE website. 
The identifiers and announcement dates are hand collected from InvestEgate, Nexis and Perfect Information 
databases. The disclosed trades of corporate insiders are retrieved from DirectorsDeals database. 
 
Table 5-2 reports the industry distribution for the firms that switch between the two UK 
markets during the period under examination using the ICB industry classification available 
on Datasteam. Panels A and B show the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM and from 
the AIM to the MM respectively. As shown in panel A, the majority of the firms are from 
groups of the financials, consumer services, consumer goods and technology which consist 
of approximately 60% of the MM to AIM sample. Similarly, as reported in panel B, the 
majority of the firms are from the groups of financials, consumers services, technology and 
basic materials which account for approximately 70% of the AIM to MM sample.  
 
 
 
                                                 
52 As explained in DerectorsDeals definitions, former directors are those that are no longer a board 
member and hence their transactions do not have to be reported under the listing rules. However, in 
specific cases they might be asked to report them. 
53 I exclude those deals due to the fact that option exercise deals are below the market price or even 
nil. In addition, the exercise of options is not based on the same information that directors use when 
trading in ordinary shares (Hillier and Marshall, 2002a; b). The transfer deals are those that the shares 
are transferred to a third party such as when children come of age while the given away shares are 
usually charitable donations. 
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Table 5-2: Industry classification 
Panel A: Switches from the MM to the AIM       
 Frequency % Cum.% 
Basic Materials 9 3.54 3.54 
Consumer Goods 39 15.35 18.90 
Consumer Services 37 14.57 33.46 
Financials 34 13.39 46.85 
Health Care 14 5.51 52.36 
Industrials 79 31.10 83.46 
Oil & Gas 3 1.18 84.65 
Technology 37 14.57 99.21 
Telecommunications 2 0.79 100 
Total 254 100   
Panel B: Switches from the AIM to the MM       
 Frequency % Cum.% 
Basic Materials 12 12.24 12.24 
Consumer Goods 1 1.02 13.27 
Consumer Services 11 11.22 24.49 
Financials 33 33.67 58.16 
Health Care 8 8.16 66.33 
Industrials 9 9.18 75.51 
Oil & Gas 8 8.16 83.67 
Technology 14 14.29 97.96 
Telecommunications 1 1.02 98.98 
Utilities 1 1.02 100 
Total 98 100 
 
This table reports the industry distribution among the firms that move between the two UK markets from 1999 
to 2015. Panel A shows the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM and panel B the firms that move from 
the AIM to the MM. For the industry classification I use the ICB industry system available on Datastream. 
 
Table 5-3 shows the summary statistics of the firms that switch markets during the period 
of 1999-2015. Panel A shows the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM, panel B the 
firms that switch from the AIM to the MM and panel C the difference between the two 
samples. The firms that upgrade to the MM tend to be significantly larger in size and to have 
higher growth compared to the firms that downgrade to the AIM. More specifically, the firms 
that move from the AIM to the MM have an average market capitalisation of 298m and a 
mean M/B of 3.34 while the firms that move from the MM to the AIM have an average 
market capitalisation of 28m and a mean M/B of 2.06. The differences are significant at the 
least at the 5% level. The average stock liquidity and R&D between the two samples is 
reported to be similar. 
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Table 5-3: Summary statistics 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD N 
Panel A: Switches from the MM to the AIM     
Size     28,661   13,013 988    552,147    58,686 226 
M/B 2.066 1.060 -7.780 20.380 3.624 226 
Stock Liquidity 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.089 0.008 226 
R&D 0.051 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.009 226 
Panel B: Switches from the AIM to the MM     
Size   298,659  117,930      3,245 4,368,805  606,970 85 
M/B 3.342 1.870 -8.880 27.500 4.555 85 
Stock Liquidity 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.102 0.011 85 
R&D 0.061 0.000 0.000 1.361 0.229 85 
Panel C: Differences between the two samples       
 Mean   Median   
Size -269,998*** (0.000)    -104917*** (0.000)  
M/B -1.276** (0.030)  -0.810*** (0.000)  
Stock Liquidity -0.001 (0.487)  0.000 (0.125)  
R&D -0.010 (0.698)  0.000* (0.057)  
This table reports the summary statistics of the firms that move between the two UK markets 1999 to 2015. 
Panel A presents the firms that move from the MM to the AIM, panel B shows the firms that move from the 
AIM to the MM and panel C depicts the differences between the two samples. Size is measured by the market 
capitalisation and it is scaled in thousands. M/B is the market to book ratio. Stock liquidity is the daily average 
of the trading volume to shares outstanding ratio over the control period. R&D is the ratio of R&D to total 
assets. The financial data are retrieved from Worldscope. Stock and volume data are retrieved from Datastream. 
The numbers in italic represent the number of observations. P-values are reported in the parentheses. The 
symbols *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
 
5.4 Methodology 
For the comparison of the insider trading levels I use both cross sectional and time series 
controls following Agrawal and Nasser (2012). For the cross sectional control, I compare 
the trades of insiders between the sample and a set of control firms while for the time series 
control, I compare the trades of insiders in the treatment group using an event and a control 
period. The cross sectional method provides a control for market trends during a specific 
time period without taking into account the firm characteristics. The time series method 
controls for the firm characteristics over two different periods without taking into account 
the trend of the market or trading behaviours of insiders. Both methods provide important 
indications however they suffer from limitations. Consequently, I use a DiD approach which 
controls for firm’s characteristics, market trends and time period. I examine insider 
purchases, sales and net purchases separately as they provide different insights. For instance, 
insiders can actively trade by buying shares prior to good news or passively trade by 
decreasing their sales. Similarly, an individual with knowledge about forthcoming negative 
news would be unlikely to buy more shares prior to the negative announcement, yet he/she 
can increase his/her sales (Pope et al., 1990). However, my main interest is in the net 
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purchases as they clearly indicate the final position of corporate insiders. Following Agrawal 
and Nasser (2012), the net purchases are calculated as follows: 
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡                                     (5.1)   
Where Net Purchasesi,t is the net number of insider purchases, Purchasesi,t is the number 
of insider purchases and Salesi,t is the number of insider sales.                     
5.4.1 Cross sectional control sample 
I match the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and vice versa with control firms that 
did not switch markets during the same period following Brophy et al. (2009). First, I 
download the yearly FTSE All Share and FTSE AIM All Share constituents lists from 
Datastream at the end of each calendar year. I also download the market capitalisation (size), 
M/B and ICB codes of all of the constituent firms. For the firms that move from the MM to 
the AIM, I use the FTSE All Share constituents while for the firms that move from the AIM 
to the MM, I use the FTSE AIM All Share constituents. Next, I match each event firm with 
a control firm that is in the same constituent list, it has the same ICB code and the smallest 
difference in the one year lagged market capitalisation (size) and M/B ratio. In the case of a 
missing constituents lists on Datastream, I use the next closest available list. In the case of 
missing size or M/B values, I match the firm with the next closest one. Overall, I match 87 
out of the total 98 firms that move from the AIM to the MM and 242 out of the 254 firms 
that switch from the MM to the AIM. Finally, I match the control firms with the 
DirectorDeals database using their ISIN code. 
5.4.2 Time series control sample 
For the times series test, I compare the treatment and control firms during the event and 
control period. The event period for the firms that move from the MM to the AIM is six 
months prior to the public switch announcement and the control period is six months prior 
to the event period. The event period for the firms that move from the AIM to the MM is 
twelve months prior to the official move announcement and the control period twelve months 
before the event window. The reasoning behind the choice of different event windows is that 
the listing process in the MM takes approximately twelve months due to its stricter listing 
requirements while the listing process in the AIM takes approximately six months (London 
Stock Exchange, 2010); hence during these periods the firms’ insiders are more likely to 
have information advantage about the forthcoming market switches.  
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For instance, the firms that undergo a listing in the MM are obliged to prepare a 
prospectus which must be approved by the UKLA while for a listing in the AIM the 
prospectus is not mandatory. The preparation of the prospectus alone could take up to several 
months. Another major and time consuming listing difference is the corporate governance 
requirements. The firms listing in the MM have to comply with the Combined Code, hence 
they require time to appoint appropriate board members. However, this is not the case for a 
downgrade to the AIM, in which case the proper board requirements are already established. 
In addition, the companies contemplating a listing in the MM will have to ensure that they 
have proper financial controls in place in order to ensure a flow of accurate and timely 
information as required by the LSE. In contrast, the firms that list from the MM to the AIM 
have all these controls in place. Finally, the firms that switch to the AIM can apply for a fast 
track admission which makes the listing process much shorter (London Stock Exchange, 
2010; 2016).  
I focus on insider trading prior to the announcement of the moves as insiders clearly have 
information advantage as they work towards the listing to the markets. I do not examine 
insider trades after the announcement of the switches due to the fact that after that date both 
insiders and outsiders possess the listing information and because insiders’ action could be 
under the spotlight during that period. 
5.4.3 Difference in Difference test 
Since the previous tests (cross sectional and time series) have their own limitations, I use a 
DiD test in order to eliminate them. In order to perform the DiD method I use the difference 
between the change in the level of purchases/sales/net purchases of the treatment firm’s 
insiders between the event and control periods and the change in the level of 
purchases/sales/net purchases of the control firms between the event and control period54. 
Since with this method I achieve a dual control that takes into account both the cross sections 
and time series characteristics, the main interest is in the DiD test. 
5.5 Empirical Results 
In this section, I compare the insider purchases, sales and net purchases of the firms that 
switch markets relative to a control period and relative to a matched control firm sample. I 
also use a dual test (DiD) which controls for both time series and cross sectional differences 
                                                 
54 In order to avoid confusion, the formula used is the following: (event firms event period 
trades/amounts/values - event firms control period trades/amounts/values) – (control firms event 
period trades/amounts/values - control firms control period trades/amounts/values). 
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and is the main interest test. The following Tables (5-4 to 5-9) report the insider purchases, 
sales and net purchases of the firms that switch markets and of their control matched firms, 
using three different measures. The first measure is the number of insider trades which shows 
the number of insider purchases, sales or net purchases. The second measure is the number 
of shares bought or sold in thousands and the third measure is the value of shares bought or 
sold in thousands. The tables present the p-values using a t-test for the difference of means 
and a Wilcoxon test for the difference of medians. Columns 1 and 2 report the results of the 
event firms during the event and control periods respectively. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 
show the results of the control firms for the event and control periods. The time series test is 
presented in column 5 [(1)-(2)] and shows the change in the levels of purchases, sales or net 
purchases of the event firms between the event and control periods while column 6 presents 
the p-value of the differences. The cross sectional test is reported in column 9 [(1)-(3)], 
which presents the change in the levels of purchases, sales or net purchases between the 
event and control firms during the event period while column 10 shows the p-values of those 
differences. Finally, the DiD test is presented in column 11 [(1)-(2)]-[(3)-(4)] which shows 
the difference between the change in the level of purchases, sales or net purchases of the 
sample firm’s insiders between the event and control periods and the change in the level of 
purchases, sales or net purchases of the control firms between the event and control periods. 
The p-values of these differences are reported in column 12. 
Table 5-4 shows the insider purchases of the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM. 
As shown in the mean values of columns 5 and 6 [(1)-(2)], insiders reduce their purchases 
(with a reduction of approximately 52%) six months prior to the announcement of the move. 
This result is significant at the 5% level. When using the cross sectional test (columns 9 and 
10, [(1)-(3)]), I find that insiders in the event firms, purchase circa 68% less shares of their 
own firm compared to the control firms while the value of the shares purchased is 
approximately 46% lower. The results are statistically significant at the 5% and 1% level 
respectively. However, the results do not hold for the mean values when using the dual 
control (DiD) as shown in columns 11 and 12 [(1)-(2)]-[(3)-(4)]. Nevertheless, the DiD 
changes are significant at the 5% level for the number of shares and value of shares measures 
when looking at the median values.  
Table 5-5 reports the insider sales for the firms that downgrade to the AIM. Columns 5 
and 6 [(1)-(2)] show that there is not significant increase in sales during the event period. 
However, when using the DiD method I find a significant appreciation in the mean amount 
of shares (92,310 shares) and mean value of shares (£63,060) sold from the insiders of the 
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firms that downgrade to AIM, indicating that the insiders sell a larger amount of stocks in 
order to avoid the negative announcement stock returns. These results are significant at the 
10% level. The DiD results for the median values are also significant at the 10% level for all 
three measures. Table 5-6 presents the net purchases which is the main interest variable as it 
shows the final position of the insiders. As shown in columns 5 and 6 [(1)-(2)] insiders 
significantly reduce the average number (by 64%), amount (by 200%) and value (by 191%) 
of their net purchases six months prior to the official announcement of the move from the 
MM to the AIM. These results are significant at the least at the 10% level. The results on the 
difference of the means and medians remain significant for all variables when using the dual 
control test (DiD) as shown in columns 11 and 12 [(1)-(2)]-[(3)-(4)].  
Table 5-7 presents the insider purchases of the firms that move from the AIM to the MM. 
As reported in all three tests, there is no significant increases, neither in mean nor in median 
values, in purchases one year prior to the announcement of the switches. Similar results are 
reported for the sales as shown in Table 5-8, even though insiders seem to decrease their 
average number of trades, amount of shares and value of shares, the difference is not 
statistically significant in all three tests. However, contrary to the previous results and as 
shown in columns 11 and 12 [(1)-(2)]-[(3)-(4)] of Table 5-9, I find a statistically significant 
increase in the average net purchases for both the insider trades (p-value of 0.044) and the 
value of shares traded (p-value of 0.060) when using the dual control (DiD) method, 
indicating that when taking into account both the time series and cross sectional tests, 
insiders tend to actively increase their purchases and decrease their sales one year prior to 
the announcement of positive news in order to benefit from the market switch announcement 
returns. 
Overall, the results report that insiders refrain from buying additional shares as well as 
increase their sales, deviating from their normal net purchasing behaviour, six months prior 
to the announcement of the move from the MM to the AIM, an announcement that triggers 
negative stock returns, in line with the active insider trading hypothesis. In contrast, 
according to the results reported by the DiD test, insiders tend to increase their net purchases 
prior to the announcement of the move from the AIM to the MM, a switch which is 
considered as good news by the market and triggers positive announcement stock returns 
(Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2013; Campbell and Tabner, 2014). However, the results appear 
to be weaker for the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM, which could be attributed 
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to the lack of the insider list55 by the AIM firms. The AIM firms do not have to produce this 
list, making it harder for the market and the regulators to recognise who is considered to be 
an insider in the AIM firms and who is required to disclose his/her trades. Thus, “unknown” 
insiders can trade freely on price sensitive information, without disclosing their trades, 
something which could also be reflected in the insiders disclosed data. As stated by Pope et 
al. (1990), the most successful trades that are based on price sensitive information are those 
from the insiders that do not report their existence to the regulators, and hence manage to 
avoid market detection. Finally, it is important to note that these results should be interpreted 
with caution as the firms that have non-zero trading for the MM to the AIM sample is 16% 
and for the AIM to the MM sample is 20%.
                                                 
55 As stated previously in Chapter 3, unlike the MM firms, AIM firms are not required to create an 
insider list or to notify the FCA and keep a detailed record for the delayed disclosures. 
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Table 5-4: Insider purchases of the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM 
Switches from the MM to the AIM, Purchases                   
   Event Firms  Control Firms Difference P-value Difference P-value Difference P-value Diff in Diff P-value 
  
Event 
Period 
Control 
Period 
Event 
Period 
Control 
Period                 
  
(1) 
 
(-180, -01) 
(2) 
 
(-360, -181) 
(3) 
 
(-180, -01) 
(4) 
 
(-360, -181) 
(5) 
 
(1)-(2) 
(6) 
 
(1)-(2) 
(7) 
 
(3)-(4) 
(8) 
 
(3)-(4) 
(9) 
 
(1)-(3) 
(10) 
 
(1)-(3) 
(11) 
[(1)-(2)]- 
[(3)-(4)] 
(12) 
[(1)-(2)]- 
[(3)-(4)] 
Mean                         
Insider trades (N) 0.13 0.27 0.40 0.42 -0.14** (0.014) -0.02 (0.805) -0.27*** (0.000) -0.12 (0.141) 
Number of Shares (N) 19.74 40.98 36.35 51.48 -21.24 (0.163) -15.13 (0.575) -16.61 (0.228) -6.11 (0.843) 
Value of Shares (£) 3.92 13.00 20.87 19.64 -9.08 (0.135) 1.23 (0.887) -16.95** (0.013) -10.31 (0.151) 
Median                         
Insider trades (N) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* (0.064) 0.00 (0.608) 0.00*** (0.002) 0.00 (0.120) 
Number of Shares (N) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* (0.065) 0.00 (0.632) 0.00*** (0.005) 0.00** (0.043) 
Value of Shares (£) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* (0.061) 0.00 (0.617) 0.00*** (0.002) 0.00** (0.040) 
This table reports the insider purchases of the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and their control firms during the event and control periods. The control firms are listed in the MM 
and they are matched according to their constituents list year, industry classification, size and market to book ratio. The event period is 180 calendar days prior to the announcement date (-
180, -01) and the control period is 180 calendar days prior to the event period (-360, -181). The table shows the p-values of a t-test for the difference of means and the p-values of Wilcoxon 
test for the difference of medians. Columns 1 and 2 show event firms during the event and control period respectively. Columns 3 and 4 present the control firms during the event and control 
period respectively. Column 5 [(1)-(2)] reports the time series test for the event firms which is the difference in insider purchases between the event and control periods. Column 6 reports the 
p-value of this difference. Column 7 and 8 [(3)-(4)] show the time series test for the control firms and their p-values. Column 9 [(1)-(3)] reports the cross sectional test which is the difference 
in insider purchases between the sample and control firms during the event period. Column 10 reports the p-value of this difference. Column 11 [(1)-(2)]-[(3)-(4)] reports the dual control 
(DiD) results which is the difference between the change in the level of purchases of the sample firm’s insiders between the event and control periods and the change in the level of purchases 
of the control firms between the control and event periods. Column 12 shows the p-value of the DiD. The Number of Shares and the Value of Shares are in thousands. The insider trading data 
are retrieved from DirectorDeals database. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5-5: Insider sells of the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM 
Switches from the MM to the AIM, Sells                   
   Event Firms  Control Firms Difference P-value Difference P-value Difference P-value Diff in Diff P-value 
  
Event 
Period 
Control 
Period 
Event 
Period 
Control 
Period                 
  
(1) 
 
(-180, -01) 
(2) 
 
(-360, -181) 
(3) 
 
(-180, -01) 
(4) 
 
(-360, -181) 
(5) 
 
(1)-(2) 
(6) 
 
(1)-(2) 
(7) 
 
(3)-(4) 
(8) 
 
(3)-(4) 
(9) 
 
(1)-(3) 
(10) 
 
(1)-(3) 
(11) 
[(1)-(2)]- 
[(3)-(4)] 
(12) 
[(1)-(2)]- 
[(3)-(4)] 
Mean                         
Insider trades (N) 0.04 0.02 0.13 0.19 0.02 (0.409) -0.06 (0.374) -0.09* (0.072) 0.08 (0.276) 
Number of Shares (N) 62.76 0.48 13.99 44.02 62.28 (0.168) -30.03 (0.131) 48.77 (0.284) 92.31* (0.062) 
Value of Shares (£) 15.39 0.41 28.33 76.41 14.98 (0.239) -48.08 (0.153) -12.94 (0.449) 63.06* (0.082) 
Median                         
Insider trades (N) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.430) 0.00 (0.290) 0.00 (0.223) 0.00* (0.090) 
Number of Shares (N) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.426) 0.00 (0.269) 0.00 (0.229) 0.00* (0.087) 
Value of Shares (£) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.419) 0.00 (0.278) 0.00 (0.217) 0.00* (0.089) 
This table reports the insider sales of the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and their control firms during the event and control periods. The control firms are listed in the MM and 
they are matched according to their constituents list year, industry classification, size and market to book ratio. The event period is 180 calendar days prior to the announcement date (-180, -
01) and the control period is 180 calendar days prior to the event period (-360, -181). The table shows the p-values of a t-test for the difference of means and the p-values of Wilcoxon test for 
the difference of medians. Columns 1 and 2 show event firms during the event and control period respectively. Columns 3 and 4 present the control firms during the event and control period 
respectively. Column 5 [(1)-(2)] reports the time series test for the event firms which is the difference in insider sales between the event and control periods. Column 6 reports the p-value of 
this difference. Column 7 and 8 [(3)-(4)] show the time series test for the control firms and their p-values. Column 9 [(1)-(3)] reports the cross sectional test which is the difference in insider 
sales between the sample and control firms during the event period. Column 10 reports the p-value of this difference. Column 11 [(1)-(2)]-[(3)-(4)] reports the dual control (DiD) results which 
is the difference between the change in the level of sales of the sample firm’s insiders between the event and control periods and the change in the level of sales of the control firms between 
the control and event periods. Column 12 shows the p-value of the DiD. The Number of Shares and the Value of Shares are in thousands. The insider trading data are retrieved from 
DirectorDeals database. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
  
  
 
120 
 
Table 5-6: Insider net purchases of the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM 
Switches from the MM to the AIM, Net Purchases                 
   Event Firms  Control Firms Difference P-value Difference P-value Difference P-value Diff in Diff P-value 
  
Event 
Period 
Control 
Period 
Event 
Period 
Control 
Period                 
  
(1) 
 
(-180, -01) 
(2) 
 
(-360, -181) 
(3) 
 
(-180, -01) 
(4) 
 
(-360, -181) 
(5) 
 
(1)-(2) 
(6) 
 
(1)-(2) 
(7) 
 
(3)-(4) 
(8) 
 
(3)-(4) 
(9) 
 
(1)-(3) 
(10) 
 
(1)-(3) 
(11) 
[(1)-(2)]- 
[(3)-(4)] 
(12) 
[(1)-(2)]- 
[(3)-(4)] 
Mean                         
Insider trades (N) 0.09 0.25 0.27 0.23 -0.16*** (0.009) 0.04 (0.672) -0.18** (0.027) -0.20* (0.075) 
Number of Shares (N) -43.02 40.50 22.36 7.47 -83.52* (0.081) 14.89 (0.656) -65.38 (0.170) -98.41* (0.090) 
Value of Shares (£) -11.47 12.59 -7.46 -56.77 -24.06* (0.088) 49.31 (0.148) -4.01 (0.822) -73.37** (0.046) 
Median                         
Insider trades (N) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** (0.033) 0.00 (0.846) 0.00** (0.023) 0.00** (0.036) 
Number of Shares (N) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** (0.020) 0.00 (0.314) 0.00** (0.028) 0.00** (0.014) 
Value of Shares (£) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00** (0.018) 0.00 (0.322) 0.00** (0.013) 0.00** (0.014) 
This table reports the insider net purchases of the firms that move from the MM to the AIM and their control firms during the event and control periods. The control firms are listed in the 
MM and they are matched according to their constituents list year, industry classification, size and market to book ratio. The event period is 180 calendar days prior to the announcement date 
(-180, -01) and the control period is 180 calendar days prior to the event period (-360, -181). The table shows the p-values of a t-test for the difference of means and the p-values of Wilcoxon 
test for the difference of medians. Columns 1 and 2 show event firms during the event and control period respectively. Columns 3 and 4 present the control firms during the event and control 
period respectively. Column 5 [(1)-(2)] reports the time series test for the event firms which is the difference in insider net purchases between the event and control periods. Column 6 reports 
the p-value of this difference. Column 7 and 8 [(3)-(4)] show the time series test for the control firms and their p-values. Column 9 [(1)-(3)] reports the cross sectional test which is the 
difference in insider net purchases between the sample and control firms during the event period. Column 10 reports the p-value of this difference. Column 11 [(1)-(2)]-[(3)-(4)] reports the 
dual control (DiD) results which is the difference between the change in the level of net purchases of the sample firm’s insiders between the event and control periods and the change in the 
level of net purchases of the control firms between the control and event periods. Column 12 shows the p-value of the DiD. The Number of Shares and the Value of Shares are in thousands. 
The insider trading data are retrieved from DirectorDeals database. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5-7: Insider purchases of the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM 
Switches from the AIM to the MM, Purchases                   
   Event Firms  Control Firms Difference P-value Difference P-value Difference P-value Diff in Diff P-value 
  
Event 
Period 
Control 
Period 
Event 
Period 
Control 
Period                 
  
(1) 
 
(-360, -01) 
(2) 
 
(-361, -720) 
(3) 
 
(-360, -01) 
(4) 
 
(-361, -720) 
(5) 
 
(1)-(2) 
(6) 
 
(1)-(2) 
(7) 
 
(3)-(4) 
(8) 
 
(3)-(4) 
(9) 
 
(1)-(3) 
(10) 
 
(1)-(3) 
(11) 
[(1)-(2)]- 
[(3)-(4)] 
(12) 
[(1)-(2)]- 
[(3)-(4)] 
Mean                         
Insider trades (N) 0.73 0.65 0.33 0.49 0.08 (0.805) -0.16 (0.323) 0.40 (0.114) 0.24 (0.151) 
Number of Shares (N) 260.03 67.46 115.50 97.40 192.57 (0.352) 18.10 (0.830) 144.53 (0.508) 174.47 (0.432) 
Value of Shares (£) 153.26 46.26 18.50 54.60 107.00 (0.269) -36.10 (0.291) 134.76 (0.159) 143.10 (0.151) 
Median                         
Insider trades (N) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.570) 0.000 (0.248) 0.00 (0.206) 0.00 (0.257) 
Number of Shares (N) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.622) 0.000 (0.242) 0.00 (0.209) 0.00 (0.179) 
Value of Shares (£) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.585) 0.000 (0.233) 0.00 (0.160) 0.00* (0.055) 
This table reports the insider purchases of the firms that move from the AIM to the MM and their control firms during the event and control periods. The control firms are listed in the AIM 
and they are matched according to their constituents list year, industry classification, size and market to book ratio. The event period is 360 calendar days before the announcement date (-
360, -01) and the control period is 360 calendar days prior to the event period (-720, -361). The table shows the p-values of t-test for the difference of means and the p-values of Wilcoxon 
test for the difference of medians. Columns 1 and 2 show event firms during the event and control period respectively. Columns 3 and 4 present the control firms during the event and control 
period respectively. Column 5 [(1)-(2)] reports the time series control for the sample firms which is the difference in insider purchases between the event and control periods. Column 6 reports 
the p-value of this differences. Column 7 and 8 [(3)-(4)] show the time series control for the control firms and their p-values. Column 9 [(1)-(3)] reports the cross sectional control which is 
the difference in insider purchases between the sample and control firms during the event period and column 10 reports the p-value of this differences. Column 11 [(1)-(2)]- [(3)-(4)] reports 
the dual control (DiD) results which is the difference between the change in the level of purchases of the sample firm’s insiders between the event and control periods and the change in the 
level of purchases of the control firms between the control and event period. Column 12 shows the p-value of the DiD. The Number of Shares and Value of Shares are in thousands. The 
insider trading data are retrieved from DirectorDeals database. The symbol * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
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Table 5-8: Insider sells of the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM 
Switches from the AIM to the MM, Sells                   
   Event Firms  Control Firms Difference P-value Difference P-value Difference P-value Diff in Diff P-value 
  
Event 
Period 
Control 
Period 
Event 
Period 
Control 
Period                 
  
(1) 
 
(-360, -01) 
(2) 
 
(-361, -720) 
(3) 
 
(-360, -01) 
(4) 
 
(-361, -720) 
(5) 
 
(1)-(2) 
(6) 
 
(1)-(2) 
(7) 
 
(3)-(4) 
(8) 
 
(3)-(4) 
(9) 
 
(1)-(3) 
(10) 
 
(1)-(3) 
(11) 
[(1)-(2)]- 
[(3)-(4)] 
(12) 
[(1)-(2)]- 
[(3)-(4)] 
Mean                         
Insider trades (N) 0.14 0.18 0.27 0.18 -0.04 (0.765) 0.09 (0.404) -0.13 (0.284) -0.13 (0.120) 
Number of Shares (N) 37.03 38.89 165.08 80.74 -1.86 (0.941) 84.34 (0.250) -128.05* (0.058) -86.20 (0.176) 
Value of Shares (£) 102.04 66.59 238.59 75.77 35.45 (0.538) 162.82 (0.189) -136.55 (0.286) -127.37 (0.214) 
Median                         
Insider trades (N) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.995) 0.00 (0.602) 0.00 (0.113) 0.00 (0.316) 
Number of Shares (N) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.990) 0.00 (0.587) 0.00 (0.115) 0.00 (0.122) 
Value of Shares (£) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.981) 0.00 (0.600) 0.00 (0.143) 0.00 (0.128) 
This table reports the insider sales of the firms that move from the AIM to the MM and their control firms during the event and control periods. The control firms are listed in the AIM and 
they are matched according to their constituents list year, industry classification, size and market to book ratio. The event period is 360 calendar days before the announcement date (-360, -
01) and the control period is 360 calendar days prior to the event period (-720, -361). The table shows the p-values of t-test for the difference of means and the p-values of Wilcoxon test for 
the difference of medians. Columns 1 and 2 show event firms during the event and control period respectively. Columns 3 and 4 present the control firms during the event and control period 
respectively. Column 5 [(1)-(2)] reports the time series control for the sample firms which is the difference in insider sales between the event and control periods. Column 6 reports the p-
value of this differences. Column 7 and 8 [(3)-(4)] show the time series control for the control firms and their p-values. Column 9 [(1)-(3)] reports the cross sectional control which is the 
difference in insider sales between the sample and control firms during the event period and column 10 reports the p-value of this differences. Column 11 [(1)-(2)]-[(3)-(4)] reports the dual 
control (DiD) results which is the difference between the change in the level of sales of the sample firm’s insiders between the event and control periods and the change in the level of sales 
of the control firms between the control and event period. Column 12 shows the p-value of the DiD. The Number of Shares and Value of Shares are in thousands. The insider trading data are 
retrieved from DirectorDeals database. The symbol * denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
  
  
 
123 
 
Table 5-9: Insider net purchases of the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM 
Switches from the AIM to the MM, Net Purchases                 
   Event Firms  Control Firms Difference P-value Difference P-value Difference P-value Diff in Diff P-value 
  
Event 
Period 
Control 
Period 
Event 
Period 
Control 
Period                 
  
(1) 
 
(-360, -01) 
(2) 
 
(-361, -720) 
(3) 
 
(-360, -01) 
(4) 
 
(-361, -720) 
(5) 
 
(1)-(2) 
(6) 
 
(1)-(2) 
(7) 
 
(3)-(4) 
(8) 
 
(3)-(4) 
(9) 
 
(1)-(3) 
(10) 
 
(1)-(3) 
(11) 
[(1)-(2)]- 
[(3)-(4)] 
(12) 
[(1)-(2)]- 
[(3)-(4)] 
Mean                         
Insider trades (N) 0.59 0.47 0.06 0.31 0.12 (0.731) -0.25 (0.180) 0.53* (0.056) 0.37** (0.044) 
Number of Shares (N) 223.28 28.57 -49.58 16.65 194.71 (0.350) -66.23 (0.536) 272.86 (0.230) 260.94 (0.271) 
Value of Shares (£) 51.22 -20.33 -220.09 -21.17 71.55 (0.507) -198.92 (0.122) 271.31* (0.086) 270.47* (0.060) 
Median                         
Insider trades (N) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.611) 0.00 (0.304) 0.00** (0.049) 0.00 (0.116) 
Number of Shares (N) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.544) 0.00 (0.248) 0.00** (0.020) 0.00* (0.069) 
Value of Shares (£) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.455) 0.00 (0.245) 0.00** (0.019) 0.00** (0.044) 
This table reports the insider net purchases of the firms that move from the AIM to the MM and their control firms during the event and control periods. The control firms are listed in the 
AIM and they are matched according to their constituents list year, industry classification, size and market to book ratio. The event period is 360 calendar days before the announcement date 
(-360, -01) and the control period is 360 calendar days prior to the event period (-720, -361). The table shows the p-values of t-test for the difference of means and the p-values of Wilcoxon 
test for the difference of medians. Columns 1 and 2 show event firms during the event and control period respectively. Columns 3 and 4 present the control firms during the event and control 
period respectively. Column 5 [(1)-(2)] reports the time series control for the sample firms which is the difference in insider net purchases between the event and control periods. Column 6 
reports the p-value of this differences. Column 7 and 8 [(3)-(4)] show the time series control for the control firms and their p-values. Column 9 [(1)-(3)] reports the cross sectional control 
which is the difference in insider net purchases between the sample and control firms during the event period and column 10 reports the p-value of this differences. Column 11 [(1)-(2)]-[(3)-
(4)] reports the dual control (DiD) results which is the difference between the change in the level of net purchases of the sample firm’s insiders between the event and control periods and the 
change in the level of net purchases of the control firms between the control and event period. Column 12 shows the p-value of the DiD. The Number of Shares and Value of Shares are in 
thousands. The insider trading data are retrieved from DirectorDeals database. The symbols *, ** denote statistical significance at the 10 and 5% levels respectively. 
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5.5.1 Regression Analysis 
In this section, I perform a regression analysis using several cross sectional regressions in 
order to control for other potential determinants that could drive the insider trading activity 
upwards or downwards. The regressions are the following: 
𝐼𝑇𝑖 =  𝑎 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗
𝑀
𝐵⁄ 𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 ∗
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝛥𝜎𝑖 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜗 ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖                 (5.2) 
𝐼𝑇𝑖 =  𝑎 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 ∗
𝑀
𝐵⁄ 𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +
𝛽5 ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽7 ∗ 𝛥𝜎𝑖 + 𝛾 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜗 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖          (5.3) 
For the dependant variable (IT) both for the times series and cross sectional tests I use 
three different parametric measures, the number of trades, the amount of shares traded and 
the value of the shares traded. For the dual control test (DiD) the dependant variables are the 
previous three variables but instead of taking the actual values, I use the difference between 
the change in the levels between event and control periods in the sample firms and the change 
in the levels between event and control periods in the control firms56. The first regression 
(5.2) corresponds to the time series control and includes only the treatment firms for the 
duration of the event and control periods. The second regression (5.3) refers to the cross 
sectional as well as the dual control tests. The dataset on this regression consists of the event 
and control firms during the event period. The main variable of interest in the first regression 
(5.2) is the Event period which is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the trade 
occurred in the event period and zero if the trade occurred in the control period. It basically 
captures whether there is a significant difference between the event and control periods. In 
the second regression (5.3) the variable of interest is the Event firm which takes the value of 
one if the trade occurred by an event firm and zero if the trade occurred by a control firm. 
This variable examines whether there is a significant difference in insider trades between the 
event and control firms. 
In addition, I include a set of independent control variables. I control for size calculated 
as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization one year prior to the announcement of 
the moves (Size), as it is evident from the literature that small firms experience more insider 
                                                 
56 As stated earlier in section 5.4.3, the formula used is the following: (event firms event period 
trades/amounts/values - event firms control period trades/amounts/values) – (control firms event 
period trades/amounts/values - control firms control period trades/amounts/values). 
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purchases while large firms more insider sales (Seyhun, 1986). Furthermore, Jenter (2005) 
argues that insiders buy (sell) stocks when they are in low (high) valuation. Thus, I control 
for M/B which is the ratio of market to book value one year prior to the announcement of the 
moves.  
Kyle (1985), Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Holmström and Tirole (1993) report that 
higher stock liquidity could prompt insiders to trade more as they can easily hide their trades 
as well as earn more from the increase of unfirmed insiders in the market. I control for stock 
liquidity measured by the daily average of the ratio trading volume to shares outstanding 
over the window (-250, -1, trading days) for the event period and (-500, -251, trading days) 
for the control period of the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM and (-125, -1, trading 
days) for the event period and (-250, -126, trading days) for the control period of the firms 
that switch from the MM to the AIM (Stock liquidity).  
Aboody and Lev (2000) argue that high R&D could increase the information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders, thereby increasing the insider trading activity. I control for 
R&D as the ratio of R&D expenses over total assets one year prior to the announcement of 
the moves. Further, Meulbroek (2000) reports that insiders in riskier firms tend to sell their 
stocks more aggressively. Thus, I control for volatility which is the standard deviation of the 
stock returns over the estimation window (-250, -126, trading days) for the event period and 
(-500, -376 trading days) for the control period prior to the move to the MM. For the firms 
that move to the AIM I use the standard deviation of the stock returns over the estimation 
window (-125, -63, trading days) for the event period and (-250, -188, trading days) for the 
control period (Volatility).  
Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Jin (2002) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999; 2003) show 
that changes in equity risk lead to changes in managers’ holdings that are expressed either 
through stock purchases or sales. Hence, I control for changes in equity risk measured as the 
changes in volatility (Δσ) which for the firms that move to the MM is estimated as σ (-125, 
-1, trading days) - σ (-250, -126, trading days) for the event period and σ (-375, -251, trading 
days) - σ (-500, -376, trading days) for the control period. Since I use different event 
windows for the firms that move to the AIM the estimation is also different. For the firms 
that move to the AIM the changes in volatility are calculated as σ (-62, -1, trading days) – σ 
(-125, -63, trading days) for the event period and σ (-187, -126, trading days) – σ (-250, -
188, trading days) for the control period. Finally, I include industry and year fixed effects to 
control for common factors that affect firms in the same industry or year.  
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Following Agrawal and Nasser (2012), for the first measure of the dependent variable, 
the number of insider purchases and sells, I use a zero inflated negative binomial regression 
due to the fact that the data are consisted of count values (they take the value between zero 
and seven) and are inflated on value zero. For the net purchases I use OLS regressions since 
the variable can take both positive and negative values. For the second and third measures, 
the amount and value of shares traded, I use Tobit regressions due to the fact that the data 
are censored from below to zero (the data cannot be negative). Once again since the values 
in net purchases can be both positive and negative, I use OLS regressions for these variables. 
Tables 5-10 to 5-15 report the results of the regressions analysis. Columns 1 to 3 depict 
the insider purchases using the three difference measures, the number of trades, the amount 
of shares bought and the value of the shares bought. Columns 4 to 6 show the insider sales 
and columns 7 to 9 the net purchases using the same three measures. Table 5-10 presents the 
time series control for the firms that move from the MM to the AIM. The results are similar 
after controlling for several variables; corporate insiders tend to decrease their purchases in 
all three measures and their sales in two of the three measures, six months prior to the 
announcement of the switch to the AIM as shown in the parameter coefficients of Event 
period in columns 1 to 6. This translates to decreases in the number of trades and amount of 
shares of net purchases as reported in columns 7 and 8. More specifically, the insiders seems 
to decrease their net purchases by an overage of 0.15 trades and 89,333 shares on the event 
period compared to the control period. These results are significant at the least at the 10% 
level. 
The results are also similar when I compare the sample firms with the control firms as 
shown in Table 5-11. More specifically, the corporate insiders of the event firms appear to 
significantly decrease their purchases, in all three measures, as shown in the parameter 
coefficient of Event firm in columns 1 to 3 and to significantly increase their sales as shown 
in columns 4 to 6 compared to the corporate insiders of the control sample. However, when 
looking to the net purchases, the results report a significant decrease of an average of 0.34 
trades only in the first measure (number of insider trades) as shown in column 7. This result 
is significant at the 1% level. Finally, using the DiD method as reported in Table 5-12, I find 
decreases in the number of purchases, significant at the 5% level, significant increases in the 
number of sales as well as decreases in the number of net purchases as shown in the 
parameter coefficient of Event firm in columns 1, 4 and 7 respectively. I also find significant 
decreases in the value of shares for the net purchases as reported in column 9. This result is 
significant at the 10% level. Overall, the results show signs of abnormal trading activity six 
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months prior to the switches from the MM to the AIM, after controlling for several factors 
that could trigger abnormal insider trading activities in line with the hypothesis (5.1). 
However, in line with the literature (e.g Friederich et al., 2002; Jeng et al., 2003) the 
economic significance of the results should not be of great concern to the regulators as the 
value of the average decrease in net purchases is £122,390. 
Table 5-13 reports the times series test from the firms that switch from the AIM to the 
MM. The table shows no abnormal activity between the event and control periods for the 
stock purchases and net purchases, however there is a significant decrease in the amount (on 
average 289,333 shares) and value of shares (on average £394,000) sold one year prior to 
the announcement of the moves as shown in the parameter coefficient of Event firm in 
columns 5 and 6. These results are significant at the 1 and 10% levels respectively. When 
using the cross sectional control as shown in Table 5-14, I find a positive and statistically 
significant difference between the event and control firms in amount and value of shares 
bought as shown in columns 2 and 3 respectively. These results are significant at the 1% 
level. In addition, I find a significant differences in insider sales, amount and value of shares 
sold between the event and control firms as shown in columns 4 to 6. Finally, I find a positive 
and significant difference between the event and control firms in the insider trades of net 
purchases as reported in column 7. This result is significant at the 10% level. With regards 
to the DiD method, I find average reduces of 0.17 in the number of insider sales which are 
significant at the 10% level as shown in column 4 of Table 5-15. Most importantly, I find 
positive and significant increases in the number of trades and value of shares of net 
purchases, indicating that the insiders of the event firms tend to significantly decrease their 
sales and slightly increase their purchases prior to the announcement of the moves from the 
AIM to the MM in line with the hypothesis (5.2). Once again, the economic significance of 
these results should not raise major concerns to the regulators as the increase in the net value 
of shares traded is relatively low (e.g. £277,510).
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Table 5-10: Regression on time series control (I)-(II) for the firms that move from the MM to the AIM 
Switches from the MM to the AIM, Time series control (I)-(II) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Purchases Sells Net Purchases 
  
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Event period -0.64** -138.76*** -55.21*** 0.29 789.76*** 217.37*** -0.15** -89.33* -25.99 
(0.024) (0.000) (0.000) (0.570) (0.002) (0.004) (0.022) (0.097) (0.114) 
Size 0.13 53.29*** 30.26*** 0.52* 533.20*** 179.13*** 0.01 -19.79 -7.46 
(0.357) (0.000) (0.000) (0.085) (0.000) (0.000) (0.884) (0.621) (0.548) 
M/B -0.04 -0.99 -5.23*** -0.02 -76.62 -20.90 -0.01 5.62 -0.29 
(0.416) (0.885) (0.000) (0.806) (0.101) (0.140) (0.432) (0.220) (0.669) 
Stock liquidity -18.15 198.88 -56.36 17.81 59367.12*** 9154.15*** -6.71* -16601.59 -625.13 
(0.361) (0.902) (0.931) (0.153) (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.266) (0.670) 
R&D -0.47 -156.40 -57.18 -0.71 -1958.17*** -576.69*** -0.04 59.45 5.79 
(0.693) (0.151) (0.128) (0.435) (0.007) (0.007) (0.722) (0.273) (0.499) 
Volatility 0.997 -1867.36** -1077.75*** -65.45*** -109565.30*** -30702.16*** 1.64 2803.62 190.39 
(0.941) (0.049) (0.006) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.503) (0.183) (0.455) 
Δσ -0.22 -5980.00*** -829.62*** -37.14 -56744.27*** -16636.52*** 0.83 207.46 255.64 
(0.985) (0.000) (0.000) (0.275) (0.000) (0.000) (0.792) (0.918) (0.469) 
Constant -22.22*** -6504.89*** -2632.55*** -17.48*** -24174.89*** -7592.93*** -0.08 141.49 72.49 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.823) (0.718) (0.539)  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 444 
R2-adjusted       0.107 0.091 0.038 
Pseudo R2   0.042 0.045   0.102 0.103       
This table presents the estimates of the regressions of the time series test (I)-(II) on insider trades of the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM. Columns 1 to 3 report the estimates of 
insider purchases, columns 4 to 6 report the estimates of insider sales and columns 7 to 9 report the estimates of net purchases. Event period is an indicator variable that takes the value of one 
if the trade occurred during the event period (-180, -1) and zero if the trade occurred during the control period (-360, -181). Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation, M/B is the 
market to book ratio, Stock liquidity is the daily average of the trading volume to shares outstanding ratio over the window (-125, -1, trading days) for the event period and the window (-250, 
-126, trading days) for the control period, R&D is the ratio of R&D to total assets, Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock returns over the window (-125, -63, trading days) for the 
event period and (-250, -188, trading days) for the control period and Δσ is calculated as σ (-62, -1, trading days) – σ (-125, -63, trading days) for the event period and σ (-187, -126, trading 
days) – σ (-250, -188, trading days) for the control period relative to the announcement of the switch. Financial data are retrieved from Worldscope database and are from the fiscal year prior 
to the switch. The insider trading data are retrieved from DirectorDeals database. All financial data are winsorised at the 1 and 99%. The Number of Shares and Value of Shares are in 
thousands. The numbers in italic represent the number of observations. P-values are reported in the parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% 
levels, respectively.
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Table 5-11: Regression on cross sectional control (I)-(III) for the firms that move from the MM to the AIM 
Switches from the MM to the AIM, Cross sectional control (I)-(III) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Purchases Sells Net Purchases 
  
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Event firm -1.32*** -200.61*** -92.39*** 1.02** 1726.38*** 559.09*** -0.34*** -144.97 -32.89 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.040) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.349) (0.515) 
Size -0.15 -16.22*** 6.24*** 1.22*** 1173.49*** 467.74*** -0.10** -62.31 -16.53 
(0.355) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.026) (0.352) (0.443) 
M/B 0.03 10.54*** -1.06 0.03 17.08 18.15 0.00 4.43 -2.41 
(0.449) (0.000) (0.313) (0.765) (0.547) (0.107) (0.841) (0.323) (0.113) 
Stock liquidity -13.78 -3346.56* -3190.97*** 12.43 60010.60*** 6941.91*** -5.84 -26203.03 -1672.13 
(0.449) (0.099) (0.000) (0.212) (0.000) (0.000) (0.107) (0.159) (0.380) 
R&D -2.47 -373.39*** -206.99*** -4.77 -2900.57** -1298.29** 0.16 62.66 35.39 
(0.171) (0.000) (0.000) (0.341) (0.015) (0.012) (0.540) (0.332) (0.281) 
Volatility -32.87*** -6969.09*** -4264.88*** -72.77** -88190.63*** -36232.81*** -4.43* 2725.85 30.05 
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.050) (0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.298) (0.957) 
Δσ -36.32*** -8931.01*** -4539.00*** -75.67** -83984.22*** -35208.15*** -6.51** 557.68 78.53 
(0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.000) (0.029) (0.622) (0.865) 
Constant -13.89*** -2541.00*** -1155.93*** -20.39*** -27625.73*** -11549.92*** 1.14** 668.69 219.34 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.363) (0.353) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 452 452 452 452 452 452 452 452 452 
R2-adjusted       0.149 0.132 0.099 
Pseudo R2   0.045 0.068   0.136 0.148       
This table presents the estimates of the regressions of the cross sectional test (I)-(III) on insider trades of the firms that switched from the MM to the AIM. Columns 1 to 3 report the estimates 
of insider purchases, columns 4 to 6 report the estimates of insider sales and columns 7 to 9 report the estimates of net purchases. Event firm is an indicator variable that takes the value of one 
if the trade occurred from an event firm during the event period (-180, -1) and zero if the trade occurred from a control firm. Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation, M/B is the 
market to book ratio, Stock liquidity is the daily average of the trading volume to shares outstanding ratio over the event window (-125, -1, trading days), R&D is the ratio of R&D to total 
assets, Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock returns over the window (-125, -63, trading days) and Δσ is calculated as σ (-62, -1, trading days) – σ (-125, -63, trading days) relative 
to the announcement of the switch. Financial data are retrieved from Worldscope database and are from the fiscal year prior to the switch. The insider trading data are retrieved from 
DirectorDeals database. All financial data are winsorised at the 1 and 99%. The Number of Shares and Value of Shares are in thousands. The numbers in italic represent the number of 
observations. P-values are reported in the parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance on the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5-12: Regression on the dual control [(I)-(II)]-[(III)-(IV)] for the firms that move from the MM to the AIM 
This table presents the estimates of the regressions of the dual control test [(I)-(II)]-[(III)-(IV)] on insider trades of the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM. Columns 1 to 3 report the 
estimates of insider purchases, columns 4 to 6 report the estimates of insider sales and columns 7 to 9 report the estimates of net purchases. Event firm is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one if the trade occurred from an event firm during the event period (-180, -1) and zero if the trade occurred from a control firm. Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation, 
M/B is the market to book ratio, Stock liquidity is the daily average of the trading volume to shares outstanding ratio over the window (-125, -1, trading days) for the event period and over the 
window (-250, -126, trading days) for the control period, R&D is the ratio of R&D to total assets, Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock returns over the window (-125, -63, trading 
days) and Δσ is calculated as σ (-62, -1, trading days) – σ (-125, -63, trading days) relative to the announcement of the switch. Financial data are retrieved from Worldscope database and are 
from the fiscal year prior to the switch. The insider trading data are retrieved from DirectorDeals database. All financial data are winsorised at the 1 and 99%. The Number of Shares and 
Value of Shares are in thousands. The numbers in italic represent the number of observations. P-values are reported in the parentheses. The symbols * and ** denote statistical significance at 
the 10 and 5% levels, respectively.
Switches from the MM to the AIM, Difference in Difference [(I)-(II)]-[(III)-(IV)] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Purchases Sells Net Purchases 
  
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Event firm -0.24** -51.49 -21.43 0.14* 154.21 90.96 -0.37** -205.69 -112.39*  
(0.049) (0.162) (0.121) (0.076) (0.326) (0.158) (0.011) (0.199) (0.087)   
Size -0.04 -30.41** -6.89 0.02 48.68 10.21 -0.06 -78.55 -17.10 
(0.370) (0.021) (0.155) (0.577) (0.477) (0.717) (0.310) (0.255) (0.547)   
M/B 0.01 3.08 -0.11 0.00 -3.75 -5.48 0.01 6.84 5.37 
(0.210) (0.358) (0.812) (0.968) (0.360) (0.446) (0.310) (0.176) (0.456)   
Stock liquidity 1.33 -124.82 -375.77 0.32 27082.81 2159.51 1.029 -27179.12 -2535.29 
(0.751) (0.932) (0.254) (0.967) (0.143) (0.260) (0.907) (0.139) (0.173)   
R&D -0.68* -82.92 -13.29 0.12 -28.89 70.89 -0.79* -52.58 -84.17 
(0.063) (0.283) (0.176) (0.712) (0.645) (0.449) (0.060) (0.604) (0.359)   
Volatility -2.90 -853.02 -376.18** 1.05 -1832.15 1345.65 -3.95 877.99 -1721.82 
(0.324) (0.239) (0.048) (0.638) (0.483) (0.285) (0.278) (0.743) (0.174)   
Δσ -8.07* 2750.84 556.78 2.88 121.74 587.66 -10.95** 2530.33 -30.88 
(0.082) (0.195) (0.249) (0.246) (0.917) (0.579) (0.036) (0.290) (0.979)   
Constant 0.83 368.99** 97.32* -0.16 -545.12 -141.02 0.99 903.18 238.34 
(0.104) (0.018) (0.086) (0.731) (0.468) (0.630) (0.150) (0.232) (0.423)   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 452 452 452 452 452 452 452 452 452 
R2-adjusted 0.129 0.126 0.056 0.036 0.102 0.060 0.092 0.115 0.066 
  
 
131 
 
Table 5-13: Regression on time series control (I)-(II) for the firms that move from the AIM to the MM 
Switches from the AIM to the MM, Time series control (I)-(II) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Purchases Sells Net Purchases 
  
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Event period 0.24 526.94 312.58 -1.07 -289.33*** -393.99* 0.26 181.28 81.41 
(0.561) (0.500) (0.404) (0.180) (0.000) (0.052) (0.549) (0.391) (0.491) 
Size 0.45*** -187.12 -83.36 0.00 480.09*** 1439.24*** 0.32** -106.09 -35.37 
(0.001) (0.554) (0.572) (0.994) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.328) (0.534) 
M/B -0.32*** -434.45 -218.02 0.10 21.89** -73.82*** -0.02 -20.06 -3.71 
(0.000) (0.196) (0.158) (0.309) (0.021) (0.010) (0.592) (0.273) (0.792) 
Stock liquidity -
145.27*** 
-196846.09** -94848.38* -1.31 -9374.01 -10313.12 -27.36*** -5294.19 -2440.92 
(0.003) (0.023) (0.017) (0.947) (0.198) (0.657) (0.007) (0.185) (0.412) 
R&D -0.37 -1908.61 -1097.79 -1.48 -3910.77*** -9082.01*** -0.82 -394.62 -352.51 
(0.643) (0.445) (0.357) (0.293) (0.000) (0.000) (0.210) (0.246) (0.129) 
Volatility -41.80* 87699.04 35354.10 -87.94* 37901.51*** 128816.59*** -44.72* 30670.28 10011.43 
(0.091) (0.256) (0.320) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.088) (0.327) (0.496) 
Δσ -35.53*** 12298.89 4696.59 17.15 58374.03*** 179916.05*** 0.37 13879.72 4690.19 
(0.002) (0.775) (0.819) (0.714) (0.000) (0.000) (0.984) (0.303) (0.507) 
Constant -4.95*** -4652.80 -2151.28 0.24 -17474.45*** -47904.00*** -1.63 768.60 463.40 
(0.006) (0.216) (0.221) (0.940) (0.000) (0.000) (0.278) (0.377) (0.397) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 156 
R2-adjusted         0.287 0.102 0.109 
Pseudo R2   0.043 0.049   0.222 0.190       
This table presents the estimates of the regressions of the time series test (I)-(II) on insider trades of the firms that switched from the AIM to the MM. Columns 1 to 3 report the estimates of 
insider purchases, columns 4 to 6 report the estimates of insider sales and columns 7 to 9 report the estimates of net purchases. Event period is an indicator variable that takes the value of one 
if the trade occurred during the event period (-360, -1) and zero if the trade occurred during the control period (-720, -361). Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation, M/B is the 
market to book ratio, Stock liquidity is the daily average of the trading volume to shares outstanding ratio over the window (-250, -1, trading days) for the event period and over the window 
(-500, -251, trading days) for the control period, R&D is the ratio of R&D to total assets, Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock returns over the window (-250, -126, trading days) 
for the event period and (-500, -376, trading days) for the control period and Δσ is calculated as σ (-125, -1, trading days) – σ (-250, -126, trading days) for the event period and σ  (-375, -
251, trading days) - σ (-500, -376, trading days) for the control period relative to the announcement of the switch. Financial data are retrieved from Worldscope database and are from the 
fiscal year prior to the switch. The insider trading data are retrieved from DirectorDeals database. All financial data are winsorised at the 1 and 99%. The Number of Shares and Value of 
Shares are in thousands. The numbers in italic represent the number of observations. P-values are reported in the parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance on the 10, 
5 and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 5-14: Regression on cross sectional control (I)-(III) for the firms that move from the AIM to the MM 
Switches from the AIM to the MM, Cross sectional control (I)-(III) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Purchases Sells Net Purchases 
  
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Event firm 0.46 1404.06*** 808.43*** -1.65*** -1039.70*** -1680.39*** 0.62* 310.44 267.48 
(0.311) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.055) (0.273) (0.122)   
Size 0.58*** -457.44*** -161.11*** 0.07 276.65*** 776.95*** 0.07 -178.28 -146.00*  
(0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.879) (0.000) (0.000) (0.578) (0.126) (0.071)   
M/B -0.12*** -21.39 -6.87 0.01 -11.30 -29.56 -0.01 -18.54 -3.03 
(0.007) (0.299) (0.478) (0.924) (0.275) (0.203) (0.409) (0.205) (0.752)   
Stock liquidity 115.28 -24417.52 -13563.74 608.89* 13562.57* 12834.64 -16.74* -1186.43 -989.13 
(0.524) (0.408) (0.346) (0.015) (0.075) (0.457) (0.076) (0.848) (0.783)   
R&D -5.77*** -6364.88*** -3151.04*** -1.43 163.03 -651.68 -0.54 -276.08 369.99 
(0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.510) (0.630) (0.332) (0.413) (0.359) (0.614)   
Volatility 48.59* 39211.72*** 13657.75*** -115.33*** -30386.40*** -56637.20*** -11.44 22247.49 11717.94 
(0.062) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.503) (0.273) (0.267)   
Δσ 38.85 -13663.02*** -4074.77** -21.29 -54538.35*** -72812.37*** 1.96 13543.22 11102.57*  
(0.135) (0.003) (0.043) (0.658) (0.000) (0.000) (0.897) (0.131) (0.069)   
Constant -10.97*** -1980.59*** -1418.34*** 1.34 -21142.30*** -46909.79*** -0.15 1944.85 1727.56** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.803) (0.000) (0.000) (0.905) (0.105) (0.049)   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 
R2-adjusted       0.172 0.158 0.172 
Pseudo R2  0.040 0.040  0.134 0.108                    
This table presents the estimates of the regressions of the cross sectional test (I)-(III) on insider trades of the firms that switched from the AIM to the MM. Columns 1 to 3 report the estimates 
of insider purchases, columns 4 to 6 report the estimates of insider sales and columns 7 to 9 report the estimates of net purchases. Event firm is an indicator variable that takes the value of one 
if the trade occurred from an event firm during the event period (-360, -1) and zero if the trade occurred from a control firm. Size is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation, M/B is the 
market to book ratio, Stock liquidity is the daily average of the trading volume to shares outstanding ratio over the event window (-250, -1, trading days), R&D is the ratio of R&D to total 
assets, Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock returns over the window (-250, -126, trading days) and Δσ is calculated as σ (-125, -1, trading days) – σ (-250, -126, trading days) 
relative to the announcement of the switch. Financial data are retrieved from Worldscope database and are from the fiscal year prior to the switch. The insider trading data are retrieved from 
DirectorDeals database. All financial data are winsorised at the 1 and 99%. The Number of Shares and Value of Shares are in thousands. The numbers in italic represent the number of 
observations. P-values are reported in the parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** denote statistical significance on the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5-15: Regression on the dual control [(I)-(II)]-[(III)-(IV)] for the firms that move from the AIM to MM 
This table presents the estimates of the regressions of the dual control test [(I)-(II)]-[(III)-(IV)] on insider trades of the firms that switched from the MM to the AIM. Columns 1 to 3 report 
the estimates of insider purchases, columns 4 to 6 report the estimates of insider sales and columns 7 to 9 report the estimates of net purchases. Event firm is an indicator variable that takes 
the value of one if the trade occurred from an event firm during the event period (-180, -1) and zero if the trade occurred from a control firm. Size is the natural logarithm of market 
capitalisation, M/B is the market to book ratio, Stock liquidity is the daily average of the trading volume to shares outstanding ratio over the window (-250, -1, trading days), R&D is the ratio 
of R&D to total assets, Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock returns over the window (-250, -126, trading days) and Δσ is calculated as σ (-125, -1, trading days) – σ (-250, -126, 
trading days) relative to the announcement of the switch. Financial data are retrieved from Worldscope database and are from the fiscal year prior to the switch. The insider trading data are 
retrieved from DirectorDeals database. All financial data are winsorised at the 1 and 99%. The Number of Shares and Value of Shares are in thousands. The numbers in italic represent the 
number of observations. P-values are reported in the parentheses.  The symbols * and ** denote statistical significance on the 10, 5% levels, respectively
Switches from the AIM to the MM, Difference in Difference [(I)-(II)]-[(III)-(IV)] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Purchases Sells Net Purchases 
  
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Insider 
trades (N) 
Number of Shares 
(N) 
Value of Shares 
(£) 
Event firm 0.27 221.15 177.05 -0.17* -88.31 -100.46 0.44** 309.46 277.51*  
(0.161) (0.436) (0.172) (0.082) (0.199) (0.325) (0.038) (0.289) (0.090)   
Size 0.03 -133.28 -38.39 0.08 56.87 96.40* -0.05 -190.15 -134.79*  
(0.699) (0.235) (0.422) (0.197) (0.167) (0.057) (0.623) (0.117) (0.053)   
M/B 0.01 -16.14 -5.54 0.01 2.89 -0.48 0.00 -19.03 -5.06 
(0.463) (0.267) (0.370) (0.288) (0.265) (0.936) (0.852) (0.214) (0.550)   
Stock liquidity -4.08 2277.28 -182.04 -0.13 2554.74 1248.44 -3.95 -277.47 -1430.48 
(0.444) (0.735) (0.952) (0.954) (0.193) (0.554) (0.494) (0.966) (0.675)   
R&D -0.25 -254.44 -193.91 0.2 25.35 -322.7 -0.45 -279.79 128.79 
(0.536) (0.410) (0.203) (0.431) (0.821) (0.569) (0.343) (0.394) (0.818)   
Volatility 1.26 21567.54 8079.14 -3.96 -4020.41* -2484.5 5.22 25587.95 10563.64 
(0.902) (0.288) (0.373) (0.333) (0.076) (0.461) (0.636) (0.214) (0.270)   
Δσ 11.78 5069.15 3763.32 1.58 -8683.11* -4870.16 10.19 13752.25 8633.48 
(0.270) (0.533) (0.344) (0.779) (0.058) (0.214) (0.414) (0.141) (0.124)   
Constant 0.00 1118.96 357.19 -0.56 -594.91 -1086.88* 0.56 1713.88 1444.08*  
(0.997) (0.321) (0.453) (0.347) (0.226) (0.076) (0.559) (0.164) (0.069)   
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 162 
R2-adjusted 0.229 0.135 0.109 0.168 0.239 0.164 0.221 0.178 0.170 
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5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides evidence on the levels of disclosed insider trades prior to the 
announcements of the switches from the AIM to the MM and vice versa. Using three 
different measures of the levels of insider trading (amount of insider trades, amount of shares 
traded and value of shares traded), I investigate the insider trading activity on 352 firms that 
switch between the two UK markets during the period of 1999-2015. I separately examine 
the stock purchases, sales and net purchases using both a control period and a control sample. 
In order to eliminate the limitations of time series and cross sectional tests I use a difference 
in difference test that takes into account both of the aforementioned tests. In addition, I 
perform a regression analysis using cross sectional regressions in order to control for other 
potential determinants that might trigger insider trading activities. 
The results are consistent with previous work in other major corporate events (e.g. 
Karpoff and Lee, 1991; Agrawal and Nasser, 2012; Agrawal and Cooper, 2015). I find 
abnormal insider trading activities six months prior to the announcement of the switches 
from the MM to the AIM, an event which is characterised as negative news for the market 
and triggers negative announcement stock returns. More specifically, corporate insiders 
increase their sales and decrease their purchases which results in significant decreases in net 
purchases, in line with the active insider trading hypothesis. For the firms that move from 
the AIM to the MM, a move that is characterised as a market upgrade and is considered to 
be good news for the market, I find insignificant increases in purchases and significant 
decreases in the amount and value of sales which translates to significant increases in some 
of the measures of net purchases. These results, however, appear to be weaker for the moves 
from the AIM to the MM compared to the firms that downgrade to the AIM. This could be 
attributed to the lack of insider list in the AIM, a list which records all individuals who are 
considered to be insiders in the firm. Thus, individuals who have access to private 
information might be omitted from the mandatory disclosure of their trades, a situation 
which could be potentially be reflected in the data.  
The results suggest that corporate insiders use their information advantage several months 
prior to the UK market switches even though the FCA prohibits trading when in possession 
of price sensitive information. Hence, the results highlight the increased need for strict 
enforcement of regulations in place and support the view that in order to reduce any 
prohibited activities, there should be a combination of both severity of punishment and high 
probability of detection (Becker, 1968; Frijns et al., 2013). Finally, the evidence of this study 
could be of interest to policy makers and market regulators of countries that have already 
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established light regulated markets or are in discussions of establishing a secondary market, 
as I introduce a new corporate event to the insider trading literature that lacks focus by both 
academics and regulators.  
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6. Nominated Advisers (Nomads) reputation and the levels 
of abnormal reactions prior to the UK market switches 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The role of advisers is vital for public firms as they provide advice and guidance not only 
during their IPO but also during their entire life in the markets. The choice of the correct 
advisers is of major importance as they work in collaboration with the firms in order to 
eliminate any issues or challenges that might arise (London Stock Exchange, 2010; 2015b). 
Prestigious advisers, such as auditors and bankers provide better information with regards to 
the valuation of a firm to the market and further provide confidence to investors on assessing 
the firms’ true value (Logue, 1973; Titman and Trueman, 1986). Furthermore, high reputable 
financial advisers are also known, at least theoretically, to decrease asymmetrical 
information between insiders and outsiders during IPOs by reducing the extent of under-
pricing and during new equity issues by reducing the negative price actions around them 
(Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). 
Based on the above literature and on the previous findings of this thesis, this chapter aims 
to assess whether the advisory and regulatory body of the AIM, the so-called Nomads, could 
assist in moderating the abnormal market reactions by providing better monitoring. Hence, 
this chapter aims to answer the third research question. It focuses on the information leakages 
rather than the insider trades as Nomads are responsible to monitor abnormal trading 
activities in the share prices of their clients, but they are not responsible to monitor the 
corporate insiders’ trades. Responsible for insider trading activities is the FCA. (London 
Stock Exchange, 2014a; 2015a; b). Apart from that, the setup of chapter five is not suitable 
for this examination as the control firms of the MM to the AIM dataset are listed in the MM, 
thus they are not required to hire Nomads. 
The Nomads are the main advisors and regulators for the AIM firms. Their role is to 
advice, guide and regulate the AIM firms while ensuring that the firms fully understand their 
obligations as dictated by the “AIM rules for companies”.  The Nomads must also monitor 
any trading activities in securities of the AIM firms they supervise, particularly when there 
is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to these companies. In addition, they 
must inform the LSE to take the appropriate actions, in case a firm has breached the rules (a 
detailed analysis on the role of the Nomads is discussed in Chapter 3). In order not to 
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endanger the stability, integrity as well as the reputation of the AIM, the LSE examines 
several criteria to decide whether a firm is appropriate for the role of the Nomad57, including 
the Nomads general reputation (London Stock Exchange, 2014a; 2015a). Hence, the 
Nomads reputation is of vital importance not only for advising the AIM firms and help them 
grow but also for reducing any illegal or market abusive behaviours, which could be a 
tempting opportunity for investors and insiders due to the light regulation of the AIM. In 
addition, the Nomads and advisors in general, are especially interested in building a strong 
reputation as they have to continuously sell their services either to the same company or to 
other client firms (Kale et al., 2003). 
In this chapter, I investigate whether reputable Nomads could reduce the abnormal price 
actions prior to the announcements of the moves from the AIM to the MM and vice versa, 
as reported in Chapter 4 during the period of 1996-2015. In addition, I examine whether 
having a Nomad that also acts as a broker in the firm further reduces the abnormal stock 
prices due to higher control over the AIM firm or whether it increases the abnormal stock 
prices due to the conflict of interest between the interests of the AIM firm and their 
obligations towards the LSE. In order to perform this examination, I construct a yearly 
reputable Nomad ranking system using a composite variable that includes five different 
measures (the Nomads market share in terms of new issues in the year prior to the switch, 
the cumulative Nomads market shares in terms of new issues in the years prior to the switch, 
the Nomads market share in terms of proceeds a Nomad backed in the year before the firm 
market switch, the cumulative market share in terms of proceeds a Nomad backed in the 
years before the firm market switch and the Nomads age on the year prior to the switch) 
following Bushman et al. (2004) and Espenlaub et al. (2012) 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature as it sheds light on the regulatory 
mechanism of the AIM which is an inspiring system for many other secondary markets such 
as the AIM Italia in Italy, the Euronext Growth (formerly known as Alternext) in Belgium, 
France and Portugal and the Freiverkehr in Germany among others (Vismara et al., 2012). 
The findings of this chapter could be of importance to the LSE and to the UK regulators as 
it provides evidence that high reputable Nomad firms constitute a key factor on moderating 
                                                 
57 Under the “AIM rules for nominated advisers” a nominated adviser must be a firm, practice 
corporate finance for at least the last two years prior to the application, have at least three relevant 
transactions during that period and employ at least four qualified executives. 
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market abusive practices as well as raises concerns as to the whether the Nomad firms take 
the appropriate safeguards in order to reduce any conflicts of interest that might arise.  
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 discusses the relevant 
literature. Section 6.3 reports the data. Section 6.4 presents the methodology and the 
descriptive statistics. Section 6.5 analyses the results. Finally, section 6.6 concludes the 
chapter. 
6.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
The association between reputation and product quality was first framed by the seminal 
papers of Klein and Leffler (1981), Shapiro (1983) and Allen (1984). More specifically, 
Klein and Leffler (1981) argue that firms that sell low quality goods at high quality prices 
develop a negative reputation which harm their sales and lead them to the exclusion from 
the market. In their model, they show that the stream of profits by producing products of 
high quality is higher than periodical gains from producing products of low quality. Thus, 
firms will have an incentive to build a good reputation. In a similar vein, Shapiro (1983) 
argues that firms are considered to be reputable when their customers believe that they offer 
high quality products. In order for the customers to judge the quality of a certain product 
produced by a firm, they can either purchase the product or examine the past products 
produced by the firm as an indicator of future or present product quality. Hence, the 
reputation of the firm can be a signalling activity of the product quality produced in the 
present or in the future. Allen (1984) adds that even when the goods quality is unobservable, 
firms only sell high quality products at high quality prices. While the previous theories and 
models are related to products, they are also applicable for services and more specifically in 
the case of advisers and Nomads. The quality of the services provided by the Nomads or 
other advisers are difficult to observe before purchasing, however a good reputation indicates 
high quality services and more experienced advisers who advise (and regulate in the case of 
Nomads) better than their low reputation counterparts. 
Prior literature has documented that indeed high reputable advisers provide better quality 
services. For example, Titman and Trueman (1986) construct a theoretical model and explain 
that prestigious and reputable advisers provide more information about the firms they guide 
in the market, which results in better firm valuation by investors and the markets in general. 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) also theoretically, argue that high reputable financial 
advisers reduce information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders during IPOs. The 
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authors suggest that the results could be extended to other corporate events such as corporate 
takeovers and new share issues. 
On empirical evidence, Rau (2000) ranks 219 investment banks which acted as advisors 
in tender offers and 919 investments banks which acted as advisors in mergers and examines 
the determinants of reputation on those events. The ranking of the investments banks is based 
on the yearly market share. The author reports a significant and positive relation between 
the percentage of deals completed by the banks in the past and the investment banks market 
share. In addition, the author finds a positive relation between the successful deals completed 
and advisor reputation in tender offers but not in mergers. Furthermore, the author reports 
lower abnormal stock returns during the announcement of the mergers for the firm that are 
supervised by reputable advisors. However, he finds no relation between the market share 
of the investment banks and post-acquisition performance of the advised firms. 
Kale et al. (2003) analysing 334 successful takeovers during the period of 1981-1994, 
report that reputable advisors, measured as the ratio of the bidder advisor reputation to target 
advisor reputation, increase the takeover wealth gains, a result which leads to better mergers 
and bargaining in general. In line, Hunter and Jagtiani (2003) examining 5337 public 
mergers during the period of 1995-2000, find that tier one advisors are more successful in 
completing the merger deals compared to the lower tier advisors. In their research the 
ranking of advisors is taking into account the total dollar value of transactions and the 
number of transactions backed by the advisors.  
In a similar vein, Fang (2005) examines the quality of services of reputable advisors in 
over 3000 non-convertible bonds issuances from 1991 to 2000 measuring the reputation 
based on the advisors market share. The author reports that reputable advisors offer better 
quality services, namely higher issuer proceeds and lower bond yields, at higher prices, 
highlighting that price could be an indicator of quality services. In addition, Golubov et al. 
(2012) examining circa 4,800 acquisitions from 1996 to 2009, report that financial advisor’s 
reputation is significantly correlated with higher bidder returns and advisor fees on public 
acquisitions, yet not in private and subsidiary acquisitions. The authors argue that the greater 
visibility of public acquisitions along with higher effort and skill demanded on those 
acquisitions are the reasons for these results. 
Contrary to the prior literature, McLaughlin (1992) examining circa 400 tender offers for 
NYSE listed target firms from 1978 to 1986, find that bidders using non reputable advisers 
experience higher announcement gains compared to those using a reputable adviser, whereas 
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Servaes and Zenner (1996) analysing M&As during the period of 1981-1992, report no 
evidence between bidders wealth and reputable investment banks. The authors conclude that 
the only determinant of the choice between a reputable and non-reputable advisor is the 
transaction costs. However, Kale et al. (2003) states that one of the reasons that those studies 
find negative or no significant relationship between the bidder wealth benefits and the 
reputable advisors could be that they do not take into account the reputation of the 
opponent’s advisor. 
In line with the previous studies, Ismail (2010) investigating 6,379 M&A deals from 1985 
to 2004 and using as a proxy for reputation the market share of the advisors, finds that non 
reputable investment banks overperform the reputable advisors. However, the author adds 
that the underperformance of high reputable advisors is due to 178 huge loss deals and if 
those deals were removed, the high reputable advisors would outperform the second tier 
advisors. In addition, the author claims that similar results can be reached by excluding the 
bear market period. Finally, Holland and Horton (1993) examining 230 IPOs in the London 
USM during the period of 1986-1989, find no relationship between sponsors quality and the 
level of IPO discount. However, they find a negative and significant relationship between 
auditor’s quality and the level of IPO discount. 
Prior literature has also examined whether the reputation and quality of Nomads play a 
role in increasing the survivability of the AIM firms and reducing the post IPO under-pricing 
reported in the market. More specifically, Espenlaub et al. (2012) analysing 896 AIM IPOs 
during the period of 1995-2004, report that reputable Nomads increase the survivability rates 
of the AIM firms by a median of 33 months, highlighting the importance of reputation in the 
choice of the decentralised regulators. In line, Gerakos et al. (2013) examine Nomads that 
provide effective oversight, judged by their supervised firms’ pre-IPO stock returns and find 
that firms that are backed by higher quality Nomads experience reduced post listing 
underperformance compared to their counterparts. However, the authors report that the 
Nomads which also act as brokers in the same firm receive limited additional information 
about the supervised firms as they do not further reduce the post IPO under-pricing.  
Prior studies have documented contradictory results as to whether reputable advisors 
benefit their clients in generating wealth. However, they highlighted that reputable advisors 
play a significant role as they can reduce information asymmetries between insiders and 
outsiders by providing more information to the markets. Moreover, prior literature 
documents that reputable Nomads could assist the firms in several aspects such as increasing 
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survivability rates or reducing post listing underperformance. Accordingly, reputable 
Nomads which act as both advisers and regulators in the AIM, could potentially reduce any 
market abusive techniques by providing better advisory and regulatory services. According 
to the 3rd rule of the “AIM Rules for Nominated Advisers” one of the Nomads’ responsibilities 
is to monitor the trading activities of the firms they supervise, especially during the existence 
of unpublished price sensitive information with regards to the AIM company. Hence, 
reputable Nomads could potentially mitigate the abnormal stock price reactions prior to the 
official announcements of the market switches from the AIM to the MM and vice versa as 
reported in Chapter 4. Thus, my hypothesis is the following:  
Hypothesis 6.1: Reputable Nomads reduce the pre-announcement abnormal stock price 
caused by the announcement of the switches from the AIM to the MM and 
vice versa. 
6.3 Data  
The initial sample of the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM and vice versa as well 
as their Nomads are retrieved from the “New issues and IPO summary” spreadsheet, which 
is offered by the LSE website58. However, the identifier codes of the firms are not reported 
in the spreadsheet, hence they have been hand collected from Investegate and Nexis 
databases. For the hand collection of the announcement dates of the switches I use the 
Investegate, Nexis and Perfect Information databases. I also hand collect the last Nomad 
used for the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM and any other missing Nomad data 
for the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM from the firms’ annual reports, using 
Perfect Information database59. The date of incorporation of the Nomad firms are 
downloaded from Fame and Amadeus databases as well as the Companies House website60. 
The broker companies for the firms that switch between the two markets are hand collected 
from the firms’ annual reports, using the Perfect Information database.  The stock prices of 
the firms that switch between the two UK markets, indices prices (FTSE All Share and FTSE 
AIM All Share) and volume data are downloaded from Datastream. The accounting data are 
downloaded from Worldscope and they are also complemented by hand collecting, where 
                                                 
58 https://www.londonstockexchange.com/statistics/new-issues-further-issues/new-issues-further-
issues.htm (last accessed October 2018). 
59 The “New issues and IPO summary” spreadsheet offers the Nomads when firms enter the market 
(even though many are missing). However, there is no information for the firms that leave the market 
(firms that switch from the AIM to the MM), hence the corresponding data have been hand collected 
from the firms’ annual reports. 
60 Accessed from https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/ (accessed on September 2018) 
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possible, the missing size and M/B values from the annual reports using the Perfect 
Information database.  
The initial sample comprises 303 transitions from the MM to the AIM and 145 switches 
from the AIM to the MM during the period of 1996-2015. I exclude four firms due to the 
lack of identifiers, three firms due to missing announcement dates, and thirty-five firms due 
to missing or incomplete stock return data on Datastream.  Finally, I exclude nine firms from 
the AIM to MM dataset due to missing Nomad firm data. The final sample consists of 287 
firms that switch from the MM to the AIM and 110 from the AIM to the MM. Table 6-1 
presents a breakdown of the selection process. 
 
Table 6-1: Breakdown of the selection process 
Description 
 (1) 
MM to AIM 
(2) 
AIM to MM 
Initial Sample  303 145 
(-) Missing identifiers  3 1 
(-) Missing announcement dates  1 2 
Clear Sample  299 142 
(-) Firms with no stock data/non available on Datastream  12 23 
(-) Firm with no Nomad data  0 9 
Final Sample  287 110 
This table presents the breakdown of the sample selection process. The initial sample as well as the Nomad 
data are retrieved from the “New issues and IPO summary” spreadsheet provided by the LSE website. The 
missing Nomad data and the last Nomad of the firms that move from the AIM to the MM are hand collected 
through the firm’s annual reports which are downloaded from the Perfect Information database. The identifiers 
and announcement dates are hand collected from the InvestEgate, Nexis and Perfect Information databases. 
The stock data are retrieved from Datastream. 
 
The initial sample of the Nomad dataset consists of 158 firms during the same period 
(1996-2015). However, the Nomads that have available all the necessary data for the 
reputation measurement (firms the Nomads backed, proceeds the Nomads backed and age 
of Nomads incorporation) are in total 140. Table 6-2 shows a breakdown of the Nomad 
selection process. The listings in the AIM that are used for the measurement of firms and 
proceeds backed by a Nomad are 3421. 
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Table 6-2: Breakdown of the Nomad firm’s selection process 
Description  Nomad firms 
Initial Sample  158 
(-) Missing firms backed  0 
(-) Missing proceeds backed  0 
(-) Missing age of incorporation  18 
Final Sample  140 
This table presents the breakdown of the Nomad firms selection process. The initial sample as well as the firms 
and proceeds backed by the Nomads are retrieved from the “New issues and IPO summary” spreadsheet 
provided by the LSE website. The age of incorporation data are retrieved from Fame and Amadeus databases 
and the Companies House website. 
 
6.4 Methodology and descriptive statistics 
6.4.1 Calculation of abnormal stock returns 
The abnormal stock returns are measured using the same methodology as in Chapter 4. More 
specifically, I follow Brown and Warner (1985) and calculate the returns as follows: 
      𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛼 − 𝛽 ∗ 𝑅𝑀,𝑡          (6.1) 
Where ARi,t is the excess return of a security i at day t, Ri,t is the logarithmic return of 
security i at day t and RM,t is the return of the market at the day t.  Following Jabbour et al. 
(2000) and King (2009), the event window is 60 trading days prior to the public 
announcement. The estimation window is 250 to 81 days prior to the official announcement 
(-250, -81).  A gap is left between the event and the estimation window in order to ensure 
that the latter is not contaminated by the former. The proxy for the market is the FTSE All 
Share index for the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM and the FTSE AIM All Share 
index for the firms that move from the AIM to the MM. 
6.4.2 Nominated Adviser reputation estimation 
In order to allocate the Nomads into different reputation scales, I use five different measures 
in line with Bushman et al. (2004) and Espenlaub et al. (2012). First, I use the Nomads’ 
market share in terms of new issues in the year prior to the firm switch, calculated as the 
ratio of the firms a Nomad backed the year prior to the firm switch over the total amount of 
listings in the AIM during that particular year. Since this variable measures the reputation of 
a Nomad only during the year prior to the listing of the supervisee/client, I also compute the 
cumulative market share of the Nomad. Thus, the second measure takes into account the 
market share of the Nomad since its establishment and is calculated as the ratio of the firms 
that a Nomad backed during all previous years prior to the firm switch over the total number 
of listings in the AIM during that years. Third, I use the Nomads’ market share in terms of 
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proceeds that a Nomad backed in the year prior to the firm market switch. This variable is 
calculated as the ratio of the proceeds a Nomad backed the year prior to the firms switch 
over the total proceeds in the AIM during that year. In addition, I compute a time variant 
variable which measures the cumulative proceeds market share estimated as the ratio of the 
proceeds a Nomad backed during all the previous years prior to the firm move, over the total 
proceeds of the new listing in the AIM during the same period. The reasoning behind market 
share is that if Nomads provide good quality of regulatory and advisory services to their 
supervisees their reputation is enhanced, thus increasing their services demand which leads 
to high market share (Ismail, 2010). In addition, proxying reputation based on market share 
is a well-established methodology in the literature (e.g. Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Rau, 
2000; Kale et al., 2003; Fang, 2005). Finally, I capture the age of the Nomad. The age proxies 
for the firm’s experience and is calculated as the amount of years between the year of 
incorporation and the year prior to the firm’s switch (Espenlaub et al., 2012). 
Having computed this five reputation measures, I estimate the decile values of the five 
different metrics and calculate a Nomad reputation composite variable as the yearly 
unweighted average decile of the five measures. Furthermore, I calculate the yearly decile 
of the Nomad reputation variable. I use a yearly measure as the Nomads might be popular 
during a specific period of time but not that popular during other periods.  Nomads that are 
ranked in the top (bottom) five deciles are characterized as reputable (non-reputable). A full 
list of the initial Nomad firms used for the measurement of the composite variable is 
provided in Appendix 5.  
Table 6-3 shows the firms listed in the AIM along with the percentage of those that used 
a reputable Nomad or a non reputable Nomad during the period of 1997-2015. As reported 
in the table, a high percentage of firms (74.16% on average) use a reputable Nomad during 
their listing in the AIM. The percentage ranges from a minimum of 48% in 2014 to a 
maximum of 88% in 2000. In addition, Table 6-4 presents the number of firms that switch 
between the two UK markets as well as the number of those that used a reputable Nomad or 
a non reputable Nomad. Similarly, the average percentage of the firms that used a reputable 
Nomad prior to their switch during the period under examination is 67.25% for the switches 
from the MM to the AIM and 56.36% for the switches from the AIM to the MM. 
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Table 6-3: Firms listed in the Alternative Investment Market using a reputable or a 
non reputable Nominated Adviser 
 Firms listed in the AIM 
 Year 
With 
reputable 
Nomads 
With reputable 
Nomads (%) 
Without 
reputable 
Nomads 
Without 
reputable 
Nomads (%) 
Total firms listed 
1997 41 60.50 39 39.50 80 
1998 43 75.44 14 24.56 57 
1999 78 84.78 14 15.22 92 
2000 178 87.68 25 12.32 203 
2001 124 75.61 40 24.39 164 
2002 118 86.13 19 13.87 137 
2003 123 76.88 37 23.13 160 
2004 249 78.55 68 21.45 317 
2005 374 79.57 96 20.43 470 
2006 333 78.91 89 21.09 422 
2007 181 69.88 78 30.12 259 
2008 78 75.73 25 24.27 103 
2009 22 73.33 8 26.67 30 
2010 57 58.76 40 41.24 97 
2011 47 63.51 27 36.49 74 
2012 34 50.75 33 49.25 67 
2013 34 48.57 36 51.43 70 
2014 48 48.00 52 52.00 100 
2015 25 53.19 22 46.81 47 
Total 2187 74.16 762 25.84 2949 
This table presents the breakdown of the firms listed in the AIM either by using a reputable or a non reputable 
Nomad each year from 1997 to 2015. The listings have been identified by the “New issues and IPO summary” 
spreadsheet which can be found in the LSE website. Any missing Nomads have been hand collected from the 
annual reports of the firms using the Perfect Information database. Reputable Nomads are considered those 
that are on the top five deciles of the Nomad reputation composite variable as described in section 6.4.2. The 
firms with Nomads that have missing metric variables and cannot be ranked are excluded from the sample. 
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Table 6-4: Switches between the two UK markets and the number of reputable Nomads used 
Panel A Switches from the MM to the AIM Panel B: Switches from the AIM to the MM 
Year 
Number 
of moves 
Number of firms 
that used a 
reputable Nomad 
Number of firms 
that used a non 
reputable Nomad 
Number of firms 
without available 
data 
Year 
Number 
of moves 
Number of firms 
that used a 
reputable Nomad 
Number of firms 
that used a non 
reputable Nomad 
Number of firms 
without available 
data 
1996 1 0 0 1 1996 0 0 0 0 
1997 4 2 1 1 1997 0 0 0 0 
1998 3 1 1 1 1998 15 8 4 3 
1999 10 8 1 1 1999 13 5 4 4 
2000 20 16 2 2 2000 13 4 2 7 
2001 32 14 13 5 2001 5 3 2 0 
2002 37 25 7 5 2002 4 2 1 1 
2003 43 28 13 2 2003 2 2 0 0 
2004 20 17 0 3 2004 0 0 0 0 
2005 35 27 7 1 2005 1 0 1 0 
2006 29 24 4 1 2006 3 3 0 0 
2007 6 4 1 1 2007 7 3 3 1 
2008 10 7 0 3 2008 12 9 1 2 
2009 3 3 0 0 2009 9 4 2 3 
2010 6 4 1 1 2010 6 4 2 0 
2011 6 2 3 1 2011 8 7 0 1 
2012 3 0 2 1 2012 3 2 1 0 
2013 8 6 1 1 2013 0 0 0 0 
2014 6 1 5 0 2014 5 3 1 1 
2015 5 4 0 1 2015 4 3 0 1 
Total 287 193 62 32 Total 110 62 24 24 
% 100 67.25 21.60 11.15 % 100 56.36 21.82 21.82 
This table presents the switches between the two UK markets. Panel A reports the moves from the MM to the AIM and panel B the switches from the AIM to the MM. The switching firms 
as well as the Nomad firms have been identified by the “New issues and IPO summary” spreadsheet which can be found in the LSE website.  The missing Nomads as well as the last Nomads 
of the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM have been hand collected from the annual reports of the switching firms using the Perfect Information database. Reputable Nomads are 
characterised the Nomads that belong to the top five deciles of the composite variable as described in section 6.4.2.
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Tables 6-5 presents the summary statistics of the firms that switch between the two UK 
markets. The first four columns show the summary statistics of the firms that are supervised 
by a reputable Nomad, the next four columns report the summary statistics of the firms that 
are supervised by a non reputable Nomad, and the last four columns present the difference 
between the firms that are supervised by a reputable Nomad and those that are supervised 
by a non reputable Nomad. Panel A shows the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM 
and panel B the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM. As shown in panel A the firms 
that downgrade to the AIM and use reputable Nomads, are smaller in size with higher growth 
and stock liquidity compared to the firms that use non reputable Nomads. More specifically, 
the mean (median) market capitalisation of the firms that use reputable Nomads is 23.8m 
(12.49m), with a M/B of 1.97 and a ratio of trading volume to shares outstanding of 0.003 
(Stock liquidity). The corresponding figures for the firms that use non reputable Nomads are 
28.86m, 1.81 and 0.002. The firms that use a reputable Nomad raise on average 0.47m more 
funds. However, all of the above differences are not statistically significant. 
As reported in panel B the firms that upgrade to the MM and use reputable Nomads are 
larger in size (mean market capitalisation of 202m) compared to the firms that use non 
reputable Nomads (mean market capitalisation of 137m). In addition, the firms that use 
reputable Nomads have lower growth and stock liquidity and raise less funds on average 
compared the firms that use non reputable Nomads. More specifically, the firms that are 
supervised by reputable Nomads have a mean M/B of 3.27, a ratio of trading volume to 
shares outstanding of 0.003 (Stock liquidity) and average proceeds of 3.12m while the 
corresponding figures for the firms that are supervised by non reputable Nomads are 3.36, 
0.005 and 16.67m. Once again, the differences are not statistically significant. Hence, the 
concerns that the choice of Nomad is endogenously determined are alleviated. For this 
reason, endogeneity is not considered as a concern in this setting. However, these results 
should be interpreted with caution as entirely eliminating endogeneity issues is a limitation 
on this type of studies.
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Table 6-5: Summary statistics 
  
(1) 
 
Firms using a Reputable Nomad  
 (2) 
 
Firms using a Non-Reputable Nomad 
(3) 
(1) - (2) 
Difference  
Variables Mean Median Max Min 
 
SD Mean Median Max Min 
 
SD Mean 
P- 
value 
 
Median 
P-
value 
Panel A: Switches from the MM to the AIM           
Size 23,848 12,497 239,501      1324  37,939  28,862  16,781 182,074    2,629  36,386 -5,014 (0.396) -4,284 (0.122) 
M/B 1.968 1.110 20.380 -7.780 3.220 1.812 1.060 20.380 -5.700 3.678 0.156 (0.784) 0.050 (0.933) 
S. Liquidity 0.003 0.002 0.076 0.000 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.167 0.000 0.003 0.001 (0.256) 0.000 (0.995) 
Volatility 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.000 0.001 0.000 (0.869) 0.000 (0.485) 
Proceeds (£m) 1.031 0.000 53.000 0.000 5.157 0.559 0.000 9.040 0.000 1.773 0.472 (0.333) 0.000 (0.474) 
Panel B: Switches from the AIM to the MM          
Size 201,998 129,796 1,573,152 2,669 268,706 137,269 67,224 781,104 3,555 196,057 -64,729 (0.280) -62,572 (0.165) 
M/B 3.270 1.990 27.500 -44.210 8.814 3.367 2.885 12.250 0.510 2.938 -0.097 (0.945) -0.895 (0.548) 
S. Liquidity 0.003 0.002 0.168    0.000 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.046 0.000 0.105 -0.002 (0.516) 0.000 (0.629) 
Volatility 0.002 0.001 0.005    0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.285) -0.001 (0.146) 
Proceeds (£m) 3.121 0.000 104.900    0.000 15.523 16.667 0.000 170.000 0.000 0.000 -13.546 (0.264) 0.000 (0.388) 
This table reports the summary statistics of the firms that move between the two UK markets during the period of 1996-2015. Panel A shows the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM 
and panel B the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM. The first four columns (1) show the descriptive statistics of the firms that are supervised by a reputable Nomad, the next four (2) 
show the statistics of the firms that are supervised by a non reputable Nomad and the last four columns (3) report the difference of means and medians between the two samples. I use a t-test 
for the difference of means and a Wilcoxon test for the difference of medians. Size is measured by the market capitalization, M/B is the market to book ratio, S. Liquidity is the daily average 
of the trading volume to shares outstanding ratio over the estimation window (-250, -81), Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock returns over the estimation window (-250, -81) and 
Proceeds are the funds raised during the switch in millions and are collected from the “New issue and IPO summary” spreadsheet offered by the LSE website. The financial data are retrieved 
from Worldscope. The stock and volume data are downloaded from Datastream. Reputable Nomads are the Nomads that belong to the first five deciles of the composite variable as described 
in section 6.4.2. P-values are reported in the parentheses.
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6.5 The significance of Nomads for the abnormal stock returns prior to market switches 
In this section, I examine the significance of Nomads, and in particular the extent to which 
they may reduce the abnormal stock returns prior to the official announcement of the market 
switches. Recall that the Nomads are responsible to monitor any abnormal trading activities 
in the share prices of their clients, especially when there are forthcoming announcements on 
significant corporate events (London Stock Exchange, 2014a; 2015a; b). In addition, I 
explore whether Nomads that also act as brokers for the same firm have better control over 
the switching firm by reducing the abnormal price reactions or whether they experience a 
conflict of interest between the interests of the AIM firms and those of any other party and 
more specifically of the LSE. As stated in Chapter 3, a Nomad that acts also as a broker in 
the same firm must take the appropriate safeguards in order to avoid any conflict of interest 
(London Stock Exchange, 2014a). This conflicting role of the Nomad could stem from the 
fact that the Nomads have two distinct roles in the same firm which translates to higher 
salaries received. This makes the firm a closer client of the Nomad which may make the 
Nomad act more favourably. The percentage of firms that hire the same company to act in 
both the role of Nomad and the role of broke is approximately 75% for both the firms that 
upgrade from the AIM to the MM and for the firms that downgrade from the MM to the 
AIM. In order to do so, I employ the following panel regression while using firm random 
effects: 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑖  + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑖 ∗
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝐴𝑉𝑖.𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽7 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽8 ∗ 𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽9 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽10 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑖 ∗ 𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12 ∗
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜗 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡          (6.2) 
Where the dependent variable AR is the daily average abnormal stock returns. The 
abnormal returns are calculated using an OLS market model, following Brown and Warner 
(1985). The independent variable of interest is the Reputable Nomad which is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the Nomad is characterised as a reputable Nomad and 
zero otherwise. Reputable Nomads are those that fall within the first five deciles of the 
composite variable as described in Section 6.4.2. Reputable advisors are reported to provide 
higher quality services (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994; 
Golubov et al., 2012) and reduce the opportunities to cheat (Holland and Horton, 1993) while 
reputable Nomads are reported to be value enhancing (Espenlaub et al., 2012). The variable 
Samebroker is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the switching firms use the 
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same company to act as a Nomad and a broker and zero otherwise. The Reputable Nomad * 
Samebroker is an interaction variable that takes the value of one if a firm uses a reputable 
Nomad that also acts as a broker and zero otherwise. Nomads that also act as brokers for the 
same company might have better control over the company or experience higher conflicts of 
interest between the interests of the AIM firms and other parties if they do not take into 
account the appropriate safeguards (London Stock Exchange, 2014a).  
In addition, I control for several other factors that could influence my depended variable. 
Kyle and Viswanathan (2008) argues that the trades that possess private information 
incorporate their information advantage into stock prices moving them towards the direction 
of the information. Hence, increases in trading volume can drive the price upwards or 
downwards depending on the information. Thus, I control for AV which is the abnormal 
trading volume. The AV is calculated as shown in equation 4.2 in Chapter 4 following Bris 
(2005). I also control for rumours which is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the 
switch was rumoured during the year prior to the announcement of the switch and zero 
otherwise (Rumours). I also include the Rumours * AV which is an interaction variable 
between the Rumours and AV. 
Atiase (1985) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991), report that stock prices in small firms 
incorporate information slower than in large firms. In addition, Seyhun (1986) reports that 
small firms experience more insider purchases which could lead to price run-ups and large 
firms more insider sales which could lead to price reductions. Hence, I control for firm size, 
calculated as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization one year prior to the 
announcement of the switches. Fama and French (1992) argues that value and small cap 
firms outperform the markets. I control for M/B which is the market value to book value 
ratio one year prior to the announcement of the switches. Major corporate events are reported 
to experience pre-announcement abnormal stock returns (Jabbour et al., 2000; King, 2009). 
Thus, I control for CA which is a binary variable that takes the value of one if the firms 
simultaneously announced another major corporate event up to one month prior to the switch 
announcement. I also include the CA*AV variable which is an interaction between CA and 
AV. 
 Meulbroek (2000) finds that riskier firms experience high levels of selling from their 
insiders. I control for volatility, measured as the standard deviation of the stock returns over 
the estimation window (-250, -81) prior to the announcement of the moves. Kyle (1985) and 
Holmström and Tirole (1993) report that insider trading is more evident when stock liquidity 
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is higher due to the fact that there is higher profit for insiders when there are more 
uninformed investors in the market. Furthermore, Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) argues that 
informed investors tend to trade more aggressively in periods of high stock liquidity due the 
fact that they can trade undetected. Hence, I control for stock liquidity calculated as the daily 
average of the ratio of trading volume over the shares outstanding during the estimation 
window (-250, -81). Finally, I include year and industry fixed effects, in order to control for 
year and industry characteristics. 
Table 6-6 reports the results. As shown in the column one which shows the firms that 
move from the MM to the AIM, the coefficient of Reputable Nomad is 0.003 and significant 
at the 5% level. This suggests that firms which employ a reputable Nomad experience lower 
negative daily abnormal stock returns by 0.3%. This result indicates that reputable Nomads 
exercise better monitoring over their firms compared to lower ranked Nomads. Interestingly, 
as shown on the parameter coefficient for the interaction variable Reputable Nomad * 
Samebroker, I find that firms that hire a reputable Nomad which simultaneously acts as a 
broker in the firm, experience less relevant benefit. I find that the relevant parameter 
coefficient (-0.004) is significant at the 5% level. Having the same firm as a Nomad and a 
broker seems to create a conflict of interest between the interest of the AIM insiders and the 
obligations of the Nomads towards the LSE. This result is to some extent, in line with 
Gerakos et al. (2013), who study the significance of Nomads within the context of post-IPO 
performance, and report that having the same firm to act in both roles does not provide 
additional information about the supervised firm. 
The second column of Table 6-6 shows the relation between abnormal stock returns and 
reputable Nomads for the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM.  In line with the above 
results, I find that the parameter coefficient for Reputable Nomads (-0.005) is significant at 
the 5% level in this occasion. This reveals a decrease in the daily price run-ups of 0.5% for 
the firms that use a reputable Nomad. Also, when firms hire the same company to act both 
as a Nomad and a broker, the decrease in the price run-ups is reduced, again revealing the 
potential conflict of interest between the interests of the AIM firms and the Nomads’ 
obligations towards the LSE.  
Overall, the results show that the choice of Nomads is of major importance, as reputable 
Nomads could decrease the abnormal stock price returns prior to the official announcement 
of the switches between the two UK markets. As a result, the reputable Nomads seem to 
exercise higher control over their supervisees on both events. However, having a reputable 
Nomad to also act as a broker seems to decrease these effects. This finding raises concerns 
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as to whether Nomads that also act as brokers take the necessary precautions, in order to 
avoid conflicts of interests as dictated by the “AIM rules for Nominated Advisers”. 
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Table 6-6: The moderating effect of Nomads’ reputation on abnormal stock 
returns 
 Dependent: Abnormal stock returns  
  From MM to AIM From AIM to MM 
 (-60, -1) (-60, -1) 
Reputable Nomad 0.003** -0.005** 
 (0.044) (0.034) 
Samebroker 0.002 -0.001 
 (0.135) (0.498) 
RepN*Samebroker -0.004** 0.005* 
 (0.020) (0.099) 
AV -0.376** 0.935*** 
 (0.025) (0.001) 
Rumours -0.001 0.003* 
 (0.404) (0.071) 
Rumours*AV -0.639** -0.192 
 (0.050) (0.846) 
Size -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.591) (0.471) 
M/B -0.000 0.000 
 (0.168) (0.393) 
CA -0.001 -0.002* 
 (0.431) (0.071) 
CA*AV 0.923*** -0.183 
 (0.000) (0.543) 
Volatility -0.477 -1.201 
 (0.236) (0.266) 
Stock Liquidity -0.014 -0.042 
 (0.878) (0.890) 
Constant -0.007 0.016* 
  (0.175) (0.077) 
Year fixed effects                   Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects                   Yes Yes 
R2-adjusted 0.015 0.032 
N 9,361  3,997 
This table explores the moderating effect of Nomads’ reputation on abnormal stock returns. Reputable Nomad 
is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the Nomad is characterized as a reputable Nomad and zero 
otherwise. Samebroker is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm hires the same firm to act 
as a Nomad and broker and zero otherwise. RepN * Samebroker is an interaction variable that takes the value 
of one if a firm uses a reputable Nomad that also acts as a broker and zero otherwise. AV is computed using 
the following model AVi,t = Vi,t -(V̅i + 2Svol) if Vi,t > V̅i + 2Svol  otherwise zero, following Bris (2005). Rumours 
is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is a rumour about the move one year prior to the 
announcement of the event and zero otherwise, Rumours*AV is the interaction between the Rumours and AV, 
Size is measured by the natural logarithm of market capitalization, M/B is the market to book ratio, CA is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one if  the firm simultaneously announced another major corporate 
event (e.g. takeovers, mergers, final year results) during the announcement day or one month prior to the 
announcement and zero otherwise, CA*AV is the interaction between the C. Announcement and AV, Volatility 
is the standard deviation of the stock returns over the estimation window (-250, -81) and  Stock liquidity is the 
daily average of the trading volume to shares outstanding ratio over the estimation window (-250, -81). The 
Nomads data for the firms that downgraded to the AIM are collected from the “New issues and IPO summary” 
spreadsheet located in the LSE website. The missing Nomad data as well as the brokers are hand collected 
from the firm’s annual reports using the Perfect Information database. Stock, indices and volume data are 
retrieved from Datastream. Financial data are collected from Worldscope. P-values are shown in parentheses. 
The numbers in italic represent the number of observations. The symbols *, ** and *** show significance at 
the 10, 5 and 1% levels, respectively. 
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6.5.1 Additional tests 
To further explore the results, I use several different ranking benchmarks of the composite 
to identify the reputation of Nomads. Reputable Nomads are also defined as the top four, 
three, two and one deciles. Next, I perform the previous multivariate regression (6.2) as 
presented in section 6.5 in order to examine whether the results are robust when using 
different ranking deciles. Tables 6-7 and 6-8 report the results of the regressions for the firms 
that move from the MM to the AIM and from the AIM to the MM, respectively. Column 1 
shows the results of the previous regression in section 6.5 using the first five deciles as 
reputable Nomads benchmark for comparison reasons. In column 2, I use the top four deciles 
as a reputable Nomads benchmark, in column 3, I use the top three deciles as a reputable 
Nomads benchmark, in column 4, I use the top two deciles as a reputable Nomads and finally 
column 5 presents the results using the top decile as a reputable Nomads. 
As shown in Table 6-7, the results are robust for the firms that move from the MM to the 
AIM even after changing the ranking procedure. More specifically, I find decreases in the 
60 days’ price run-ups that range between 0.3% and 0.4% for the firms that use a top four, 
top three, top two and top one decile reputable Nomads. These results are significant at the 
least at the 10% level. Furthermore, when Nomads act also as brokers the firms seem to 
experience less relevant benefit almost in all ranking benchmarks as reported in the 
parameter coefficients of Reputable Nomad * Samebroker variable. Table 6-8 shows that the 
results hold when I use different ranking measurements for the firms that move from the 
AIM to the MM. I find decreases in the 60 days’ price reductions in all ranking benchmarks 
that range from 0.4% to 0.5%. These results are significant at the 5% level. Once again, 
having the same firms to act as a Nomad and a broker in the same firms seems to create 
conflicts of interest as it is reflected in all ranking benchmarks. Overall, the results are 
qualitatively similar on both events after controlling for different ranking benchmarks. 
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Table 6-7: Different ranking deciles for the measurement of reputable Nomads, MM 
to AIM 
 Dependent: Abnormal stock returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Top 5  
deciles 
Top 4 
deciles 
Top 3 
deciles 
Top 2 
 deciles 
Top  
decile 
Reputable Nomad 0.003** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004** 0.003* 
 (0.044) (0.037) (0.008) (0.023) (0.079) 
Samebroker 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.135) (0.525) (0.367) (0.752) (0.666) 
RepN*Samebroker -0.004** -0.002* -0.003** -0.003* -0.003 
 (0.020) (0.100) (0.021) (0.087) (0.182) 
AV -0.376** -0.376** -0.377** -0.376** -0.377** 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) 
Rumours -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.404) (0.384) (0.420) (0.271) (0.358) 
Rumours*AV -0.639** -0.639** -0.630* -0.664** -0.657 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.053) (0.041) (0.043) 
Size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.591) (0.607) (0.716) (0.738) (0.614) 
M/B -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.168) (0.142) (0.126) (0.140) (0.144) 
CA -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.431) (0.424) (0.467) (0.420) (0.427) 
CA*AV 0.923*** 0.922*** 0.923*** 0.920*** 0.922*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Volatility -0.477 -0.555 -0.555 -0.568 -0.542 
 (0.236) (0.178) (0.183) (0.177) (0.202) 
Stock Liquidity -0.014 -0.020 -0.020 -0.026 -0.190 
 (0.878) (0.823) (0.822) (0.774) (0.834) 
Constant -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 
  (0.175) (0.182) (0.133) (0.129) (0.198) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2-adjusted 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 
N 9,361     9,361      9,361 9,361     9,361 
This table presents the relation between abnormal stock returns and reputable Nomads when using five different 
ranking deciles for the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM. Reputable Nomad is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if the Nomad is characterized as a reputable Nomad and zero otherwise. Samebroker 
is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm hires the same firm to act both as a Nomad and 
as a broker and zero otherwise. RepN * Samebroker is an interaction variable that takes the value of one if a 
firm uses a reputable Nomad that also acts as a broker and zero otherwise. AV is computed using the following 
model AVi,t = Vi,t -(V̅i + 2Svol) if Vi,t > V̅i + 2Svol  otherwise zero, following Bris (2005). Rumours is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if there is a rumour about the move one year prior to the announcement of 
the event and zero otherwise, Rumours*AV is the interaction between the Rumours and AV, Size is measured 
by the natural logarithm of market capitalization, M/B is the market to book ratio, CA is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if  the firm simultaneously announced another major corporate event (e.g. takeovers, 
mergers, final year results) during the announcement day or one month prior to the announcement and zero 
otherwise, CA*AV is the interaction between the CA and AV, Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock 
returns over the estimation window (-250, -81) and  Stock liquidity is the daily average of the trading volume 
to shares outstanding ratio over the estimation window (-250, -81).  The missing Nomad data as well as the 
brokers are hand collected from the firm’s annual reports using the Perfect Information database. Stock, indices 
and volume data are retrieved from Datastream. Accounting data are collected from Worldscope database. P-
values are shown in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** show significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 6-8: Different ranking deciles for the measurement of reputable Nomads, 
AIM to MM 
 Dependent: Abnormal stock returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Top 5  
deciles 
Top 4 
deciles 
Top 3 
deciles 
Top 2 
 deciles 
Top  
decile 
Reputable Nomad -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.004** -0.004** 
 (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.023) (0.014) 
Samebroker -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.000 0.001 
 (0.498) (0.346) (0.326) (0.872) (0.655) 
RepN*Samebroker 0.005* 0.006** 0.006* 0.005*** 0.006*** 
 (0.099) (0.050) (0.052) (0.006) (0.004) 
AV 0.935*** 0.935*** 0.931*** 0.935*** 0.926*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Rumours 0.003* 0.002* 0.003 0.002 0.002 
 (0.071) (0.100) (0.103) (0.159) (0.152) 
Rumours*AV -0.192 -0.201 -0.194 -0.163 -0.156 
 (0.846) (0.838) (0.844) (0.870) (0.875) 
Size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.471) (0.483) (0.461) (0.591) (0.535) 
M/B 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.393) (0.364) (0.373) (0.390) (0.278) 
CA -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.061) (0.021) (0.016) 
CA*AV -0.183 -0.183 -0.178 -0.185 -0.170 
 (0.543) (0.543) (0.553) (0.538) (0.569) 
Volatility -1.201 -1.144 -1.111 -1.354 -1.768 
 (0.266) (0.281) (0.302) (0.223) (0.116) 
Stock Liquidity -0.042 -0.055 -0.046 -0.081 -0.068 
 (0.890) (0.853) (0.876) (0.786) (0.811) 
Constant 0.016* 0.162* 0.165* 0.013* 0.015* 
  (0.077) (0.085) (0.081) (0.084) (0.067) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2-adjusted 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 
N     3,997     3,997      3,997 3,997 3,997 
This table presents the relation between abnormal stock returns and reputable Nomads when using five different 
ranking deciles for the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM. Reputable Nomad is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if the Nomad is characterized as a reputable Nomad and zero otherwise. Samebroker 
is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm hires the same firm to act both as a Nomad and 
as a broker and zero otherwise. RepN * Samebroker is an interaction variable that takes the value of one if a 
firm uses a reputable Nomad that also acts as a broker and zero otherwise. AV is computed using the following 
model AVi,t = Vi,t -(V̅i + 2Svol) if Vi,t > V̅i + 2Svol  otherwise zero, following Bris (2005). Rumours is an indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if there is a rumour about the move one year prior to the announcement of 
the event and zero otherwise, Rumours*AV is the interaction between the Rumours and AV, Size is measured 
by the natural logarithm of market capitalization, M/B is the market to book ratio, CA is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of one if  the firm simultaneously announced another major corporate event (e.g. takeovers, 
mergers, final year results) during the announcement day or one month prior to the announcement and zero 
otherwise, CA*AV is the interaction between the CA and AV, Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock 
returns over the estimation window (-250, -81) and  Stock liquidity is the daily average of the trading volume 
to shares outstanding ratio over the estimation window (-250, -81).  The missing Nomad data as well as the 
brokers are hand collected from the firm’s annual reports using the Perfect Information database. Stock, indices 
and volume data are retrieved from Datastream. Accounting data are collected from Worldscope database. P-
values are shown in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** show significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Finally, to test whether reputable Nomads reduce the abnormal trading volume prior to 
market switches, I estimate the following panel regressions, using firm random effects: 
𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼+ 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑖  + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑖 ∗
𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑘𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽4 ∗ 𝑅𝑢𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠𝑖  +  𝛽5 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽6 ∗ 𝑀/𝐵𝑖,𝑡−1 +  𝛽7 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑖 + 𝛽8 ∗
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9 ∗ 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛾 ∗ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜗 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡       (6.3) 
Table 6-9 reports the relation between abnormal trading volume and reputable Nomads. 
The first column shows the firms that switch from the MM to the AIM. The coefficient of 
Reputable Nomad is -0.001 and significant at the 10% level, indicating that reputable 
Nomads slightly reduce the abnormal trading volume prior to the switching announcements. 
In line with the results on abnormal stock returns reported earlier, hiring the same firm to act 
both as a Nomad and a broker creates a conflict of interest as reported in the parameter 
coefficient of Reputable Nomad * Samebroker variable. I find that the latter parameter 
coefficient is 0.001 and significant at the 5% level. The second column shows the firms that 
switch from the AIM to the MM. The results are not as consistent in this occasion. I find that 
reputable Nomads reduce the daily abnormal trading volume by 0.1%, however the 
parameter coefficient is insignificant. This could be attributed to the fact that volume may 
increase in response to non-price sensitive announcements such as the CEOs appearing in 
the media. It could also be attributed to the limitation of abnormal trading volume to act on 
its own as a robust indication of the overall informed trading as it cannot show the direction 
of the trades. However, when supplemented by price information it provides a strong 
indication (Monteiro, 2007).  
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Table 6-9: The moderating effect of Nomads’ reputation on abnormal trading 
volume 
 Dependent: Abnormal trading volume  
 (1) (2) 
  From MM to AIM From AIM to MM 
 (-60, -1) (-60, -1) 
Reputable Nomad -0.001* -0.001 
 (0.099) (0.514) 
Samebroker -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.597) (0.397) 
RepN*Samebroker 0.001** 0.000 
 (0.014) (0.664) 
Rumours -0.000 0.000 
 (0.487) (0.905) 
Size 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.527) (0.879) 
M/B 0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.549) (0.029) 
CA 0.000 0.000 
 (0.244) (0.775) 
Volatility -0.013 -0.308 
 (0.887) (0.269) 
Stock Liquidity 0.109** 0.202** 
 (0.012) (0.041) 
Constant 0.000 0.001 
  (0.241) (0.707) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
R2-adjusted 0.012 0.054 
N 9,361 3,997 
This table explores the moderating effect of Nomads’ reputation on abnormal trading volume. The abnormal 
trading volume is computed using the following model AVi,t = Vi,t -(V̅i + 2Svol) if Vi,t > V̅i + 2Svol  otherwise 
zero following Bris (2005). Reputable Nomad is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the Nomad 
is characterized as a reputable Nomad and zero otherwise. Samebroker is an indicator variable that takes the 
value of one if the firm hires the same firm to act as a Nomad and broker and zero otherwise. RepN * 
Samebroker is an interaction variable that takes the value of one if a firm uses a reputable Nomad that also acts 
as a broker and zero otherwise. Rumours is an indicator variable that takes the value of one if there is a rumour 
about the move one year prior to the announcement of the event and zero otherwise, Size is measured by the 
natural logarithm of market capitalization, M/B is the market to book ratio, CA is an indicator variable that 
takes the value of one if  the firm simultaneously announced another major corporate event (e.g. takeovers, 
mergers, final year results) during the announcement day or one month prior to the announcement and zero 
otherwise, Volatility is the standard deviation of the stock returns over the estimation window (-250, -81) and  
Stock liquidity is the daily average of the trading volume to shares outstanding ratio over the estimation window 
(-250, -81). The Nomads data for the firms that downgraded to the AIM are collected from the “New issues 
and IPO summary” spreadsheet located in the LSE website. The missing Nomad data as well as the brokers 
are hand collected from the firm’s annual reports using the Perfect Information database. Stock, indices and 
volume data are retrieved from Datastream. Financial data are collected from Worldscope. P-values are shown 
in parentheses. The symbols * and ** show significance at the 10, and 5% levels, respectively. 
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6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides insights on the Nomads as a regulatory mechanism and trading 
monitor. Using five different measures (the Nomads market share in terms of new issues in 
the year prior to the switch, the cumulative Nomads market shares in terms of new issues in 
the years prior to the switch, the Nomads market share in terms of proceeds a Nomad backed 
in the year before the firm market switch, the cumulative market share in terms of proceeds 
a Nomad backed in the years before the firm market switch and the Nomads’ age) I rank the 
Nomads into reputable and non reputable and examine whether reputable Nomads mitigate 
the abnormal stock price actions observed prior to the announcement of the switches from 
the AIM to the MM and vice versa during the period of 1996-2015. In addition, I investigate 
whether reputable Nomads that also act as brokers in the same firm could further reduce the 
pre-announcement abnormal stock returns due to having better control over the supervised 
firm.  
Using a panel regression analysis, I find that reputable Nomads moderate the abnormal 
stock price movements generated 60 trading days prior to the public announcement of the 
market switches on both events. These results demonstrate the importance of reputation on 
the decentralised regulatory body of the AIM. However, the abnormal stock price reductions 
decrease when the same firm acts both as a Nomad and as a broker in the same firm raising 
concerns as to whether the Nomad firms take the necessary precautions in order to avoid 
potential conflicts of interest that might arise by having the same firm into two different 
roles. The results are qualitatively similar after controlling for four additional ranking 
benchmarks. 
The results suggest that the Nomads play a significant role as a regulatory and monitoring 
mechanism deeming them as an essential part of the AIM. The findings also show that 
reputable Nomads can safeguard the reputation and stability of the LSE by mitigating illegal 
and market abusive behaviours. However, the results also report a weak spot in the 
decentralised regulation which could be the conflicts of interests between the interests of the 
AIM firms and the interests of the LSE. The evidence of this study could be of importance 
to the UK regulators and to the LSE as I highlight the significance of reputable Nomads in 
reducing price anomalies. In addition, the results could be of interest to investors as they 
show that the choice of quality and reputable Nomads could constitute another factor in their 
investment strategies.   
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7. Conclusion 
 
7.1 Summary of the thesis 
This thesis comprised of three empirical chapters, focusing on the market switches between 
the two UK markets, namely the AIM and the MM. The MM is the traditionally regulated 
market of the UK, created to attract medium or large developed firms. It is a prestigious 
market with a long history, founded in 1698 maintaining its position as a home for firms 
from all over the world. It features strict market regulations, high eligibility criteria and 
ongoing obligations. Companies listed in the MM are considered of high esteem and are 
followed by many analysts while they have access to a large investor pool (London Stock 
Exchange, 2010). The AIM is the secondary market of the UK, its traits is that it is a light 
regulated market that allows small and high growth firms to gain access to capital on a cost-
efficient manner. It was created in 1995, initially to act as a stepping stone to the MM. 
However, this notion changed over the years and AIM started to attract firms from all over 
the world including firms formerly listed in the MM (Acrot et al., 2007). Today it is 
considered as one of the most popular secondary markets of the globe (Doukas and Hoque, 
2016). In fact, it acted as a blueprint for other light regulated markets such as the Nasdaq’s 
First North operating in the Nordic countries, the Mercado Alternativo operating in Spain 
and the NewConnect operating in Poland, among others. The US has also initiated discussion 
with regards to secondary markets61, highlighting the increased need for regulatory attention 
in these markets. 
Firms listed in the LSE often switch between the two markets. Firms that meet the 
eligibility criteria and pursue access to high analyst coverage and a larger investor pool move 
to the MM. This move is considered as a market upgrade and therefore perceived as good 
news by the market. In contrast, firms that seek to avoid the strict regulations and high costs 
of the MM switch to the AIM. However, this switch is characterized as a market downgrade 
triggering negative reaction in the market. These moves have been associated with abnormal 
announcement stock returns, and more specifically with positive announcement stock 
returns for the switches to the MM and negative announcement stock returns for the moves 
to the AIM (Jenkinson and Ramadorai, 2013; Campbell and Tabner, 2014).  
                                                 
61https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/need-for-greater-secondary-market-liquidity-for-small-
businesses.html#_edn33 
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The existence of these abnormal announcement stock returns creates a possibility for 
profit generation for individuals that are knowledgeable over the upcoming switches before 
they are publicly announced, a phenomenon that is well documented in other major corporate 
events (Eyssell and Arshadi, 1993; Holland and Hodgkinson, 1994; Jabbour et al., 2000; 
Dubow and Monteiro, 2006; King, 2009; Siganos and Papa, 2015). This forms my 
motivation for the first empirical chapter (Chapter 4) in which I examine whether individuals 
in possession of price sensitive information prior to the market switches use their information 
advantage against other investors in the market by leaking that information to other 
individuals. In order to explore this question, I examine the stock prices and trading volume 
during the pre-announcement period for the firms that switch from the AIM to the MM and 
vice versa.  
Following a standard event study methodology, I find price run-ups and abnormal trading 
volume approximately 60 trading days prior to the announcement of switches from the AIM 
to the MM and price reductions and abnormal trading volume circa 60 trading days prior to 
the announcement of the switches from the MM to the AIM. After controlling for several 
factors such as rumours or other major corporate announcement, I find that the market 
anticipation hypothesis may be valid, but it cannot fully explain the abnormal market 
reactions. This indicates that the abnormal prices could be attributed to the leakage of inside 
information prior to the transition announcements. In addition, employing panel regressions, 
I find a significant and contemporaneous relationship between the abnormal stock returns 
and the abnormal trading volume which is an additional sign in support of the information 
leakage hypothesis. I further match the switching firms with a sample of control firms that 
did not switch markets and I find a statistically significant difference in the abnormal stock 
returns of the two groups which confirms my earlier findings that firms switching between 
the two markets experience abnormal stock price reactions. 
Following my findings from Chapter 4, that suggest potential informational leakage prior 
to the market switches, I further assess whether corporate insiders trade on their own 
personal accounts prior to the events in order to generate profit. Thus, Chapter 5 is motivated 
by the fact that corporate insiders know about the forthcoming switches several months prior 
to the official announcements and therefore could adjust their trading strategies in the 
direction of their information, as it is evident in other major corporate events such as new 
issue announcements (Karpoff and Lee, 1991; Kahle, 2000), leveraged buyouts (Harlow and 
Howe, 1993), real estate investment appraisals (Damodaran and Liu, 1993)  and takeovers 
(Agrawal and Nasser, 2012). In order to document corporate insiders behaviour, I use three 
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different insider trading measures (the number of insider trades, the amount of shares traded 
and the value of shares traded) and separately examine the insiders’ purchases, insiders’ sales 
and insiders’ net purchases calculated as purchases minus sales. Using these three measures, 
I assess insiders’ trades relative to a time series benchmark, which compares the volume of 
trades during the pre-announcement period and a control period before the pre-
announcement period, and relative to a cross sectional benchmark which compares the 
sample firms with a set of a matched control firms. Finally, I use a difference in difference 
methodology that serves as a dual control taking into account both of the previous 
benchmarks.  
I find that corporate insiders decrease their purchases and increase their sales, effectively 
decreasing their net purchases six months prior to the switches from the MM to the AIM, in 
line with the active insider trading hypothesis. In addition, I find significant increases in net 
purchases one year prior to the public announcement of the moves from the AIM to the MM. 
However, the results appear to be weaker for the firms that upgrade from the AIM to the 
MM, which can be attributed to the lack of insider list in the AIM which could result to 
improper or poor recording of the insiders in the AIM firms and hence potentially missing 
disclosed insider trading data.  
Finally, motivated by the abnormal stock price actions and market abusive behaviours 
reported in the previous two empirical Chapters, in Chapter 6 I investigate potential ways 
that could assist in mitigating those phenomena. More specifically, I assess whether 
reputable Nomads are a useful tool against the abnormal pre-announcement price actions, as 
it is reported in the literature that reputable advisors provide higher quality services and 
reduce potential information asymmetries (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri, 1994; Golubov et al., 2012). In order to measure the reputation of the Nomads I 
follow Bushman et al. (2004) and Espenlaub et al. (2012) and create a composite variable 
ranking method that takes into account the unweighted average of five different 
measurements. The first measure is the Nomads market share in terms of new issues in the 
year prior to the switch, the second measure is the cumulative Nomads market shares in 
terms of new issues in the years prior to the switch, the third measure is  the Nomads market 
share in terms of proceeds a Nomad backed in the year before the firm market switch, the 
fourth measure is the cumulative market share in terms of proceeds a Nomad backed in the 
years before the firm market switch and the fifth measure is the Nomads age on the year 
prior to the switch. Finally, reputable Nomads are characterised those that belong in the top 
five decides of the composite variable. 
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I find that the reputable Nomads reduce the abnormal stock returns observed prior to the 
public announcement of the switches on both the switches from the AIM to the MM and 
from the MM to the AIM, highlighting that high quality decentralised regulators could assist 
in mitigating prohibited market behaviours. However, when the Nomads act also as brokers 
in the same firms the reductions on abnormal stock returns decreases or even disappear, 
indicating a potential conflict of interest between the interests of the board of the AIM firms 
they supervise and their obligations towards the LSE, due to the closer relationship between 
the AIM firms and the Nomads. The results are robust when controlling for different ranking 
deciles of the composite variable such as the top four, top three, top two and top one deciles. 
7.2 Implications of the study 
This study has several implications on both academics and practitioners. The first major 
implication of the study is that it fills the literature gap on the information leakage and insider 
trading studies. Prior literature focuses mostly on major and popular corporate events such 
as takeovers, SEOs and MBOs among others (e.g. John and Larry, 1991; Eyssell and 
Arshadi, 1993; Kahle, 2000; Jabbour et al., 2000; King, 2009; Agrawal and Nasser, 2012; 
Berkman et al. 2016) when it comes to insider trading and to leakage of inside information. 
In this thesis, I introduce a new corporate event which lacks focus by academics, yet it can 
trigger market abusive techniques. 
In addition, the study has several implications on regulators and policy makers as I 
highlight that the switches between a light, decentralized regulated market and a traditional 
regulated market could damage the integrity and stability of the markets by creating space 
for illegal and market abusive behaviours. The market cleanliness statistic that examines 
whether the UK markets are clean from insider trading in the UK, is measured mostly by 
taking into account takeovers or other significant trading announcements on the FTSE 350 
(Dubow and Monteiro, 2006; Monteiro, 2007; Goldman et al., 2014). This study suggests 
that the regulators should take a wider view on where insider trading might be lurking in 
order to protect their investors. Furthermore, by shading light on these corporate events, 
might have implications to market participants as they could potentially avoid falling victims 
of informed trading. 
Finally, this research provides further insights on the decentralized regulation of the light 
and exchange regulated markets (in the EU are also known as Multilateral Trading 
Facilities). Prior literature shows that reputable Nomads could increase the survivability of 
the AIM firms (Espenlaub et al., 2012) and that reputable advisors provide better information 
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about their firms (Titman and Trueman, 1986; Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994). I extend 
this literature by providing evidence that the reputable Nomads offer better advisory and 
regulatory services. This finding could have several implications on the exchanges or bodies 
that regulate the MTFs as they suggest that they should focus on attracting high quality and 
prestigious firms that can assist on improving the integrity and reputation of those markets. 
7.3 Limitations of the study 
The findings of this research should be considered in the context of the following caveats. 
First, the estimation and examination of the information leakage hypothesis is by definition 
limited as the methodology used cannot directly prove the existence of leakage of inside 
information or any other illegal activities prior to market switches. However, even though it 
has its limitations, it is the most reliable method to date used by academics (Keown and 
Pinkerton, 1981; Jabbour et al., 2000; King, 2009; Siganos and Papa, 2015), UK regulators 
(Dubow and Monteiro, 2006; Monteiro, 2007; Goldman et al., 2014) and oftentimes by the 
SEC in courts when they are in need of additional evidence to prove the guilt or innocence 
of individuals or firms accused for illegal insider trading (Mitchell and Netter, 1994). 
Second, this study assumes that all individuals that have access to private information are 
registered as corporate insiders. However, the disclosed data from corporate insiders, might 
only capture a percentage of insider trading prior to the market moves between the two UK 
markets, of which especially the insider sales could have been made due to liquidity needs 
rather than possession of inside information (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). In addition, as 
reported in the insider trading literature the most successful trades that use price sensitive 
information are those from the insiders that hide their existence from the market regulators 
managing to avoid detection (Pope et al., 1990). Hence, the limitation on the availability of 
disclosed data should be also taken into account as the study assumes that all director deals 
are reported to the LSE as required by law. 
Third, even though the market share measurement for reputable advisors is well 
established in the literature, (e.g. Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Rau, 2000; Kale et al., 2003; 
Fang, 2005; Ismail, 2010 Espenlaub et al., 2012) it only serves as a proxy of reputation or 
advisor quality as it cannot take into account the reputation of emploees working in the firms 
or corporate frauds such as scandals related to the advisory firms and fines imposed to the 
them (Karpoff and Lott Jr, 1993; Alexander, 1999). 
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7.4 Further work 
The market switches and especially the AIM is a fruitful area for research as it is relatively 
a new market with a unique decentralized regulatory system which has spawned the 
establishment of several secondary markets throughout the world. An extension of this 
research could be to examine whether a combination of a reputable Nomad along with a 
high-quality auditor, registrar and lawyer firms could further reduce the market abusive 
behaviours in the market. As there is evidence that solely reputable Nomads (Espenlaub et 
al., 2012; Gerakos et al., 2013), reputable advisors (Kale et al., 2003; Golubov et al., 2012) 
and big 4 auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Beatty, 1989; Willenborg, 1999) provide higher quality 
services, a research investigating this setup would give us a better understanding as to 
whether the qualities of several advisors and auditors synergize in order to provide a safer 
environment for investing and thus better quality services to investors.  
Another extension of this study could be the examination of the performance of the firms 
that switch from a low reputable Nomad to a high reputable Nomad and vice versa as this 
would shed light as to whether high quality Nomads assist in the performance of the firms 
they supervise. Prior literature reports the reputable advisors do not assist in the performance 
of their clients (Michel et al., 1991; McLaughlin, 1992; Servaes and Zenner, 1996), however 
since Nomads have a dual role, as they act as both regulators and advisors, a link between 
the performance of the firms and Nomads could be possible.  Finally, a further extension of 
this study could be an examination of the impact of the MAR on insider trading activities in 
the AIM market. This new stricter regulation was introduced in July 2016 and brought 
several changes in insider trading (for a detailed analysis of the changes brought by MAR, 
see section 3.2.1).  An examination as to whether stricter insider trading country laws work 
on light regulated markets would provide us with a better understanding on these markets.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Examples of illegal insider trading cases in the UK 
In this section I present some of the criminal sanctions that were achieved by the FCA during 
the previous years. In total the FCA has brought seventeen insider trading criminal sanction 
cases during the last ten years. The first criminal sanction in the UK occurred in 27th of 
March of 2009. The FCA found that Mr. Christopher McQuoid, counsel at TTP 
communications, shared inside information with his father in law Mr. James William 
Melbourne in order to generate profit. More specifically, in May of 2006 Mr. McQuoid was 
informed that Motorola was planning to takeover TTP, while two days before the takeover 
his father in law, Mr. Melbourne purchased 153,824 TTP shares at 13 pence per share. When 
the takeover was announced, the price soared at 45 pence per share creating a profit of 
£48,919.20 for Mr. Melbourne, who after three months he gave a cheque of £24,459.60 (half 
of the profit) to Mr. McQuoid. Mr. McQuoid was convicted for 8 months of imprisonment 
while his father in law was convicted for the same amount of time but suspended for 12 
months (Financial Times 31 March 2009; http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/ 
Library/Communication/PR/2009/042.shtml) 
In 28th of May of 2012, the FCA brought another significant case which involved the co-
operation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the US Department of Justice (DoJ) 
and the US SEC. Mr. Arnold McClellan, head of mergers and acquisitions advisory team at 
Deloitte in San Francisco, or his wife Mrs. Annabel McClellan, passed inside information 
about US takeovers in the NYSE and the NASDAQ exchanges to Mr. James Sanders, a 
director of Blue Index, and Mrs. Miranda Sanders, Annabel’s sister, who proceeded in 
insider dealing. Moreover, Mr. James Sanders shared that information to Mr. Swallow and 
encouraged clients of Blue Index to trade on the basis of this price sensitive information. 
The total profits earned by the defendants were £1.9 million while the total profits generated 
by Blue Index clients were £10.2 million. Mr. James Sanders was sentenced to four years’ 
imprisonment with a reduction of six months after pledging guilty while Mrs. Miranda 
Sanders and Mr. Swallow were both sentenced to 10 months in prison. Mrs. Annabel 
McClellan pleaded guilty and was fined for $1 million and sentenced to 1 month in prison 
without parole (Financial Times 28 May, 2012; Telegraph.co.uk 20 June, 2012; 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/060.shtml). 
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Another famous insider trading case was also occurred in 2012. Mr. Ali Mustafa along 
with his brother Mr. Ersin Mustafa, who were working on the printing facilities of UBS and 
JPMorgan Cazenove, were disclosing inside information about forthcoming takeovers bids 
to Mr. Pardip Saini, who then shared the data to Mr. Neten Shah, an accountant, Ms. Bijal 
Shah, the nephew of Mrs. Neten Shah and Mr. Truptesh Patel through drop box, making a 
combined profit of £732,044.59. Mr. Ali Mustafa, Mr. Pardip Saini and Mr. Paresh Shah 
were sentenced to 3 and a half years’ imprisonment, Mr. Truptesh Patel and Mr. Bijal Shah 
were sentenced to 2 years while Mrs. Neten Shah was sentenced to 18 months.  Mr Ersin 
Mustafa fled to the north part of Cyprus (which does not have an extradition treaty with the 
UK) before the trial as Judge Pegden mentioned (FT.com July 27, 2012; 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/pr/2012/080.shtml). 
The last example is one of the most famous UK cases with the higher sentence ever served 
in the UK. In 12th of May of 2016 Mr. Martyn Dodgson, a senior investment banker, and 
Mr. Andrew Hind, a Chartered Accountant, have been sentenced to 4.5 years and 3.5 years’ 
imprisonment, respectively. Mr. Martyn Dodgson was passing insider information to 
Andrew Hind who shared the information to wealthy individuals, Mr. Itaj Prvizi and Mr. 
Ben Anderson in order to trade. They made profit of millions of pounds. Mr. Itaj Privzi and 
Mr. Ben Anderosn were acquitted due to the fact that they didn’t know that the information 
from Mr. Andrew Hind was inside information (Financial Times 9 May, 2016; 
Bloomberg.com 28 June, 2016; https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/insider-dealers-
sentenced-operation-tabernula-trial). 
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Appendix 2: The main differences between the UK and the US insider trading 
regulations 
 
While in the UK the insider trading legislation was introduced in 1980 in the US it started 
decades earlier in 1933 with the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 through Section 16 (a) (b), Section 10(b) and rule Rule 10b-5. The two legislations 
serve the same purpose, which is to protect shareholders from market abusive techniques 
and to keep the markets free from fraud. However, the legislation differences between the 
two countries are major with the US following a stricter approach. The following table shows 
the main differences between the two countries. 
The main differences between the UK and the US insider trading legislations 
 UK US 
Year of insider law 
introduction 
1980 
(Companies Act of 1980) 
1933 
(Securities Act of 1933) 
Regulation body FCA SEC 
Insider definition 
Directors, executives, and any 
individual that has the power to 
make managerial decisions 
(Section 96b of FSMA) 
Directors, officers, key 
employees, shareholders with 
more than 10% of equity 
(Section 16 (a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934) 
Short swing profits 
prohibition 
No 
Yes 
(Section 16 (b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934) 
Close periods 
Yes 
(Model Code) 
No 
Disclosure period 
Up to 4 days 
(DTR 3) 
Up to 2 days 
(Section 16 (a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, after the 
amendment of SOX section 403) 
Penalties 
7 years of imprisonment and 
unlimited fine 
(Criminal Justice Act 1993) 
20 years of imprisonment, up to 
$5milion fine for individuals 
and up to $25 million for 
corporations 
(Section 32 (a), Securities Act of 
1934) 
This table reports the main differences between the UK and the US insider trading legislations. The differences 
are up to 2015. For the construction of the table I use legislation and regulatory handbooks provided by the 
LSE and the SEC websites. Close period is a rule that prohibits insider trading 60 days prior to yearly and 
interim earnings announcements and 30 days prior to quarterly results. Short swing profits is a rule that 
prohibits profits that are realised by insiders in their own company’s stocks in a period shorter that six months. 
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The main differences are the following: First, on the definition of the insider. According 
to section 16 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the US insiders are considered to 
be the officers, directors, shareholders with more than 10% equity and key employees while 
according section 96b of FSMA in the UK to are considered to be only the directors, 
executives and any individual that has the power to make managerial decisions (PDMRs). 
Second, on the notification period on which insiders must report their trades. According to 
section 16 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the US the insiders must report their 
trades to the SEC within up to 2 business days62 while under the DTR 3 in the UK the insiders 
must report their trades to the LSE within 4 days. Third, the US prohibits short-swing 
profits63 generated by corporate insiders in their own firm’s stock (Section 16 (b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934) while in the UK there is no legislation with regards to 
short swing profits. Fourth, in the UK applies the close periods (see section 3.5.1) while in 
the US there is not such restriction. 
Finally, and probably the most important difference, is in the level of insider laws 
enforcement. Under the section 32 (a) of the Securities Act of 1934, the penalties for 
engaging in illegal insider trading in the US are up to 20 years of imprisonment and/or fine 
up to $5 million for individuals and up to $25 million for corporations. According to the 
Criminal Justice Act of 1993, in the UK the penalties are 7 years of imprisonment and 
unlimited fine. In addition, the SEC has filed 1501 enforcement actions with regards to 
market abusive activities for the last 3 years (SEC enforcement results, 2015-2017) while 
the amount of FCA penalties imposed for the same period is 92 (FCA enforcement statistics, 
2015-2017). Hence, both the penalties and enforcement in the US are stricter compared to 
the ones in the UK which could make it easier for the UK corporate insiders to indulge in 
illegal profit temptations.  
  
                                                 
62 Prior to 2002 the disclosure period was up to 40 days, that is within 10 days of the month following 
the month of the execution of the trade (Persons, 1997; Fidrmuc et al., 2006). However, the section 
413 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 amended the section 16 (a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 requiring insiders to report their trades within two business days. 
63 Short-swing profits are the profits that are realised in a period shorter that six months. 
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Appendix 3: Examples of market switching announcements and their reasons for the 
switch 
Some examples of market switching announcements are presented below: 
1) Macau Property Opportunities Fund Limited (moving from the AIM to the MM) 
Macau Property Opportunities Fund Limited is pleased to announce that it intends to seek a 
Premium Listing of its ordinary shares on the Official List of the UK Listing Authority and 
admission to trading on the London Stock Exchange plc's Main Market for listed securities 
("Admission"). It is expected that Admission will occur during the second quarter of 2010. 
Collins Stewart Europe Limited will be acting as Sole Sponsor and Broker to the listing. The 
Board believes that a Premium Listing will bring about a number of potential benefits 
including greater share liquidity, enhanced market profile and a wider shareholder base, and 
will also offer the most appropriate platform for the continued development of the Company. 
In the longer term, there is also the added potential for the Company to enjoy the benefit of 
eligibility for inclusion in the FTSE AllShare Index. Further details of the Admission 
proposal, including the expected timetable, will be announced in due course. It is expected 
that a general meeting of the Company will be convened in order to seek shareholder 
approval for the Admission proposal, including the making of certain amendments to the 
Company's articles of association. 
2) Havelock Europa plc (moving from the MM to the AIM) 
The Company today announces its intention to seek the cancellation of the listing of its 
Ordinary Shares on the Official List and to apply for its Ordinary Shares to be admitted to 
trading on AIM. The Board believes that AIM is a more appropriate market for a company 
of Havelock's size and resources and that a transfer of the Ordinary Shares to trading on AIM 
should lead to lower ongoing costs associated with being a publicly quoted company and a 
simplification of the Company's administrative and regulatory requirements. The Board also 
believes that AIM will offer greater flexibility, particularly with regard to corporate 
transactions, and should therefore enable the Company to agree and execute certain 
transactions more quickly, if acquisitions or other opportunities arise in the future. The Board 
envisages no material alteration in the standards of reporting and governance which the 
Company maintains. The Company will today post a circular to its shareholders containing 
details of the Proposals. The circular explains the background to and reasons for the 
Proposals and contains a notice convening a General Meeting of shareholders to be held at 
the Company's offices at … on 1 July 2010, at which approval for the Proposals will be 
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sought. The last day of dealings in the Company's Ordinary Shares on the main market of 
the London Stock Exchange is expected to be 29 July 2010. The anticipated date of 
cancellation of the listing of the Company's Ordinary Shares on the Official List is on or 
around 8.00 a.m. on 30 July 2010, being not less than 20 business days following the 
expected date of approval of the Proposals by the Company's shareholders as required by the 
Listing Rules. Admission of the Ordinary Shares to AIM and commencement of dealings in 
the Ordinary Shares on AIM is expected to occur simultaneously with such cancellation, on 
or around 8.00 a.m. on 30 July 2010. 
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Appendix 4: Examples of rumours and other major corporate announcements 
Some examples of rumours prior to the official announcement of the market switches are 
presented below: 
1) Genus PLC rumours about their move to the MM on 8th of June 2006 in FT.  
The performance of its collection of prize bulls and boars helped Genus, the global animal 
genetics company to lift operating profit from £10.9m to £18.3 in the year to March. 
However, after exceptional changes – including goodwill amortisation on the acquisition last 
year of the much bigger Sygen International- pre-tax profit fell from £8.1m to £1.1m…. The 
company is also expected to move up from the AIM to the Official List. 
2) Minorplanet Systems rumours on their move to the MM on 12th of November 2001 in 
Sunday Telegraph hand collected through Nexis database.  
Shares in Minorplanet Systems, the supplier of satellite based systems, have almost 
halved this year falling as low as 172.5p in late September. The company is predicting a 
doubling in sales in the UK and mainland Europe next year to about 80m. It is expected to 
announce a move from the AIM to the Main Market in the next few weeks, which should 
help increase demand for shares. Buy. 
In addition, below are presented some examples of other major corporate announcements 
along with the market switches. Note that only the parts of interest of the announcements are 
presented. 
1) Mithril Capital PLC, now known as Be Heard Group PLC, announcement of acquisition 
of Agenda 21 Digital Holding Limited along with the announcement of the move to the AIM 
on 12th of October 2015: 
Mithril Capital PLC (LSE: MITH) announces that it has conditionally agreed to acquire 
the entire issued share capital of digital media agency Agenda 21 Digital Holding Limited 
(“Agenda 21”) (the “Acquisition”) in a reverse takeover. The company has requested an 
immediate suspension of trading in its shares and intends to cancel it listing on the Official 
List and seek re-admission of the Company’s shares to trading on AIM in due course. 
2) Dominion Energy PLC announcement of acquisition of Startup Station business and of 
the move to the AIM on 31st of March 2000:  
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The Company has agreed to acquire the business of Startup Station for a case 
consideration of £346,000 from Startup Holdings Limited…. The company has requested 
cancellation of its current listing on the Official List of the London Stock Exchange and has 
applied for its shares to be traded on AIM. Dealings are expected to commence following 
the EGM. The Directors believe that there are certain advantages to the admission to AIM. 
Companies quoted on AIM are deemed to be unlisted for the purposes of various areas of 
taxation law, and certain shareholders of such companies are able to enjoy various reliefs 
associated with, and investment in, certain qualifying unlisted companies, of which the 
Directors anticipate the Company will be one. In addition, AIM provides greater flexibility 
in issuing shares to fund future development. 
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Appendix 5: Initial list of Nominated Advisers used for the reputation measurement 
Albert E. Sharp Securities Cairn Financial Advisers LLP Deutsche Bank AG London 
Allenby Capital LTD Canaccord Genuity LTD Dolmen Securities LTD 
Altium Capital LTD Cantor Fitzgerald Europe Dowgate Capital Advisers LTD 
Ambrian Partners LTD Capital Ventures PLC Dresdner Kleinwort 
Apax Partners & Co Cazenove & Co Dresdner Kleinwort Benson 
Arbuthnot Securities LTD CCF Charterhouse Corporate Durlacher LTD 
Arden Partners LTD Cenkos Securities PLC English Trust Co. LTD 
ARM Corporate Finance LTD Charles Stanley Securities Ermgassen & Co LTD 
Arthur Andersen Charterhouse Securities Ernst & Young LLP 
Barclays de Zoete Wedd LTD Citigroup Global Markets UK Equity LTD Evolution Securities LTD 
Beaumont Cornish LTD City Financial Associates LTD Fairfax I.S. LTD 
Beeson Gregory LTD Close Brothers Corporate Finance LTD finnCap LTD 
Bell Lawrie White & Co Coopers & Lybrand Corporate Finance Fox-Davies Capital LTD 
Blomfield Corporate Finance LTD Corporate Synergy PLC Fox-Pitt, Kelton LTD 
BOfA Merrill Lynch Credit Lyonnais Securities Gerrand Vivian Gray LTD 
Brewin Dolphin Securities LTD Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) LTD Goodbody Corporate Finance LTD 
Bridgewell LTD Daniel Stewart & Company PLC Grant Thornton UK LLP 
British Linen Bank (The) Davy Corporation Granville Baird LTD 
Brown Shipley & Co LTD Dawnay, Day Corporate Finance LTD Granville Davies 
Butterfield Securities Deloitte & Touche LLP Greig Middleton & Co. LTD 
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Guinness Mahon & Co LTD John East & Partners LTD Nabarro Wells & Co. LTD 
Hanson Westhouse LLP Johnson Fry Securities NCB Stockbrokers LTD 
Hawkpoint Partners LTD JPMorgan Cazenove LTD Neill Clerk Capital LTD 
HB – Corporate Kaupthing Singer & Friedlander NM Rothschild & Sons LTD 
Henderson Crosthwaite Corporate Finance KBC Peel Hunt LTD Noble & Company LTD 
Henry Ansbacher & Co LTD Kennedy Gee Corporate Finance Nomura Code Securities LTD 
Henry Cooke Corporate Finance KPMG LLP Northland Capital Partners LTD 
Hichens Harrison and Co Landsbanki Securities (UK) LTD Nplus1 Singer Advisory LLP 
Hoare Govett LTD Lazard & Co. LTD Numerica Capital Markets LTD 
HSBC Investment Bank Lazard Asset Management Numis Securities LTD 
ING Bank N.V. Lehman Brothers Europe LTD Old Mutual Securities 
Insinger de Beaufort Libertas Capital Corporate Finance LTD Old Park Lane Capital PLC 
Insinger Townsley Liberum Capital LTD Oriel Securities LTD 
Investec Bank (UK) LTD Macquarie Capital (Europe) LTD Panmure Gordon (UK) LTD 
Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Marshall Securities LTD Pelham Bell Pottinger 
J Henry Schroder & Co LTD Matrix Corporate Capital LTD Piper Jaffray LTD 
J M Finn & Co Merchant John East Securities PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP 
J&E Davy Merchant Securities LTD Raphael Zorn Hemsley LTD 
Jefferies International LTD Merrill Lynch International Rathbone Neilson Cobbold 
JMFinn Capital Markets LTD Morgan Stanley & Co International LTD RBC Capital Markets 
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RBC Europe LTD Ruegg & Co LTD SVS Securities 
RBS Hoare Govett LTD Sanlam Securities UK LTD Teather & Greenwood LTD 
Rea Brothers LTD SBC Warburg Dillon Read Townsley & Co 
Religare Capital Markets (UK) Seymour Pierce LTD UBS Investment Bank LTD 
Renaissance Capital LTD SG Securities (London) LTD USB LTD 
RFC Ambrian Group LTD Shore Capital & Corporate LTD W.H. Ireland LTD 
RFC Corporate Finance LTD Singer Capital Markets LTD Westhouse Securities LTD 
Robert Fleming & Co. LTD Smith & Williamson Corporate Finance LTD WestLB AG 
Robert W. Baird LTD Societe Generale Strauss Turnbull WestLB Panmure LTD 
Rowan Dartington & Co LTD Solomon Hare LLP William de Broe PLC 
Royal Bank of Canada Europe LTD SP Angel Corporate Finance LLP ZAI Corporate Finance LTD 
RP&C International LTD SPARK Advisory Partners Zeus Capital LTD 
RSM Robson Rhodes Corporate Finance Strand Partners LTD  
This table provides the initial list of Nomads used for the construction of the reputable Nomad composite variable in alphabetical order. Since Nomads may change name during their life-
time, the list reports only the last name of the Nomads. The data are retrieved for the “New issues and IPO summary” spreadsheet provided by the LSE website. Any missing data are hand 
collected using the annual reports of the AIM firms which were downloaded through the Perfect Information database. 
 
